Plagio di lettera da parte di un breve saggio: “The Kindest” in Larson v. Dorland Perry

La corte del Massachussets 14.09.2023 n. Case 1:19-cv-10203-IT, larson v. Dorland Perry, (segnalato e linkato dal prof. Edward Lee su X ).

Qui la peculiarità fattuale è che il lavoro plagiario si è evoluto in tre versioni, sempre più lontane dal lavoro originale.

Sulla substantial similarity : <<“Substantial similarity is an elusive concept, not subject to precise definition.” Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988). The inquiry is a “sliding scale”: If there are many ways to express a particular idea, then the burden of proof on  the plaintiff to show substantial similarity is lighter. Id. at 606-07. Here, there are many ways to write a letter, even one dealing specifically with kidney donations. Larson Mem. SJ, Ex. 8 [Doc. No. 189-8] (examples of sample letters from organ donors/family members of organ donors to recipients); Id., Ex. 1 ¶ 7 (Larson Aff.) [Doc. No. 189-1]>>.

Sulle parti non originali:

<<However, “[n]o infringement claim lies if the similarity between two works rests necessarily on non-copyrightable aspects of the original—for example, ‘the underlying ideas, or expressions that are not original with the plaintiff.’” TMTV, Corp. v. Mass. Prods., Inc., 645 F.3d 464, 470 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). “[I]t is only when ‘the points of dissimilarity not only exceed the points of similarity, but indicate that the remaining points of similarity are (within the context of plaintiff’s work) of minimal importance either quantitatively or qualitatively, [that] no infringement results.’” Segrets, Inc., 207 F.3d at 66. “‘The test is whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible expression by taking material of substance and value.’” Id. at 62. “While summary judgment for a plaintiff on these issues is unusual,” it may be warranted based on the factual record. Id.; accord T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 112 (1st Cir. 2006)>>.

Sui dati fattuali sostenenti il giudizio di accertato plagio nella prima versione:

<<The 2016 Brilliance Audio Letter.8 As Larson concedes, the undisputed evidence mandates a conclusion that the 2016 Letter is substantially similar to the Dorland Letter. The Dorland Letter is approximately 381 words long, Dorland Mem. SJ, Ex. C [Doc. No. 181-3]; of those 381 words, the 2016 Letter copies verbatim approximately 100, and closely paraphrases approximately 50 more, Larson Mem. SJ, Appendix I [Doc. No. 193-1]. Many of these verbatim or near-verbatim lines gave the Dorland Letter its particular character, including: “My gift…trails no strings”; “I [focused/channeled] [a majority of] my [mental] energ[y/ies] into imagining and celebrating you”; “I accept any level of involvement,…even if it is none”; “To me the suffering of strangers is just as real”; and “I [wasn’t given/didn’t have] the opportunity to form secure attachments with my family of origin.” Id. The 2016 Letter also follows an identical structure to the Dorland Letter: a paragraph introducing the donor, including information on race, age, and gender; a paragraph explaining how the donor discovered the need for kidney donation; a paragraph explaining the donor’s traumatic childhood; a paragraph expressing the donor’s focus on the future recipient; a paragraph wishing the recipient health and happiness; and a concluding paragraph expressing a desire to meet. Id. Based on the documents before the court, the 2016 Letter took “material of substance and value” from the Dorland Letter in such a quantity and in such a manner that the points of similarity outweigh the points of dissimilarity. See Segrets, Inc., 207 F.3d at 62, 66.>>

Con analitico esame ravvisa comunque fair use.

Il giudice esclude tortiuous interference nelle continue dichiaraizoni dell’asserito plagiato verso le contriopati contrattiuali dell’asserito plagiante

Esclude anche che ricorra diffamazione.

Andy Wharol e la sua elaborazione della fotografia di Prince scattata da Lynn Goldsmith: per la decisione della Corte Suprema non c’è fair use

Supreme Court US n. 21-869 del 18 maggio 2023, ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL ARTS, INC. v. GOLDSMITH ET AL.  decide l’oggetto.

