Le pagine Facebook e Twitter dei Trustees di una scuola pubblica sono “public forum” e devono rispettare il Primo Emendamento

Aprofondita sentenza di appello sull’oggetto, resa dal 9° Circuito, 27 luglio 2022, Nos. 21-55118 e 21-55157, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-02215-BEN-JLB, Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliff  e Zane.

Alcuni Trustees del Poway Unified School District (“PUSD” or the “District”) Board of Trustees (scuola pubblica, parrebbe: non si potrebbe ravvisare public forum per una scuola privata) bannarono due genitori dalla pagina Facebook (F.) per le loro critiche continue e estese , anche se non offensive

I genitori agirono per violazione del Primo  Emendamento (libertà di parola)  in relazione al 42 U.S. Code § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights.

L’appello conferma il primo grado dicendo che ricorre State Action (color of state law) e che il Primo Emendamento va rispettato anche sui social media, se usati nel dialogo con i cittadini: essi infatti diventano Designated Public Fora.

Succo: << The Garniers’ claims present an issue of first impression
in this Circuit: whether a state official violates the First
Amendment by creating a publicly accessible social media
page related to his or her official duties and then blocking
certain members of the public from that page because of the
nature of their comments. For the following reasons, we
hold that, under the circumstances presented here, the
Trustees have acted under color of state law by using their
social media pages as public fora in carrying out their official
duties. We further hold that, applying First Amendment
public forum criteria, the restrictions imposed on the
Garniers’ expression are not appropriately tailored to serve
a significant governmental interest and so are invalid. We
therefore affirm the district court judgment
>>, p. 6.

Si v. poi:

– i quattro criteri per ravvisare State Action, p. 18.

– il concetto di <designated public forum> e di <limited public forum>, p. 35.

– non è spam giustificativo della censura la continuata rieptizione di post critici, p. 39 ss

– l’usare i filtri Word, permesso da F., non fa diventare chiuso quello che altrimenti  è un public forum, p,. 15 ss

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Copyright, fair use, diritto di parola e diritto vs. la piattaforma di conoscere il soggetto che diffonde anonimamente post satirici

Chi carica post vagamente satirici con fotografie ritraenti un private-equity billionaire in comapgian di ragazze, compie delle stesse un fair use, quindi non rientrante nel copyright sulle foto stesse.

Ne segue che il diritto di far cadere l’anonimato non gli spetta,   perchè <<has not made out a prima facie case of copyright infringement>>, secondo l’interprteazione del § 512.h DMCA “Subpoena To Identify Infringer”.

E’ del resto chiaro che i sei tweet satirici ACCOMPAFGNATORI DELLE FOto,  erano espressione del diritto di parola/critica: << The six tweets flagged by Bayside are best interpreted as vaguely satirical commentary criticizing the opulent lifestyle of wealthy investors generally (and Brian Sheth, specifically). For example, one tweet reads: “Good morning from Mrs. Brian Sheth #2. Life is good when you’re a 44-year old private equity billionaire.” The tweet accuses Brian Sheth of having a mistress and links his infidelity to the broader class of “private equity billionaires,” suggesting that wealth (or working in private equity) corrupts. Unmasking MoneyBags thus risks exposing him to “economic or official retaliation” by Sheth or his associates. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995). And MoneyBags’s interest in anonymity is heightened further by his other tweets, which discuss issues of political importance such as sexual harassment, tax enforcement, and corporate regulations>> (Brian Seth è il milionario e Bayside il soggetto reclamante diritto di autore sulle foto, forse ricollegabile allo stesso Seth).

Così il distretto nord della California 21 giugno 2022, Case 4:20-mc-80214-VC , IN RE DMCA § 512(H) SUBPOENA TO TWITTER, INC., di cui dà notizia www.eef.org in un’inteessante fattispecie all’intersezione tra copyright , privacy e diritto di parola.

