Caramella a forma e sapore di fetta di anguria: marchio di forma negato dal 3° circuito d’appello usa

il 3 circuito d’appello usa 7 settembre n. 22-2821, Pim brands v. Haribo, giudice Arleo, conferma il primo grado (notizia e link da IPwatchdog)

La forma e i colori indicano il flavour del dolciume: quindi nessuna distintività.

<<The question is whether the candy’s colors alone signal its flavor or whether the colors and shape combined further that function. Though PIM disagrees, we think the two work together. (…)

As PIM notes, the shape and colors do not match exactly: The bottom could be more curved and have a thinner band of darker green. The wedge could be wider. The point could be sharper and a deeper red. There could be black seeds. But as PIM itself put it, because this candy is an impulse buy, it “do[es]n’t need to be the Mona Lisa.” Oral Arg. 13:15–19. To identify its flavor, the candy’s trade dress need not exactly copy watermelon, but just evoke it.
And the shape contributes to the overall effect. Some shapes for watermelon candies, such as sharks, ropes, and rib-bons, detract from (or at least add no information beyond) the colors. But the wedge shape contributes to the function. The colors alone could leave some ambiguity: Is it watermelon or strawberry? With the wedge shape, all ambiguity is gone—this candy is a wedge of watermelon.
In that vein, the wedge might or might not identify the fla-vor on its own or with other color schemes. That trade dress is not before us; the watermelon-colored wedge is. The registered trademark at issue defines the mark by both colors and shape. So does PIM’s complaint. Plus, when we look at the pictured candies, our eyes are drawn immediately to both their colors and their shape. We think of a slice of watermelon based on both its color scheme and its shape. And in this color scheme, the candy looks like a watermelon wedge. So we hold that the trade dress presented as a whole, colors and shape together, makes the watermelon candy more identifiable as a slice of wa-termelon. That is function enough>>.

DA noi la conclusione sarebbe verosimilmente uguale ex art. 9.c – 13.1.b) c.p.i.

La suola dorata non può costituire marchio per scarpe (ancora sui marchi di posizione)

Jerome Tassi su Linkedin segnala la decisione 31 agosto 2023 EUIPO, domanda nà 018731419, istante: Yeshua Investment consulting, che dà esito opposto ai notissimi casi Louboutin

In breve dice ora l’ufficio che il pubblico non lo percepusce come segni di provenenzia aziendale

<<In the case at hand the sign is not distinguishable from the appearance of the
goods it designates, namely “metallic gold outer soles sold as an integral
component of men’s and women’s shoes”; it would only be distinctive for the
purposes of Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR if the consumer was able to recognize the
sign applied for as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to
distinguish the shoes of the applicant from those of other undertakings
(21/04/2010, T-7/09, ‘Spannfutter’, EU:T:2010:153, § 26) and, also, if it
departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector. The benchmark
also applies to signs which are only applicable to a component or an element
of the appearance of the product, in the case at hand “Metallic gold outer
soles” (10/10/2008, T-387/06 to T-390/06, ‘Pallet’, EU:T:2008:427, § 36;
13/04/2011, T-202/09, ‘Footwear’, EU:T:2011:168, § 40; 19/09/2012, T-50/11,
‘Stoffmuster’, EU:T:2012:436, § 43).
· The sign consists of a metallic gold sole on footwear. It is clear from these
objective characteristics that the sign applied for aims to protect a coloured
surface in a particular position of the shoe. The sign merges in the eyes of the
relevant public with the claimed goods itself, i.e. shoes, since in the words of
the applicant the metallic gold outer soles are sold as an integral component
of men’s and women’s shoes.
· As to the gold colour of the sole, the public will not instantly perceive a single
colour, or a coloured element which forms part of the external appearance of
the goods as a reference to the commercial origin of the goods (21/10/2004,
C-447/02, ‘Orange’, EU:C:2004:649, § 78). Thus, while colours are capable of
conveying certain associations of ideas, and of arousing feelings, they
possess little inherent capacity for communicating specific information,
especially since they are commonly and widely used, because of their appeal,
in order to advertise and market goods or services, without any specific
message (06/05/2003, C-104/01, ‘Libertel’, EU:C:2003:244, § 40; 24/06/2004,
C-49/02, ‘Blau/Gelb’, EU:C:2004:384, § 38; 12/11/2008, T-400/07, ‘Farben in
Quadraten’, EU:T:2008:492, § 35).
· Furthermore, the use of the gold colour to highlight the quality of a given
product is a common place associated with high quality and excellence and,
therefore, does not confer distinctive character on the product>.