Decide uno dei temi più importanti del diritto di autore, che assai spesso riguarda opere elaboranti opere precedenti.

Qui riporto il sillabo e per esteso: in sostanza l’esame della SC si appunta solo sul primo elemento dei quattro da conteggiare per decidere sul fair use (In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include : (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; ), 17 US code § 107.

<< The “purpose and character” of AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph in commercially licensing Orange Prince to Condé Nast does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Pp. 12–38.
AWF contends that the Prince Series works are “transformative,”and that the first fair use factor thus weighs in AWF’s favor, because the works convey a different meaning or message than the photograph. But the first fair use factor instead focuses on whether an allegedlyinfringing use has a further purpose or different character, which is amatter of degree, and the degree of difference must be weighed againstother considerations, like commercialism. Although new expression, meaning, or message may be relevant to whether a copying use has asufficiently distinct purpose or character, it is not, without more, dis-positive of the first factor. Here, the specific use of Goldsmith’s photograph alleged to infringe her copyright is AWF’s licensing of OrangePrince to Condé Nast. As portraits of Prince used to depict Prince inmagazine stories about Prince, the original photograph and AWF’s copying use of it share substantially the same purpose. Moreover, AWF’s use is of a commercial nature. Even though Orange Prince adds new expression to Goldsmith’s photograph, in the context of the challenged use, the first fair use factor still favors Goldsmith. Pp. 12–27.
The Copyright Act encourages creativity by granting to the creator of an original work a bundle of rights that includes the rights toreproduce the copyrighted work and to prepare derivative works. 17
S. C. §106. Copyright, however, balances the benefits of incentives to create against the costs of restrictions on copying. This balancingact is reflected in the common-law doctrine of fair use, codified in §107,which provides: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” To determine whether a particular use is “fair,” the statute enumerates four factors to be considered. The factors “set forth general principles, the application of which requires judicial balancing, depending upon relevant circumstances.” Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U. S. ___, ___.
The first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes,” §107(1), considers the reasons for, and nature of, the copier’s use of an original work. The central question it asks is whether the use “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation . . . (supplanting the original), or instead adds something new, with afurther purpose or different character.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 579 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As most copying has some further purpose and many secondary works add something new, the first factor asks “whether and to what extent” the use at issue has a purpose or character different from the original. Ibid. (emphasis added). The larger the difference, the morelikely the first factor weighs in favor of fair use. A use that has a further purpose or different character is said to be “transformative,” but that too is a matter of degree. Ibid. To preserve the copyright owner’s right to prepare derivative works, defined in §101 of the Copyright Act to include “any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed,or adapted,” the degree of transformation required to make “transformative” use of an original work must go beyond that required to qualify as a derivative.
The Court’s decision in Campbell is instructive. In holding that parody may be fair use, the Court explained that “parody has an obvious claim to transformative value” because “it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.” 510 U. S., at 579. The use at issue was 2 Live Crew’s copying of Roy Orbison’s song, “Oh, Pretty Woman,” to create a rap derivative, “Pretty Woman.” 2 Live Crew transformed Orbison’s song by adding new lyrics and musical elements, such that “Pretty Woman” had adifferent message and aesthetic than “Oh, Pretty Woman.” But that did not end the Court’s analysis of the first fair use factor. The Court found it necessary to determine whether 2 Live Crew’s transformationrose to the level of parody, a distinct purpose of commenting on theoriginal or criticizing it. Further distinguishing between parody and satire, the Court explained that “[p]arody needs to mimic an originalto make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.” Id., at 580–581. More generally, when “commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, . . . the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.” Id., at 580.
Campbell illustrates two important points. First, the fact that a use is commercial as opposed to nonprofit is an additional element of the first fair use factor. The commercial nature of a use is relevant, but not dispositive. It is to be weighed against the degree to which the use has a further purpose or different character. Second, the first factor relates to the justification for the use. In a broad sense, a use that has a distinct purpose is justified because it furthers the goal of copyright,namely, to promote the progress of science and the arts, without diminishing the incentive to create. In a narrower sense, a use may be justified because copying is reasonably necessary to achieve the user’s new purpose. Parody, for example, “needs to mimic an original to make its point.” Id., at 580–581. Similarly, other commentary or criticism that targets an original work may have compelling reason to “conjure up” the original by borrowing from it. Id., at 588. An independent justification like this is particularly relevant to assessing fairuse where an original work and copying use share the same or highly similar purposes, or where wide dissemination of a secondary work would otherwise run the risk of substitution for the original or licensedderivatives of it. See, e.g., Google, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).