L’editorial judgment delle piattafrome social , in quanto esercizio del diritto di parola, è coperto dal Primo Emendamento

E’ stata data la notizia circa la sentenza di appello 23 maggio 2022 dell’11 circuito, USCA11 Case: 21-12355 , Netchoice LLc e altri c. ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA (link fornito da varie fonti), circa la legittimità di una legge della Florida regolante e vincolante in vario modo le piattaforme social.

Soprattuto tre son i vincoli contestati:

i) restrizioni sulla content-moderation, ( p. 10);

ii) obblighi di disclosure (p. 12);

iii) obbligo di  fornire i dati all’utente in caso di deplatforming  (p. 13; disposzione invero molti interessante e probabilmente da accogliere, visti i recenti casi italiani di distruzioni immotivate del materiale postato negli anni dall’utente medesimo)

La corte di appello dell’11° circuito, adita dalle piattaforme la ritiene sostanzialmente incostituzionale, in quanto troppo inibente la freedom of speech tutelata dal Primo Emendamento.

Il presupposto , importante, è che le piattafforme sono soggetti privati titolari appunto dei diritti da First Amendement: <<The question at the core of this appeal is whether the Facebooks and Twitters of the world—indisputably “private actors” with First Amendment rights—are engaged in constitutionally protected expressive activity when they moderate and curate the content that they disseminate on their platforms. The State of Florida insists that they aren’t, and it has enacted a first-of-its-kind law to combat what some of its proponents perceive to be a concerted effort by “the ‘big tech’ oligarchs in Silicon Valley” to “silenc[e]” “conservative” speech in favor of a “radical leftist” agenda. To that end, the new law would, among other things, prohibit certain social-media companies from “deplatforming” political candidates under any circumstances, prioritizing or deprioritizing any post or message “by or about” a candidate, and, more broadly, removing anything posted by a “journalistic enterprise” based on its content. USCA11 Case: 21-12355 Date Filed: 05/23/2022 Page: 3 of 674 Opinion of the Court 21-12355

We hold that it is substantially likely that social-media companies—even the biggest ones—are “private actors” whose rights the First Amendment protects, Manhattan Cmty., 139 S. Ct. at 1926, that their so-called “content-moderation” decisions constitute protected exercises of editorial judgment, and that the provisions of the new Florida law that restrict large platforms’ ability to engage in content moderation unconstitutionally burden that prerogative. We further conclude that it is substantially likely that one of the law’s particularly onerous disclosure provisions—which would require covered platforms to provide a “thorough rationale” for each and every content-moderation decision they make—violates the First Amendment.

Accordingly, we hold that the companies are entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of those provisions. Because we think it unlikely that the law’s remaining (and far less burdensome) disclosure provisions violate the First Amendment, we hold that the companies are not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief with respect to them>>

Sul conflitto tra editorial judgment/diritto di free speech in capo alle piattaforme social, da una parte, e diritto dello stato di chiedere conto dei criteri seguiti nella content moderation, dall’altro,  v. l’interessante saggio “Rereading Herbert v. Lando” di E. Douek-G. Lakier, 26 maggio 2022 , richiamante la cit. decisione della Suprema Corte del 1979.

Sulla legge della Florida v. Calvert, First Amendment Battles over Anti-Deplatforming Statutes: Examining Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo’s Relevance for Today’s Online Social Media Platform Cases, NY Univ. law review-online, aprile 2022.

La senatrice Warren chiede ad Amazon di modificare il suo algoritmo per combattere la misinformation: è inibizione del diritto di parola a carico delle pubblicazioni contrarie al mainstream e da ciò penalizzate?

Affronta in via sommaria il tema il Western District of Washington at Seattle, 9 maggio 2022, Case No. 2:21-cv-01508-BJR, giudice Barbara Rothstein, Kennedy e altri c. Elizabeth Warren (in proprio e nella funzione) (v. qui la pagina sul caso in CourtListener)

Il libro inibito era <<The Truth About COVID-19>>.

