freedom of speech – Lorenzo Albertini

I social media, utilizzati da un politico locale per attività ufficiali, costituiscono “public forum”, soggetto alla libertà di parola ex Primo Emendamento (ennesima conferma)

Il Tribunale NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION cofnerma che la pagina Facebook di un consigliere circoscrizionale (Alderman) del 45° Ward di Chcago (v. l’elenco qui) è public forum. Quindi soggetta alla lbiertà di parola costituzionale sicchè la censura da aprte deel Consigliere dei post sgraditi non è ammessa, tranne i strettissimi limiti ricosciuti dalla giurisprudenza.

Si tratta della decisione 10.02.2022, PETE CZOSNYKA, et al. v. JAMES GARDINER, Alderman of the 45th Ward of the City of Chicago,Case: 1:21-cv-03240 .

<<In his motion, Alderman Gardiner argues that plaintiffs have insufficiently alleged that hisFacebook Page is a public forum, especially because Facebook is a private entity. The SeventhCircuit has held that public forums are “locations or channels of communication that thegovernment opens for use by the public for expressive activity.” Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 869(7th Cir. 2011).

Indeed, federal courts have “extended public speech protection to less traditional,designated public forums.” One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2019).The Supreme Court discussed similar conceptions of less traditional public forums in Packingham,which addressed the issue of a lack of access to public forums in our “cyber age,” specifically socialmedia. See Packingham v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017).The Supreme Court provides guidance in determining whether a designated forum has beenintentionally created by the government, including (1) the “policy and practice of the government”and (2) “the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.” Cornelius v.NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund. Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).

Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to address this issue, other Circuit Courts have reliedon Cornelius’ expressive activity factor when examining whether social media platforms canconstitute a public forum. For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that expressive activity can bewhen one “intentionally open[s] the public comment section” and invites commentary, noticeablymarked by an interactive component of (say) a Facebook Page, “on [any] issue, request, criticism,complement or just …thoughts.” Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2019), asamended (Jan. 9, 2019).

Similarly, the Second Circuit has ruled in the context of Twitter (ananalogous social media platform), that blocking an account from certain users prevents expressiveCase: 1:21-cv-03240 Document #: 39 Filed: 02/10/22 Page 3 of 5 PageID #:1854conduct. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019)(“The Account was intentionally opened for public discussion when the President, upon assumingoffice, repeatedly used the Account as an official vehicle for governance and made its interactivefeatures accessible to the public without limitation.”).

Thus, based on Packingham and the Cornelius factors, federal courts have concluded that whenthe government or a government official uses a social media account for official business, theinteractive portions of the social media platforms are public forums for First Amendment purposes. See Davison, 912 F.3d at 682; Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 237; Felts v. Reed, 504 F.Supp.3d978, 985 (E.D. Mo. 2020); One Wisconsin, 354 F.Supp. 3d at 953. The Court agrees with thispersuasive authority.

Correspondingly, the fact that the government only has temporary control over theFacebook Page and that the government does not own the social media platform is not determinativeof whether the property is, in fact, sufficiently controlled by the government to make it a forum inrelation to the First Amendment. See Knight First Amendment Inst., 928 F.3d at 235. Specifically,control is not determined based on private or public ownership, but instead on the government’sexercise of control over the relevant aspects of the social media platformI>>.

Sentenza breve e dall’esito scontato.

Più interssante sarebbe chiedersi:

1) quando la pagina Fb del politico diventa solo privata e non più soggetta al 1° Emend.? Deve mancare di ogni e qualunque riferimento all’attività politico/amministrativa?

2) quale sarebbe da noi la valutazione giuridica di un caso analogo?

(notizia della sentenza e link alla stessa dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Al social network non si applica la state action doctrine: altra decisione in tale senso

In Perez c. Linkedin, la US DC Norther district of California, san Josè Division, 05.02.2021, caso n° 5:20-cv-07238-EJD, affronta la ormai vechia questione del se esista un diritto dell’utente a non essere “zittito” da un social network (Linkedin, ne,l caso, che prima cancellò dei post e poi sospese l’account).