In sum, if an original work and secondary use share the same orhighly similar purposes, and the secondary use is commercial, the first fair use factor is likely to weigh against fair use, absent some other justification for copying. Pp. 13–20.
The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fairwhen used for one purpose but not another. See Campbell, 510 U. S., at 585. Here, Goldsmith’s copyrighted photograph has been used in multiple ways. The Court limits its analysis to the specific use allegedto be infringing in this case—AWF’s commercial licensing of Orange Prince to Condé Nast—and expresses no opinion as to the creation, display, or sale of the original Prince Series works. In the context of Condé Nast’s special edition magazine commemorating Prince, the purpose of the Orange Prince image is substantially the same as thatof Goldsmith’s original photograph. Both are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince. The use also is of a commercial nature. Taken together, these two elements counsel against fair use here. Although a use’s transformativeness may outweigh its commercial character, in this case both point in the same direction. That does not mean that all of Warhol’s derivative works, nor all uses of them, give rise to the same fair use analysis. Pp. 20–27.
AWF contends that the purpose and character of its use of Goldsmith’s photograph weighs in favor of fair use because Warhol’s silkscreen image of the photograph has a different meaning or message. By adding new expression to the photograph, AWF says, Warhol madetransformative use of it. Campbell did describe a transformative use as one that “alter[s] the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.” 510 U. S., at 579. But Campbell cannot be read to mean that §107(1) weighs in favor of any use that adds new expression, meaning, or message. Otherwise, “transformative use” would swallow the copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works, asmany derivative works that “recast, transfor[m] or adap[t]” the original, §101, add new expression of some kind. The meaning of a secondary work, as reasonably can be perceived, should be considered to the extent necessary to determine whether the purpose of the use is distinct from the original. For example, the Court in Campbell considered the messages of 2 Live Crew’s song to determine whether the song hada parodic purpose. But fair use is an objective inquiry into what a user does with an original work, not an inquiry into the subjective intent of the user, or into the meaning or impression that an art critic or judge draws from a work.
Even granting the District Court’s conclusion that Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic, that difference must be evaluatedin the context of the specific use at issue. The purpose of AWF’s recent commercial licensing of Orange Prince was to illustrate a magazine about Prince with a portrait of Prince. Although the purpose could bemore specifically described as illustrating a magazine about Prince with a portrait of Prince, one that portrays Prince somewhat differently from Goldsmith’s photograph (yet has no critical bearing on her photograph), that degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF, given the specific context and commercial nature of the use. To hold otherwise might authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs to be used for purposes that are substantially the sameas those of the originals.
AWF asserts another related purpose of Orange Prince, which is tocomment on the “dehumanizing nature” and “effects” of celebrity. No doubt, many of Warhol’s works, and particularly his uses of repeated images, can be perceived as depicting celebrities as commodities. But even if such commentary is perceptible on the cover of Condé Nast’s tribute to “Prince Rogers Nelson, 1958–2016,” on the occasion of the man’s death, the asserted commentary is at Campbell’s lowest ebb: It “has no critical bearing on” Goldsmith’s photograph, thus the commentary’s “claim to fairness in borrowing from” her work “diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish).” Campbell, 510 U. S., at 580. The commercial nature of the use, on the other hand, “loom[s] larger.” Ibid. Like satire that does not target an original work, AWF’s asserted commentary “can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification forthe very act of borrowing.” Id., at 581. Moreover, because AWF’s copying of Goldsmith’s photograph was for a commercial use so similar to the photograph’s typical use, a particularly compelling justification is needed. Copying the photograph because doing so was merely helpfulto convey a new meaning or message is not justification enough. Pp.28–37.
(c) Goldsmith’s original works, like those of other photographers, areentitled to copyright protection, even against famous artists. Such protection includes the right to prepare derivative works that transform the original. The use of a copyrighted work may nevertheless be fair if, among other things, the use has a purpose and character that is sufficiently distinct from the original. In this case, however, Goldsmith’s photograph of Prince, and AWF’s copying use of the photograph in an image licensed to a special edition magazine devoted to Prince, share substantially the same commercial purpose. AWF has offered no other persuasive justification for its unauthorized use of thephotograph. While the Court has cautioned that the four statutory fairuse factors may not “be treated in isolation, one from another,” but instead all must be “weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright,” Campbell, 510 U. S., at 578, here AWF challenges only the Court of Appeals’ determinations on the first fair use factor, and theCourt agrees the first factor favors Goldsmith. P. 38 >>