EW scrisse ad Amazon lamentando che favoriva la misinformation in tema di covid.-19 .

Concludeva la lettera byask[ing] [Amazon to] perform an immediate review of [its] algorithms and, within 14 days, provide both a public report . . . and a plan to modify these algorithms.” Id. at 5. The letter also asked Amazon to respond to four questions about its search algorithms and “Best Seller” labels, so that Sen. Warren could “fully understand Amazon’s role in facilitating misinformation about COVID-19 and its actions to address the issue.” Id. at 5-6.

Il libro era stato messo in vendita su Amazon e Barnes§Noble , che -dopo la pubblicità data alla lettera- lo esclusero dalle vendite oppure in modo opaco ne diminuirono la visibilità (overtly demoting, downgrading, or otherwise suppressing The Truth About COVID-19” without informing Plaintiffs. )

Essi citano allora EW per farle ritirare la lettera e inibirle simili condotte in futuro.

La Corte -prevedibilmente- rigetta. A nulla serve il precedente Bantham Books del 1963 invocato dagli attori, ove la censura era stata assai chiara, e analizzato dalla Corte. p. 7-8

First, the “thinly veiled threats” in Bantam Books were very thinly veiled. The commission’s notices were “phrased virtually as orders” and made explicit reference to the attorney general, the police, and the possibility of criminal prosecution. Id. at 67-68. Here, Defendant Warren’s alleged threat is derived primarily from her statements that the circulation of The Truth About COVID-19 was “potentially unlawful” and that COVID-19 misinformation has “led to untold illnesses and death.” Dkt. 8, Exh. A, at 1- 2; see Dkt. 7 at 10-17. Plaintiffs argue that booksellers could interpret these statements as threatening them with “legal liability for wrongful death or homicide.” Plaintiffs will have difficulty establishing that this is a reasonable or likely interpretation of Defendant Warren’s letter. The two noted phrases are not in the same paragraph and, even if they were, equating them to an accusation of homicide requires a vivid imagination. Furthermore, the vast majority of Defendant Warren’s letter is dedicated to persuasion—by arguing, for example, that “[o]ther major technology companies have recognized their role in propagating misinformation” and, unlike Amazon, taken steps to address it. Dk.8, Exh. A, at 5.

Next, Defendant Warren is far removed from the power to legally punish booksellers for continuing to sell The Truth About COVID-19. Although Plaintiffs are correct that “the fact that a public-official defendant lacks direct regulatory or decisionmaking authority over a plaintiff [or third-party publisher] . . . is not necessarily dispositive,” that does not mean it will not be dispositive in most cases. Dkt. 7 at 11 (citing Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 230).

(…) Put another way, the threat of legal sanctions can act as an unlawful restriction on speech, but a threat will only be perceived as such if there is a realistic chance the threatened action can be carried out. Plaintiffs are unlikely to successfully demonstrate that the booksellers reasonably perceived Defendant Warren’s letter as a threat. Cf. id. at 68 (“The Commission’s notices [were]
phrased virtually as orders [and] reasonably understood to be such by the distributor . . . .”).

In summary, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Defendant Warren’s letter constitutes a prior restraint on speech.

Il fumus boni iuris dunque non viene ravvisato: condivisibilmente , direi.

Altro rigetto di domanda per presunta violazione del Primo Emendamento a seguito di blocco di account Facebook e Twitter

Implacabile la giurisprudenza USA nel continuare ad affermare che la protezione costituzionale del diritto di parola è concessa solo verso lo Stato o organi pubblici,  non verso privati (quali sono i pur giganteschi social media).

Ora è la volta del Distretto Nord della California a firma del giudice Breyer con provv. 5 maggio 2022, Case 3:22-cv-00737-CRB , Hart. c. Facebook e altri , a seguito di blocco dell’account per ripetuta disinformazione soprattutto in tema di covid-19.