L’avvocato Tassi segnala l’opposto esito dato dall’ufficio alla suola rossa di Louboutin (dopo il via libera della corte giustizia 12.06.2018, C-163/16)

Modifiche al codice di proprietà industriale

la legge 102 del 24.07.2023 (GU 184 del 8 agosto 2023) apporta alcune modifiche al c.p.i.

Le più importati sono nei primi tre articoli: art. 1 Divieto di registrazione di marchi evocativi di indicazioni geografiche e denominazioni di origine protetta;  art. 2 Protezione temporanea dei disegni e dei modelli nelle fiere;  art. 3 Titolarita’ delle invenzioni realizzate nell’ambito di universita’ ed enti di ricerca.

In particolare andrà approfondito il caso sub 1, dovendolo distinguere sia da quello delle segg. lettere c) e c-bis) sia dalla tutela delle denominazioni ex reg. 1151/2012, spt. art. 13 (del cui § 3 potrebbe essere ritenuta attuazione)

Cuiriso è la nuolva disciplina del calcolo dei termini di durata, art. 20: pare non coincuidere con quella civilprocessuale , ad es. , se si tiene conto della’rt. 155 cpc.

Disegno elementare ma sufficientemente distintivo ai sensi della disciplina dei marchi

Questo disegno di un teddy bear come marchio bidimensionale (così pare, anche se il rif. all’art. 7.1.e) del reg. 40-1994  fa pensare ad una forma cioè ad un segno 3D)  per gioielli è stato ritenuto sufficientemente distintivo, per cui è stata rigettata la domanda di amnnullamenot per carenza di distintività.

Così -confermando la fase amminsitrativa-  il Trib. UE 26.07.2023, T-591/21, Apart c. EUIPO-Tous SL.

<< 70 First, it is true that, according to the case-law, a sign which is excessively simple and composed of a basic geometrical figure, such as a circle, a line, a rectangle or a conventional pentagon, is not, in itself, capable of conveying a message which consumers will be able to remember, with the result that they will not regard it as a trade mark unless it has acquired distinctive character through use (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2007, Cain Cellars v OHIM (Device of a pentagon), T‑304/05, not published, EU:T:2007:271, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

71 In that regard, it must be observed that the contested sign and geometrical shapes cannot be regarded as being comparably simple. Irrespective of whether it will be recognised as a teddy bear or as a fantasy figure, the outline contains sufficient elements – such as rounded shapes – as a result of which it cannot be compared to a simple geometrical shape.

72 Secondly, it should be borne in mind that it is settled case-law that, in its review of legality, the Court is not bound by the decision-making practice of EUIPO (judgment of 7 September 2022, Völkl v EUIPO – Marker Dalbello Völkl (International) (Völkl), T‑155/21, not published, EU:T:2022:518, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

73 Thirdly, the heart symbol is commonly used in trade in general, and not only in the jewellery sector. It is also used in a wide variety of fields and is immediately recognised as symbolising love or affection. The extent of the use of the heart symbol cannot be compared to the use of the representation of a teddy bear. Although the teddy bear is capable of conveying positive feelings, it is not used for the same purposes and is not associated, immediately and unequivocally, with feelings of love or affection, but rather, as the applicant also maintains, with childhood or childhood memories.

74 That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the relevant public would not be attracted by the shape of the bear in itself, but rather by the symbols conveyed by it, namely love or tenderness, or by the argument relating to the meaning of the teddy bear as a symbol of love. The consumer will perceive and remember the mark as such and it cannot be established that, in the present case, such a consumer will be attracted by that mark solely because of the appeal of the symbols that it represents>>.

Rigettata pure il motivo della caratteristica (rectius: della forma) che dà valore essenziale al prodotto (art. 7.1.e.iii) reg. 1001 / 2017.