Per quanto elevata la creatività di Wharol, non si può negare che egli si sia appoggiato a quella della fotografa.

Da noi lo sfruttamento dell’opera elaborata, pe quanto creativa questa sia,  sempre richiede il consenso del titolare dell’opera base (a meno che il legame tra le due sia evanescente …).

Decisione a maggioranza, con opinione dissenziente di Kagan cui si è unito Roberts. Dissenso assai articolato, basato soprattutto sul ravvisare uso tranformative e sul ridurre l’importanza dello sfruttamento economico da parte di Wharol. Riporto solo questo :

<<Now recall all the ways Warhol, in making a Prince portrait from the Goldsmith photo, “add[ed] something new, with a further purpose or different character”—all the wayshe “alter[ed] the [original work’s] expression, meaning, [and] message.” Ibid. The differences in form and appearance, relating to “composition, presentation, color palette, and media.” 1 App. 227; see supra, at 7–10. The differences in meaning that arose from replacing a realistic—and indeed humanistic—depiction of the performer with an unnatural, disembodied, masklike one. See ibid. The conveyance of new messages about celebrity culture and itspersonal and societal impacts. See ibid. The presence of, in a word, “transformation”—the kind of creative building that copyright exists to encourage. Warhol’s use, to be sure, had a commercial aspect. Like most artists, Warhol did not want to hide his works in a garret; he wanted to sell them.But as Campbell and Google both demonstrate (and as further discussed below), that fact is nothing near the showstopper the majority claims. Remember, the more trans-formative the work, the less commercialism matters. See Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579; supra, at 14; ante, at 18 (acknowledging the point, even while refusing to give it any meaning). The dazzling creativity evident in the Prince portrait might not get Warhol all the way home in the fair-use inquiry; there remain other factors to be considered and possibly weighed against the first one. See supra, at 2, 10,
14. But the “purpose and character of [Warhol’s] use” of the copyrighted work—what he did to the Goldsmith photo, in service of what objects—counts powerfully in his favor. He started with an old photo, but he created a new new thing>>.

Fair use nel software: la sentenza di appello in Apple v. Corellium

L’appello dell’11 circuito 8 maggio 2023, Apple v. Corellium, Case: 21-12835, decide un interessante caso di fair use nel software.

Si tratta del sftw CORSEC per simulare il sistema operativo iOS di Apple anche su macchine android.

La corte di appello conferma il fair use, dati i benefici per la collettività di tale sftw.