La risposta è negativa: il primo emendamento si applica solo a casi di <<state action>> e un social è un ente privato.

<< Tthe First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of Speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. A fundamental precept of the First Amendment establishes “that the Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). The First Amendment does not prohibit a private entity’s abridgment of speech. Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996). This separation of constitutional enforcement between state actors and private individuals actually “protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 1928. Courts across the country have found social media companies are private, not state actors. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-03579-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 4169304, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010); Shulman v. Facebook.com, No. CV 17-764 (JMV), 2017 WL 5129885, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017).

Here, Perez has not put forth any facts or caselaw to suggest LinkedIn is a state actor subject to the First Amendment >>, p. 6.

La dottrina è divisa, invece: v. il mio <<La responsabilità civile degli internet service provider per i materiali caricati dagli utenti (con qualche considerazione sul ruolo di gatekeepers della comunicazione)>>, alle note 379-380.

Strano che i giudici statunitensi non ragionino per analogia: come un tempo i pericoli alla libertà potevano provenire dallo Stato, oggi possono provenire (anche) da enti privati dotati di enormi dimensioni e poteri. In effetti impera (o imperava) la dottrina dell’originalism, per cui conta soprattutto l’intento del legislatore storico, portata avanto soprattuitto da Robert Bork (sulla cui figura v. ora Vinceti S.R., L’originalista: l’interpretazione costituzionale nel pensiero e nella vita di Robert Bork, Dirit. pubbl. comp. eur. online, 2020/4 .

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Si possono azionare diritto di parola e diritti fondamentali verso Google e Twitter? Non è pregiudizialmente escluso

L’annosa questione, del se il diritto di parola negli USA sia azionabile anche contro le grandi piattaforme (Big Tech), trova una possibile risposta positiva in US D.C. corte distrettuale del New Hampshire 28.01.2021, Civil No. 1:19-cv-978-JL, N. DeLima c. Google-Twitter.

Erano stato azionati (“pro se” : senza difesa tecnica) la violazione sia dei dirtti fondamentali ex 42 US Code § 1983 , sia del Primo Emendamento: disposizioni, però, che sono riferite a condotte statali o pubbliche (state action), non a condotte di enti privati quali sono le Big Tech.

La corte ha rigettato ma non perchè sia pregiudizialmente escluso, bensì perchè l’attrice non ha sufficientemente argomentato in modo da poter ravvisare state acrtion anche nella condotta delle Big Tech.

Osserva infatti: <<Defendants are private companies and not state actors, and thus cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, absent factual allegations that could lead to a finding of state action. DeLima’s complaint is devoid of any allegation that could transform either defendant into a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim>>, p. 12.

E poco sotto, circa il Primo Emendamento: <<DeLima repeatedly alleges in her complaint that Defendants’ have violated the First Amendment and discriminated against her based on her protected speech and viewpoint. Yet she acknowledges that Defendants are private companies and not government entities, which is fatal to her claim. “[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976). “[E]very First Amendment claim thus requires state action in some sense,” and DeLima has failed to allege any state action on the part of Defendants that could give rise to an alleged violation of her free speech rights. … She accordingly has failed to state a claim for violation of the First Amendment and Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is granted>>, p. 13.

Non c’è quindi chiusura pregiudiziale. Bisogna però argomentare, nel senso che la condotta delle Big Tech, in relazione alla esigenze soddisfatte dalle disposizioni de quibus, è parificabile alla condotta statale.

Da noi è pacifico che l’art. 2 Cost. riguiardi il rapporto verso qualunque ente, pubblico o privato che sia.