Misinformazione che violava i terms of service (Facebook:  forbade users from sharing “anything . . . [t]hat is unlawful, misleading, discriminatory, or fraudulent.”; Twitter: prohibits using “Twitter’s services to share false or misleading information about COVID-19 which may lead to harm.”).

In particolare sono rigettate le due modalità prospettate dall’attore, evidentemente per superare il dettato costituzionale e la sua interpretazione corrente. Infatti non ricorre nè la cd joint action (tra privato e potere pubblico; v. nota 4 << It is still more difficult to understand how general legislative debates, such as those surrounding Section 230, could provide a President with coercive power over a private company sufficient to confer state action>>) nè la government coercicion, pp. 9-15.

Allo scopo, l’attore aveva citato pure il presidente Biden e il responsabile sanitario Murphy in proprio.  In particolare aveva allegato che <<Biden and Murthy “directed” social media platforms to make four changes: (1) to “measure and publicly share the impact of misinformation on their platform”; (2) to “create a robust enforcement strategy that bridges their properties and provides transparency about the rules”; (3) to “take faster action against harmful posts” because “information travels quite quickly on social media platforms”; and (4) to “promote quality information in their feed algorithm.” Id. ¶¶ 14-17. Hart also alleges that Biden directed Murthy to create a 22-page advisory with “instructions on how social media companies should remove posts with which Murthy and Biden disagree.” Id. ¶ 18.  Finally, Hart alleges that Biden “threatened” social media companies who do not comply by “publicly shaming and humiliating them, stating, ‘They’re killing people”)>>.

Da noi per fortuna l’art. 2 Cost. si applica pacificamente pure verso i soggetti privati.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Altra conferma (d’appello) che Facebook non è “state actor” e che dunque l’arbitraria rimozione di post non viola il Primo Emendamento

SEcondo l’orientamento dominante il diritto di parola non ha la tutela costituzionale del 1 Emendamento quando la sua inibizione provenga da soggetto privato, quale il filtraggio operato dalle piattaforme digitali.

A tale orientameno si adegua l’Appello del secondo circuito 27.04.2022, Brock v. Zuckerberg e altri, 21-1796-cv .

Motivazione leggera e non particolarmente interessante.

Di fronte alla duplice causa petendi <<two principal arguments as to why the removal of his Facebook posts constituted state action: (1) Facebook was a publicly held company [sic!]; and (2) Facebook was the equivalent of a “public square” or “public forum.” >>, la Corte rigetta.

In particolare osserva:

<< Although Brock alleged some facts, construed liberally, as to his first argument, it clearly fails as a matter of law.   “The management of a corporation is not a public function; and a state’s permission for a corporation to organize itself in a particular manner is not the delegation of governmental authority.” Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003).

As to Brock’s assertion that Facebook is a public square, he failed to make any non-conclusory factual allegations to support that claim.   Instead, the amended complaint merely repeats the legal conclusion that Facebook is a public forum and public square. While we construe pro se complaints liberally, legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations,” Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). None of Brock’s conclusory allegations “nudged” his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Brock conclusorily asserted for
the first time that Facebook is a state actor because it performs the traditional public function of delivering mail. Brock did not raise this argument on appeal or challenge the district court’s conclusion that he cannot “avoid the state action
question” by analogizing “Facebook’s provision of an online messaging service to

the government’s traditional provision of mail services through the United States
Postal Service,” App’x at 188–89.

It is well settled in the Second Circuit “that issues not discussed in an appellate brief will normally be deemed abandoned.” Beatty v. United States, 293 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (“When a litigant – including a pro se litigant – raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, the issue is abandoned.”).  And although “[a]n abandoned claim may nevertheless be considered if manifest injustice would otherwise result,” Ocean Ships, Inc. v. Stiles, 315 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2002), such circumstances are not present here; Brock’s complaint and opposition below is devoid of any facts that would support a conclusion that Facebook has assumed a heretofore exclusively public function>>.