<< Like Google Books, CORSEC adds new features to copyrighted works. CORSEC allows re-searchers to visualize in real time iOS’s processes, freeze those pro-cesses and study them for as long as they need to, step backward and forward in time at will to closely monitor system activity, and run multiple experiments from the same starting point. CORSEC also adds file and app browsers. There’s no dispute that these fea-tures assist researchers and enable them to do their work in new ways. Corellium has thus “augment[ed] public knowledge by mak-ing available information about [iOS].” Id. at 207; see also A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that copying student assignments into a database to detect plagiarism was “transformative” because the database’s “use of [the students’] works had an entirely different function and pur-pose than the original works”); Perfect 10, Inc. v., Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Google image search’s “use of thumbnails [was] highly transformative” because the “use of the images served a different function” than the original pictures by “improving access to information on the internet ver-sus artistic expression” (cleaned up)); Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a PlayStation emulator was “modestly transformative” because the emulator “create[d] a new platform, the personal computer, on which consumers can play games designed for the Sony PlayStation”) >>.

Apple solleva tre obieizoni, rigettate dalla Corte.

<<Against all this, Apple advances three arguments—all unpersuasive.

First, Apple argues that “making verbatim copies of a cop-yrighted work and converting [those works] into a different format is not transformative.” Apple is right. In Patton, for example, we found no transformative use where “verbatim copies of portions of . . . original books . . . ha[d] merely been converted into a digital format.” 769 F.3d at 1262. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not transformative to convert copyrighted songs from CDs to MP3 files for download because the “original work[s] [were] merely retransmitted in a different medium.” See A&M Recs., Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
But this isn’t a case in which the original is simply repack-aged in a different format. Corellium adds several features that are not normally available on iOS. These include (1) the ability to see and halt running processes; (2) the ability to modify the kernel; (3) CoreTrace, a tool to view system calls; (4) an app browser; (5) a file browser; and (6) the ability to take live snapshots. They also include, for example, the ability to modify the trust cache so that researchers can install new programs on the device that allow the user to perform fuzzing (a way to find bugs in a product’s code) or other types of security research. The record, in other words, shows that there wasn’t verbatim copying here. And even if there were, Patton itself recognized that “verbatim copying may be transform-ative so long as the copy serves a different function than the origi-nal work.” 769 F.3d at 1262. Here, Corellium used iOS to serve a research function, and not as a consumer electronic device.
Second, Apple contends that “[s]ecurity research is not a transformative purpose because it is one of the purposes already served by Apple’s works.” Apple says that “security researchers have long used Apple-licensed versions of iOS to do their work.” Corellium (in our view) rightly points out the flaw in this argu-ment: it’s “like saying Google Books was not transformative be-cause scholars could manually search books for keywords by going to the library.” In other words, there’s no dispute that CORSEC “adds features that are not available on retail iOS that are useful for security research.” These features make security research far more efficient. See Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting “the transformative purpose of en-hancing efficiency”). They also make possible deeper insights into the software. The fact that iOS itself allowed for some security re-search before, then, can’t negate Corellium’s innovation (just like sifting through books at the library didn’t negate Google Books’s transformativeness).
Third, Apple asserts that “the district court was wrong to find—on summary judgment—that the purpose of [CORSEC] is security research.” For this, Apple mostly points to evidence show-ing that customers can use CORSEC for multiple purposes. For example, Corellium’s expert testified that security research wasn’t CORSEC’s “exclusive use.” But transformativeness does not re-quire unanimity of purpose—or that the new work be entirely dis-tinct—because works rarely have one purpose. In assessing whether a work is transformative, the question has always been “whether a [transformative use] may reasonably be perceived.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 (emphasis added) (finding that a parody was transformative even though both a song and its parody serve the same function of entertainment). We don’t ask whether the new product’s only purpose is transformative.
The Supreme Court made this point in Google. In that case, Google used Java’s code “for the same reason that [Oracle] created those portions, namely, to enable programmers [to use shortcuts] that would accomplish particular tasks.” Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1203. But, at a higher level, the purpose was to create a “new product [that] offer[ed] programmers a highly creative and innovative tool for a smartphone environment.” Id. This higher-order purpose was what made Google’s product transformative. Id. As in Google, the mere fact that some purposes overlap does not pre-clude a finding of transformative use >>

Editori contro Internet Archive: sentenza della corte newyorkese sul fair use relativo alla digitalizzazione di libri cartacei

Distretto Sud di New York 24 marzo 2023, 20-cv-4160 (JGK), Hachette ed altri c. Internet Archive ed altri.

