Tag: executive order

L’ Executive Order del presidente Biden per promuovere la concorrenza nell’economia statunitense

Ieri 9 luglio l’amministrazione Biden ha emesso l’Executive Order (EO) on Promoting Competition in the American Economy.

E’ l’EO n. 14.036, come si legge in wikipedia .

GLi EO non sono fotne diretta di diritto erga omnes ma solo ordini alle varie amministrazioni (di valutare riforme normative per quanto in proprio potere).

Qui la scheda informativa approntata dall’Amministrazione.

Segnalo qui alcuni punti.

  • ridurre la diffusione dele clausole di non concorrenza imposte dalle aziende ai dipendenti, assai diffuse in USa;
  • quanto al digital world, questa la sintesi iniziale: << The American information technology sector has long been an engine of innovation and growth, but today a small number of dominant Internet platforms use their power to exclude market entrants, to extract monopoly profits, and to gather intimate personal information that they can exploit for their own advantage. Too many small businesses across the economy depend on those platforms and a few online marketplaces for their survival. And too many local newspapers have shuttered or downsized, in part due to the Internet platforms’ dominance in advertising markets. … This order affirms that it is the policy of my Administration to enforce the antitrust laws to combat the excessive concentration of industry, the abuses of market power, and the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony — especially as these issues arise in labor markets, agricultural markets, Internet platform industries, healthcare markets (including insurance, hospital, and prescription drug markets), repair markets, and United States markets directly affected by foreign cartel activity.
         It is also the policy of my Administration to enforce the antitrust laws to meet the challenges posed by new industries and technologies, including the rise of the dominant Internet platforms, especially as they stem from serial mergers, the acquisition of nascent competitors, the aggregation of data, unfair competition in attention markets, the surveillance of users, and the presence of network effects.
         Whereas decades of industry consolidation have often led to excessive market concentration, this order reaffirms that the United States retains the authority to challenge transactions whose previous consummation was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) (Sherman Act), the Clayton Antitrust Act (Public Law 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) (Clayton Act), or other laws.  See 15 U.S.C. 18; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). >>
  • <internet service>: migliorare la situazione dei consumatori sotto alcuni specifici profili (qui di minor intersse): v. facts shet alla voce relativa;
  • <technology>: v. fact sheet relativa voce e spt. i profili antitrust, naturalmente:

A)  Big Tech platforms purchasing would-be competitors: Over the past ten years, the largest tech platforms have acquired hundreds of companies—including alleged “killer acquisitions” meant to shut down a potential competitive threat. Too often, federal agencies have not blocked, conditioned, or, in some cases, meaningfully examined these acquisitions.

Per cui il Presidente annuncia una policy <<of greater scrutiny of mergers, especially by dominant internet platforms, with particular attention to the acquisition of nascent competitors, serial mergers, the accumulation of data, competition by “free” products, and the effect on user privacy>>.

B) Big Tech platforms gathering too much personal information:  Many of the large platforms’ business models have depended on the accumulation of extraordinarily amounts of sensitive personal information and related data.

Per questo il Presidente encourages the FTC to establish rules on surveillance and the accumulation of data.

C) Big Tech platforms unfairly competing with small businesses:  The large platforms’ power gives them unfair opportunities to get a leg up on the small businesses that rely on them to reach customers. For example, companies that run dominant online retail marketplaces can see how small businesses’ products sell and then use the data to launch their own competing products. Because they run the platform, they can also display their own copycat products more prominently than the small businesses’ products..

Pertanto, il Presidente <encourages the FTC to establish rules barring unfair methods of competition on internet marketplaces>.

I rimedi proposti perà o mancano o sono genericissimni. Si v. l’accurato commento del prof. Hovenkamp President Biden’s Executive Order on Promoting Competition: an Antitrust Analysis, in ssrn :

<<While the President’s Executive Order has been touted as a “Progressive” document, its content falls short of that. It does notsuggest thatthe antitrust enforcement agencies break up any firms, other than becoming more aggressive about mergers. Nor does it contain any general expression of concern about vertical integration as such or advocacy for removal of antitrust immunities.Consistent with antitrust policy generally, it repeatedly expresses concerns about market power,or the power to profit by charging high prices,butitnevercomplainsabout large firm size as such. Further, while it discusses market power repeatedly, it does not speak aboutdisplacing antitrust’s current economicapproachwithconcerns aboutpolitical power or large firm size.To the contrary,it makes no reference to political powerat all,except for this one telling passagethat it quotesfrom a 1957 Supreme Court decision declaring that the Sherman Act:

rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield thebest allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.