E’ assorbita la censura sul § 230 CDA ,.

E’ noto che da noi, invece, la tutela dei diritti fondamentali ex art. 2 Cost. opera anche nelle relazioni tra soggetti privati.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)

I social media, utilizzati da un politico locale per attività ufficiali, costituiscono “public forum”, soggetto alla libertà di parola ex Primo Emendamento (ennesima conferma)

Il Tribunale NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION cofnerma che la pagina Facebook di un consigliere circoscrizionale (Alderman) del 45° Ward di Chcago (v. l’elenco qui)  è public forum. Quindi soggetta alla lbiertà di parola costituzionale sicchè la censura da aprte deel Consigliere dei post sgraditi non è ammessa, tranne i strettissimi limiti ricosciuti dalla giurisprudenza.

Si tratta della decisione 10.02.2022, PETE CZOSNYKA, et al. v. JAMES GARDINER, Alderman of the 45th Ward of the City of Chicago,Case: 1:21-cv-03240  .

<<In his motion, Alderman Gardiner argues that plaintiffs have insufficiently alleged that hisFacebook Page is a public forum, especially because Facebook is a private entity. The SeventhCircuit has held that public forums are “locations or channels of communication that thegovernment opens for use by the public for expressive activity.” Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 869(7th Cir. 2011).

Indeed, federal courts have “extended public speech protection to less traditional,designated public forums.” One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2019).The Supreme Court discussed similar conceptions of less traditional public forums in Packingham,which addressed the issue of a lack of access to public forums in our “cyber age,” specifically socialmedia. See Packingham v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).The Supreme Court provides guidance in determining whether a designated forum has beenintentionally created by the government, including (1) the “policy and practice of the government”and (2) “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Cornelius v.NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).

Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to address this issue, other Circuit Courts have reliedon Cornelius’ expressive activity factor when examining whether social media platforms canconstitute a public forum. For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that expressive activity can bewhen one “intentionally open[s] the public comment section” and invites commentary, noticeablymarked by an interactive component of (say) a Facebook Page, “on [any] issue, request, criticism,complement or just …thoughts.” Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2019), asamended (Jan. 9, 2019).

Similarly, the Second Circuit has ruled in the context of Twitter (ananalogous social media platform), that blocking an account from certain users prevents expressiveCase: 1:21-cv-03240 Document #: 39 Filed: 02/10/22 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:1854conduct. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019)(“The Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the President, upon assumingoffice, repeatedly used the Account as an official vehicle for governance and made its interactivefeatures accessible to the public without limitation.”).

Thus, based on Packingham and the Cornelius factors, federal courts have concluded that whenthe government or a government official uses a social media account for official business, theinteractive portions of the social media platforms are public forums for First Amendment purposes.  See Davison, 912 F.3d at 682; Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 237; Felts v. Reed, 504 F.Supp.3d978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2020); One Wisconsin, 354 F.Supp. 3d at 953. The Court agrees with thispersuasive authority.

Correspondingly, the fact that the government only has temporary control over theFacebook Page and that the government does not own the social media platform is not determinativeof whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum inrelation to the First Amendment. See Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 235. Specifically,control is not determined based on private or public ownership, but instead on the government’sexercise of control over the relevant aspects of the social media platformI>>.

Sentenza breve e dall’esito scontato.

Più interssante sarebbe chiedersi:

1) quando la pagina Fb del politico diventa solo privata e non più soggetta al 1° Emend.? Deve mancare di ogni e qualunque riferimento all’attività politico/amministrativa?

2) quale sarebbe da noi la valutazione giuridica di un caso analogo?

(notizia della sentenza e link alla stessa dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Altra decisione per cui Twitter non è State actor (nè è ravvisabile joint action con organi statali)

Un avvocato statunitense, divenuto acceso sostenitore di Trump, si vede etichettati in modo sfavolrevole (labeled) suoi post su Twitter e poi sospeso l’account in via definitiva.