Interne Archive , non profit, durante la pandemia digitalizzò 127 libri cartacei di 4 editori e li mise on line. Questi agiscono in giudizio per violaizone di diritto di autore.

La difesa di IA consistette solo nell’eccezione di  fair use (17 us code § 107).

Eccezione rigettata però.

Tra i punti più interessanti:

i) la differenza rispetto al caso Google Books (che pure digitalizza libri cartacei), ove fu ravvisato transformative use, sub A.1, pp. 19-20.

ii) l’aver ravvisato profit indiretto, anche se l’associazione è non profit, sub A.2 p. 26 ss

Protezione del personaggio di fantasia col diritto d’autore: la sentenza di appello conferma il Tribunale nel caso Clint Eastwood c. Rango

Con post 2.6.2021 avevo dato conto della setnenza di primo grado Trib. Roma 16.04.2021 che rigettava la domanda del produttore de <Per un pugno di dollari>.

Ora è stata emanata la sentenza di appello App. Roma n. 5432/2022, RG 6935/2021, rel. Romandini, che conferma il primo grado , ricalcandone la motivaizone.

Conferma che nel famoso film, riprodotto in minima misura (un minuto o poco più) in particolare nel suo personaggio più noto <L’uomo denza nome> (C. EAstwood) , il personaggio non è tutelabile perchè non disgiungibile dall’attore che lo impersonifica (C. Eastwood appunto).

Il quesito centrale, secondo il tribunale  cui aderisce la CdA,  sarebbe questo: <<La questione, tuttavia, attiene nel caso di specie, come in modo condivisibile spiegato dal
Giudice di prime cure, alla verifica se il personaggio “l’uomo senza nome”, non più comparso in
alcuna ulteriore opera cinematografica al di fuori dei lungometraggi costituente la c.d. “trilogia
del dollaro”, presenti profili pur minimi della creatività o piuttosto non costituisca “la
rielaborazione personale e non evolutiva (bensì contestualizzata nel mondo western) da parte
di Sergio Leone di prototipi noti alla narrazione letteraria e cinematografica e non ha acquisito
una penetrazione ovvero una permanenza nel pubblico , nella critica cinematografica o nelle

successive opere, così da renderlo qualificabile come opera creativa ed identificabile come tale>>.

Non so se sia esatta la valutazione: bisognerebbe provare a realizzare un  corto con altro attore, ma uguale tutto il resto.

In ogni caso, questo aspetto (disgiungibilità) nella disciplina della proteggibilità del personaggio è importante.

Errata invece l’affermazione per cui la risposta al quesito è questione di fatto (<<Il Tribunale ha optato per la seconda soluzione. Si tratta, dunque, di una valutazione in punto di fatto operata che appare alla Corte, peraltro,
sorretta da adeguata e coerente motivazione
>>): solo i fatti storici rientrano in essa, mentre il loro inquadramento nel concetto di creatività è giudizio in diritto.

La corte qualifica la brevità di riproduzione come <pura volontà di citazionismo … più che altro per rendere omaggio all’attore ed ad regista Sergio Leone >>. Affermazione assai dubbia, parendo invece voler riprodurre per lucrare, anche se abilmente riducendo il tempo per ridurre i rischi di violazione (difettano i requisiti dell’art. 70 l. aut.).

Significativa anche la discussione sull’eccezione di citazione, condotta però con motivazione non molto appfofondita . E’ invece giusta la critica di uso poco o nulla sorvegliato del termine fair use da parte del Trib.

V. il collage riportato da Girardello con post in IpKat 12.09.2022

e poi il video di RAngo, con link sempre offerto dal medesimo autore.