La corte poi rigetta pure per il safe harbour posto dal noto § 230 CDA communication decency act

(notizia della sentenza e link presi dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Può un politico bannare un follower dal proprio account Twitter? Si , se non si tratta di account ufficiale

La canditata Reisch (R.) alle elezioni del parlamento del Missouri 44° distretto banna un follower (Campbell; poi: C.) per il semplice di aver ritweettato un post critico (caricato da terzi) nei suoi confronti.

C. agisce, facendo valere la violazione del diritto di parola in connessione con il 42 US Code § 1983, che suona così : “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia“.

La questione allora è se R. agì “under color of state law”: l’attore dice di si, il convenuto di no. Così la corte: <<so the question this case presents is whether Reisch acted under color of statelaw when she blocked Campbell on Twitter. Campbell maintains that she did becauseshe blocked him for criticizing her fitness for political office even though she hadcreated a virtual forum for the public to discuss “the conduct of her office.” Reischsays she didn’t act under color of state law because she runs this Twitter account ina private capacity, namely, as a campaigner for political office>>, p. 4.

La corte di primo grado aveva ravvisato azione under color of state law.

La corte di appello del Missouri (8° circuito), con sentenza 27.01.2021, Campbell c. C. T. Reisch, n° 19-2994, invece, dice che non si tratta di account pubblico e dunque ben può il titolare bloccare chi vuole.

L’account era stato aperto prima dell’elezione e dunque non era ufficiale. Nè cambia tale qualificazione il fatto che successivamente la canditata sia stata eletta: <<We don’t intimate that the essential character of a Twitter account is fixedforever. But the mere fact of Reisch’s election did not magically alter the account’scharacter, nor did it evolve into something different. A private account can turn intoa governmental one if it becomes an organ of official business, but that is not whathappened here. The overall theme of Reisch’s tweets—that’s she’s the right person forthe job—largely remained the same after her electoral victory. Her messagesfrequently harkened back to promises she made on the campaign trail, and she toutedher success in fulfilling those promises and in her performance as a legislator, oftenwith the same or similar hashtags as the ones she used while a candidate. So it seemsto us that Reisch used the account in the main to promote herself and position herselffor more electoral success down the road—a conclusion supported by the campaign-related tweet that led to this litigation>>, p. 7.

In breve, la corte pensa che l’account Twitter di R. <<is more akin to a campaign newsletter than to anything else, and so it’s Reisch’s prerogative to select her audienceand present her page as she sees fit. She did not intend her Twitter page “to be like a public park, where anyone is welcome to enter and say whatever they want”>>.

La pensa all’opposto il giudice Kelly, autore della dissenting opinion: <<In short, Reisch’s persistent invocation of her position as an electedofficial overwhelmed any implicit references one might perceive to her campaign orfuture political ambitions>>.

(notizia e link alla sentenza presi dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Il deepfake non va trattato come lo speech tradizionale

Ottimo articolo di Mary Anne Franks sul deepfake (A dangerous form of unanswerable speech, bostonglobe, 12.10.2020).

Deepfake è la notizia falsa (bufala) nlla forma di audiovisivo: per questo più persuasiva e dunque pericolosa della notizia solo scritta

la giurista A.M. Franks ricorda che non si può a questo proposito seguire l’approccio dei giudici Holmes e Brandeis (e di moltissimi altri) del marketplace of ideas per cui la verità sconfigge la falsità (o the best cure for bad speech is more speech): < but especially given the state of disinformation in America, such a belief can most charitably be described as willfully ignorant. Lies, especially those that serve the interests of those in power, have always had a competitive advantage over the truth, and truthful speech frequently gets drowned out by fake, misleading, and salacious content.>

Chiusura di un social (WeChat) e Primo Emendamento (freedom of speech)

E’ noto che il Presidente Trump con executive order n. 13943 del 6 agosto 2020 ha ordinato la chisura del social WeChat, in quanto di provenienza cinese (appartiene a Tencent) e dunque pericoloso per la sicurezza nazionale (viene citato anche quello n. 13873 del 15 maggio 2019).