The passage is important for what it does notsay about political power, even during a period ofgreat antitrust expansion. The goals areto achieve the bestallocation ofeconomicresources, lowest prices, highest quality, and greatest material progress–but all of this within an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic institutions>>, pp. 3-4

Chiusura di un social (WeChat) e Primo Emendamento (freedom of speech)

E’ noto che il Presidente Trump con executive order n. 13943 del 6 agosto 2020 ha ordinato la chisura del social WeChat, in quanto di provenienza cinese (appartiene a Tencent) e dunque pericoloso per la sicurezza nazionale (viene citato anche quello n. 13873 del 15 maggio 2019).

La comunità chinese-speaking statunitense nell’agosto 2020 lha impugnato perchè incostituzionale ed ora un giudice californiano (S. Francisco) l’accoglie in via cautelare: si tratta del provvedimento UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 19 settembre 2020, U.S. WECHAT USERS ALLIANCE et al. v. DONALD J. TRUMP et al., caso No. 20-cv-05910-LB.

L’atto esecutivo , determinativo delle prohibited transactions,  è del 18 settembre 2020.

Vdiam cosa dice sul punto della vilazine del First Amendment

<< 1 – Likelihood of Success on the Merits:  First Amendment

The plaintiffs contend that the prohibited transactions will result in shutting down WeChat, a public square for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking community in the U.S. that is effectively their only means of communication with their community. This, they say, is a prior restraint on their speech that does not survive strict scrutiny. Also, even if the effect of the prohibited transactions is a content-neutral time-place-or-manner restriction, it does not survive intermediate scrutiny because the effective ban on WeChat use is not narrowly tailored to address the government’s significant interest in national security. The government does not meaningfully contest through evidence that the effect of the prohibited transactions will be to shut down WeChat (perhaps because the Secretary conceded the point) and instead contends that its content-neutral restrictions are based on national-security concerns and survive intermediate scrutiny. On this record, the plaintiffs have shown serious questions going to the merits of their First Amendment claim that the Secretary’s prohibited transactions effectively eliminate the plaintiffs’ key platform for communication, slow or eliminate discourse, and are the equivalent of censorship of speech or a prior restraint on it.  Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–59 (1994) (a city’s barring all signs — except for signs identifying the residence, “for sale” signs, and signs warning of safety hazards — violated the city residents’ right to free speech).

The government — while recognizing that foreclosing “‘an entire medium of public expression’” is constitutionally problematic — makes the pragmatic argument that other substitute social-media apps permit communication.  But the plaintiffs establish through declarations that there are no viable substitute platforms or apps for the Chinese-speaking and Chinese-American community.

The  government counters that shutting down WeChat does not foreclose communications for the plaintiffs, pointing to several declarations showing the plaintiffs’ efforts to switch to new platforms or apps. But the plaintiffs’ evidence reflects that WeChat is effectively the only means of communication for many in the community, not only because China bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English proficiency have no options other than WeChat.  

The plaintiffs also have shown serious questions going to the merits of the First Amendment claim even if — as the government contends — the Secretary’s identification of prohibited transactions (1) is a content-neutral regulation, (2) does not reflect the government’s preference or aversion to the speech, and (3) is subject to intermediate scrutiny. A content-neutral, time-place-or-manner restriction survives intermediate scrutiny if it (1) is narrowly tailored, (2) serves a significant governmental interest unrelated to the content of the speech, and (3) leaves open adequate channels for communication. (…). To be narrowly tailored, the restriction must not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. Unlike a content-based restriction of speech, it “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the governments interests. But the government still may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not advance its goals.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S 464, 486 (2014) (cleaned up).

Certainly the government’s overarching national-security interest is significant. But on this record — while the government has established that China’s activities raise significant national-security concerns — it has put in scant little evidence that its effective ban of WeChat for all U.S. users addresses those concerns. And, as the plaintiffs point out, there are obvious alternatives to a complete ban, such as barring WeChat from government devices, as Australia has done, or taking other steps to address data security.

The government cited two cases to support its contention that “preventing or limiting” WeChat use advances the WeChat Executive Order’s essential purpose to reduce WeChat’s collection of data from U.S. users.64See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ) (upholding FCC’s ban on credit agency’s sale of consumers’ personal financial data because it was the only means of preventing the harm of disseminating personal data); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding criminal charge under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for selling a tool that allowed a user to remove copying restrictions from Adobe files and thereby engage in copyright infringement by duplicating eBooks; targeting tool sellers and banning tool sales was reasonably necessary to avoid copyright infringement and protect digital privacy). The speech interests at stake in these cases — a credit agency’s sale of consumer data and targeting unlawful copying — are not equivalent to the denial of speech that attends the complete ban of WeChat for the Chinese-American and Chinese-speaking U.S. users. On this limited record, the prohibited transactions burden substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the government’s significant interest in national security, especially given the lack of substitute channels for communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791>>.

Vedremo cosa succederà con l’ancor più importante social Tik Tok.