Copyright, fair use, diritto di parola e diritto vs. la piattaforma di conoscere il soggetto che diffonde anonimamente post satirici

Chi carica post vagamente satirici con fotografie ritraenti un private-equity billionaire in comapgian di ragazze, compie delle stesse un fair use, quindi non rientrante nel copyright sulle foto stesse.

Ne segue che il diritto di far cadere l’anonimato non gli spetta,   perchè <<has not made out a prima facie case of copyright infringement>>, secondo l’interprteazione del § 512.h DMCA “Subpoena To Identify Infringer”.

E’ del resto chiaro che i sei tweet satirici ACCOMPAFGNATORI DELLE FOto,  erano espressione del diritto di parola/critica: << The six tweets flagged by Bayside are best interpreted as vaguely satirical commentary criticizing the opulent lifestyle of wealthy investors generally (and Brian Sheth, specifically). For example, one tweet reads: “Good morning from Mrs. Brian Sheth #2. Life is good when you’re a 44-year old private equity billionaire.” The tweet accuses Brian Sheth of having a mistress and links his infidelity to the broader class of “private equity billionaires,” suggesting that wealth (or working in private equity) corrupts. Unmasking MoneyBags thus risks exposing him to “economic or official retaliation” by Sheth or his associates. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995). And MoneyBags’s interest in anonymity is heightened further by his other tweets, which discuss issues of political importance such as sexual harassment, tax enforcement, and corporate regulations>> (Brian Seth è il milionario e Bayside il soggetto reclamante diritto di autore sulle foto, forse ricollegabile allo stesso Seth).

Così il distretto nord della California 21 giugno 2022, Case 4:20-mc-80214-VC , IN RE DMCA § 512(H) SUBPOENA TO TWITTER, INC., di cui dà notizia in un’inteessante fattispecie all’intersezione tra copyright , privacy e diritto di parola.

Riprodurre giornalisticamente uno screenshot di articolo di giornale e di fotografia ivi presente può essere lecito per fair use?

Dice di si la corte di appello del 2 circuito 29.03.2022, Yang c. Mic Network, 20-4097-cv(L), confermando il primo grado: ricorrono infatti i requisiti previsti dal 17 U.S. Code § 107.

Fatto: < Stephen Yang sues Mic Network Inc. (“Mic”) for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. The copyright at issue protects a photograph of Dan Rochkind taken by Yang and licensed to the New York Post for its article Why I Won’t Date Hot Women Anymore. Yang alleges that Mic, without obtaining a license, used a digital screenshot of the Post article—including its headline and a
portion of the photograph of Rochkind—as the banner image of its article Twitter Is Skewering the ‘New York Post’ for a Piece on Why a Man ‘Won’t Date Hot Women’.

Il diritto azionato è dunque quello di autore su fotografia.

Da noi tale riproduzine si collocherebbe probabilmente tra il diritto di informazione e la satira

L’articolo dell’editore  Mic dovrebbe essere questo .

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman, ove pure riproduzione dello screenshot)

Copiare da un forum ad un altro threads, contenenti post diffamatori e soggetti a copyright, non preclude il safe harbour e costituisce fair use

Copiare post (anzi interi threads) da un forum ad un altro (in occasione ed anzi a causa di cambio di policy nel 2017) non impedisce la fruzione del safe harbour ex 230 CDA in caso di post diffamatori ; inoltre, quanto al copyright , costituisce fair use.

così il l’appello del primo circuito conferma il primo grado con sentenza 10.03.2022, caso n. 21-1146, Monsarrat v. Newman.

Quanto al § 230 CDA, il giudizio è esatto.

La prima piattaforma era LiveJournals, controllata dalla Russia; quella destinataria del trasferimento (operato da un moderatore) è Dreamwidth.