La comunità chinese-speaking statunitense nell’agosto 2020 lha impugnato perchè incostituzionale ed ora un giudice californiano (S. Francisco) l’accoglie in via cautelare: si tratta del provvedimento UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 19 settembre 2020, U.S. WECHAT USERS ALLIANCE et al. v. DONALD J. TRUMP et al., caso No. 20-cv-05910-LB.

L’atto esecutivo , determinativo delle prohibited transactions, è del 18 settembre 2020.

Vdiam cosa dice sul punto della vilazine del First Amendment

<< 1 – Likelihood of Success on the Merits: First Amendment

The plaintiffs contend that the prohibited transactions will result in shutting down WeChat, a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S. that is effectively their only means of communication with their community. This, they say, is a prior restraint on their speech that does not survive strict scrutiny. Also, even if the effect of the prohibited transactions is a content-neutral time-place-or-manner restriction, it does not survive intermediate scrutiny because the effective ban on WeChat use is not narrowly tailored to address the government’s significant interest in national security. The government does not meaningfully contest through evidence that the effect of the prohibited transactions will be to shut down WeChat (perhaps because the Secretary conceded the point) and instead contends that its content-neutral restrictions are based on national-security concerns and survive intermediate scrutiny. On this record, the plaintiffs have shown serious questions going to the merits of their First Amendment claim that the Secretary’s prohibited transactions effectively eliminate the plaintiffs’ key platform for communication, slow or eliminate discourse, and are the equivalent of censorship of speech or a prior restraint on it. Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–59 (1994) (a city’s barring all signs — except for signs identifying the residence, “for sale” signs, and signs warning of safety hazards — violated the city residents’ right to free speech).

The government — while recognizing that foreclosing “‘an entire medium of public expression’” is constitutionally problematic — makes the pragmatic argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication. But the plaintiffs establish through declarations that there are no viable substitute platforms or apps for the Chinese-speaking and Chinese-American community.

The government counters that shutting down WeChat does not foreclose communications for the plaintiffs, pointing to several declarations showing the plaintiffs’ efforts to switch to new platforms or apps. But the plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that WeChat is effectively the only means of communication for many in the community, not only because China bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no options other than WeChat.

The plaintiffs also have shown serious questions going to the merits of the First Amendment claim even if — as the government contends — the Secretary’s identification of prohibited transactions (1) is a content-neutral regulation, (2) does not reflect the government’s preference or aversion to the speech, and (3) is subject to intermediate scrutiny. A content-neutral, time-place-or-manner restriction survives intermediate scrutiny if it (1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication. (…). To be narrowly tailored, the restriction must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. Unlike a content-based restriction of speech, it “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the governments interests. But the government still may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not advance its goals.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S 464, 486 (2014) (cleaned up).

Certainly the government’s overarching national-security interest is significant. But on this record — while the government has established that China’s activities raise significant national-security concerns — it has put in scant little evidence that its effective ban of WeChat for all U.S. users addresses those concerns. And, as the plaintiffs point out, there are obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat from government devices, as Australia has done, or taking other steps to address data security.

The government cited two cases to support its contention that “preventing or limiting” WeChat use advances the WeChat Executive Order’s essential purpose to reduce WeChat’s collection of data from U.S. users.64See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ) (upholding FCC’s ban on credit agency’s sale of consumers’ personal financial data because it was the only means of preventing the harm of disseminating personal data); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding criminal charge under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for selling a tool that allowed a user to remove copying restrictions from Adobe files and thereby engage in copyright infringement by duplicating eBooks; targeting tool sellers and banning tool sales was reasonably necessary to avoid copyright infringement and protect digital privacy). The speech interests at stake in these cases — a credit agency’s sale of consumer data and targeting unlawful copying — are not equivalent to the denial of speech that attends the complete ban of WeChat for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking U.S. users. On this limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of substitute channels for communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791>>.

Vedremo cosa succederà con l’ancor più importante social Tik Tok.