Agisce allora contro Twitter (ed altri organi pubblici USA di alto livello con cui avrebbe commesso  conspiracy) facendo valere il diritto di parola/free speech.

L’ovvia eccezione di inesistenza di ogni state action nella condotta di Twitter viene però accolta.

Viene respinta pure la qualifica di <joint action> Stato/Twitter: il relativo test cheide “whether the state has `so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity“, sub III.A.1 (qualifica esaminata in dettaglio).

Si tratta del Tribunale del Nord California, 10.01.2022, Case No. 21-cv-07063-CRB. ,  ROGAN O’HANDLEY v.  ALEX PADILLA, et al., Defendants.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Quattro causae petendi relative al First Amendment/libertà di parola per contrastare la sospensione dell’account Youtube, ma nessuna accolta

Interessante sentenza californiana sulla solita questione della libertà di parola  (First Amendement)  asseritamente violata da sospensione dell’account su social media (politicamente di destra) da parte di una state action.

Si tratta della corte distrettuale di S. Josè, Californa, 19 ottobre 2021, Case No. 20-cv-07502-BLF, Doe c. Google,.

Sono azionate quattro causae petendi, tutte rigettate visto che nessuna è applicabile alla censura/content moderation di Youtube:

1) Public function: curiosamente l’attore e la corte invocano in senso reciprocamente opposto il  noto precedente Prager Univ. c. Google del 2020.

2) Compulsion: <<Rep. Adam Schiff and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and an October 2020 House Resolution, which “have pressed Big Tech” into censoring political speech with threats of limiting Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) and other penalties.>>. Alquanto inverosimile (è però la più lungamente argometnata)

3) joint action: <<Joint action is present where the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). Further, a private defendant must be a “willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Joint action requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between private and public actors. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).>.

Per gli attori la  joint action theory starebbe in un  <<Twitter exchange between Rep. Schiff and YouTube CEO Susan Wojnicki in which Ms. Wojnicki states, “We appreciate your partnership and will continue to consult with Members of Congress as we address the evolving issues around #COVID19.” FAC, Ex. E at 1; Opp. at 10-15. Plaintiffs argue that this Twitter exchange shows Defendants and the federal government were in an “admitted partnership.”>>. Allegazione un pò leggerina.

4) Governmental nexus: ricorre quando c’è << “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-1005>>. (sembra assai simile alla prcedente).

Non avendo accolto alcuna di quesrta, non affronta il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, p. 12. Curioso l’rodine logico : il criterio della ragine più liquidqa avrebbe potuto a rigttare (nel merito) con tale norma.

(sentenza e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Ancora sugli annuari on line che usano dati personali degli ex studenti

In Knapke v. Peopleconnect Inc , 10.08.2021, un Tribunale di Washington decide una lite sul right of publicity sfruttato indebitamente dall’annuario Classmates (C.) (nella fattisecie proponendo nome e immagine in niserzioni publiciitarie).

C. pubblica annuari di scuola e università, parte gratjuitamente (ma con pubblicità) e parte a pagamento.

C. si difende strenuamente ma la corte rigetta la domanda di dismiss.

E’ rigettata l’eccezione di safe harbour ex 230 CDA, trattandosi di materiale proprio e non di soggetti terzi.

Inoltre si v. le analitiche difese di C..

La più interessante è basata sul First Amendment: <<Classmates argues that “where a person’s name,  image, or likeness is used in speech for ‘informative or cultural’ purposes, the First Amendment renders the use ‘immune’ from liability.”>> (sub F).

La corte però la rigetta.

Avevo già dato notizia mesi fa di altro caso relativo agli annuari, CALLAHAN v.
ANCESTRY.COM INC..

(notizia e link tratti dal blog di Eric Goldman)