(sentenza a link alla stessa dal blog del profl Eric Goldman)

Copyright su personaggi in 3D, fair use e counterclaim per misrepresentations ex § 512.d DMCA

Interessante caso di violazione di diritto di autore su personaggi animati in 3D, regolarmente registrati (come da diritto usa) deciso dal Distretto nord della California, 25.02.2022, Case 3:21-cv-06536-EMC, Moonbug c. Babybus.  La sentenza riporta  esempi grafici a colori messi a paragone.

La domanda di violazine viene contrastata con l’eccezione di fair use e conseguemente di abuso dello strumento di notice and take down (misrepresentations), previsto dalla norma di cui al titolo.

La somiglianza dei personaggi è notevole.

Il fair use non è concesso: <In sum, none of the four fair use factors tip in Babybus’s favor. Indeed, the first, second and fourth factors weigh decisively against Babybus. And, as to the third factor, despite the fact that Babybus already amended its affirmative defenses once and the Court provided Babybus with two opportunities to supplement the record with examples of videos that support its fair use defense after this motion was fully briefed and argued, Babybus still has not presented any arguments and allegations that tip the third factor in its favor. Even if the Court were to overlook Babybus’s failure to do so despite multiple opportunities, and assumed arguendo that Babybus could allege facts indicating that its copying was insubstantial, that would merely demonstrate one factor tips towards Babybus. Any such hypothetical showing would still be outweighed by the fact that the other three factors weigh conclusively against Babybus. Accordingly, the Court strikes Babybus’s fair use defense because it is implausible

Di conseguenza pure l’illecito da misrepresetnations a Youtube è negato, pur dopo approfondito esame delle allegazini del convenuto: Babybus fails to allege any specific misrepresentations in Moonbug’s DMCA takedown notices in its supplemental filings and identification of six exemplary videos. Cf. Docket No. 56,
63. It simply relies on the argument that Moonbug’s DMCA notices fail on the merits of their assertions of infringement because “there are no protectable similarities in protectable elements between these videos and the videos in Moonbug’s catalogue.” Docket No. 63 at 3. The claims of copyright infringement were not frivolous. Thus, Babybus’s allegations do not plausibly demonstrate the first element of its § 512(f) counterclaim that Moonbug made material misrepresentations in its DMCA takedown notices filed with YouTube

Riproduzione parziale di opera letteraria da parte di una scuola a fini “motivazionali: è fair use?

Dice di si la corte di appello del 5° circuito, Bell c. Eagle Mountain Saginaw Independent School District, 25.02.2022, Case: 21-10504 .

La squadra sportiva della scuola, al fine di motivare i propri alunni-atleti,  riproduceva in post Twitter il passaggio seguente da un’opera di psicologia motivazionale (cioè 1 pag. su 72 circa, anche se forse la più importante):

<<Winning isn’t normal. That doesn’t mean there’s anything
wrong with winning. It just isn’t the norm. It is highly unusual.

Every competition only has one winner. No matter how many
people are entered, only one person or one team wins each

Winning is unusual. And as such, it requires unusual action.

In order to win, you must do extraordinary things. You can’t
just be one of the crowd. The crowd doesn’t win. You have to
be willing to stand out and act differently.

Your actions need to reflect unusual values and priorities. You
have to value success more than others do. You have to want
it more. Now take note! Wanting it more is a decision you
make and act upon—not some inherent quality or burning
inner drive or inspiration! And you have to make that value a

You can’t train like everyone else. You have to train more and
train better.

You can’t talk like everyone else. You can’t think like everyone
else. You can’t be too willing to join the crowd, to do what is
expected, to act in a socially accepted manner, to do what’s
“in.” You need to be willing to stand out in the crowd and
consistently take exceptional action. If you want to win, you
need to accept the risks and perhaps the loneliness . . .

la Corte ricorda i quattri fattori ex lege previsti dal 17 USC § 107: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Rititene che il primo e l’ultimo siano a favore della scuola, il terzo neutro e il secondo -il meno importante, però- a favore dell’autore del libro.

Quindi rigetta la sua domanda per ricorrenza del fair use.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)