<< 84 The immediate aim of the prohibition on registering purely functional shapes and the prohibition on registering shapes which give substantial value to the goods is to prevent the exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from serving to extend the life of other rights which the EU legislature has sought to make subject to ‘limited periods’ (see, by analogy, judgments of 18 September 2014, Hauck, C‑205/13, EU:C:2014:2233, paragraph 31, and of 6 October 2011, Bang & Olufsen v OHIM (Representation of a loudspeaker), T‑508/08, EU:T:2011:575, paragraph 65).

85 Like the ground for refusal to register that applies to the shapes of goods which are necessary to obtain a technical result, the ground that concerns refusal to register signs consisting exclusively of shapes which give substantial value to the goods is to prevent the granting of a monopoly on those shapes (judgment of 6 October 2011, Representation of a loudspeaker, T‑508/08, EU:T:2011:575, paragraph 66).

86 The concept of a ‘shape which gives substantial value to the goods’ cannot be limited purely to the shape of products having only artistic or ornamental value, as there is otherwise a risk that products which have essential functional characteristics as well as a significant aesthetic element will not be covered. In that case, the right conferred by the trade mark on its proprietor would grant that proprietor a monopoly on the essential characteristics of such products, which would not allow the objective of that ground for refusal to be fully realised (see, by analogy, judgment of 18 September 2014, Hauck, C‑205/13, EU:C:2014:2233, paragraph 32).

87 It should also be borne in mind that, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 34 above, in invalidity proceedings, as the registered EU trade mark is presumed to be valid, it is for the person who has filed the application for a declaration of invalidity to invoke before EUIPO the specific facts which call the validity of that trade mark into question.

88 In the applicant’s view, it is well known that the teddy bear is recognised as a symbol of love – similar to the symbol of the heart – which evokes positive emotions and strengthens the purchasing impulse. The applicant submits that the aesthetic value of the contested mark – an aspect which, in its view, is highlighted by the intervener – determines its attractiveness for consumers and significantly increases the value of the goods.

89 The Board of Appeal stated that the fact that the shape of the contested mark may be pleasing or attractive is not sufficient to exclude it from registration. In that regard, the Board of Appeal stated that the intervener’s statements relating to the meaning of the teddy bear symbol were not sufficient to show that the contested mark came under Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation No 40/94 and also observed that the applicant had merely recalled the relevant case-law without explaining in what respect the contested sign would determine to a large extent the behaviour of consumers. Lastly, it noted that the applicant relied on several occasions on the alleged simplicity of the bear shape in order to prove that it was devoid of distinctive character, which was in direct contradiction with the criteria required for the application of Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of that regulation.

90 In the present case, it must be stated that the contested mark does not represent a sign which consists exclusively of the shape or another characteristic of the goods. As is apparent from the reasoning set out in paragraphs 37 to 47 above, the goods covered by the contested mark represent items of jewellery which generally take the form of rings, necklaces or earrings and which are likely to bear the sign of which that mark consists, but not to take the shape thereof.

91 Consequently, the contested mark consists of a sign unrelated to the appearance of the goods it covers and not of a sign which consists exclusively of the shape of those goods.

92 Therefore, that assessment of the contested mark precludes that mark from being capable of falling under the prohibition laid down in Article 7(1)(e)(iii) of Regulation No 40/94>>.

(segnalazione di Marcel Pemsel di IPKat)

La crowded art riduce il tasso di distintività del marchio azionato

Alessandro Cerri in IPKat ci propone High CourT of Justice inglese 19 luglio 2023, Case No: IL-2018-000115, giudice Mellor, per cui il primo dei due marchi seguenti non è violato dal secondo.

Le differenze sono modeste dato che fantino e cavallo non hanno un ruolo dominante (§ 264) e che il settore delle magliette polo è assi affollato di marchi analoghi.

Il passo più interessante è quello circa la valorizzazione della crowded art: essa conta circa il giudizio di distintività del segno azionato, che si riduce se il settore è pieno di prodotti affini marcati in modo assai simile.

Mi pare esattissimo.

<<66  As far as I could tell, the Ds did not engage with the Cs’ arguments as to context but it seems to me that these submissions confuse two separate but related concepts and involve a non-sequitur between the first two and the last two points. The concepts are related in the sense that they both involve things that impinge on the mind of the average consumer and (may) influence the result.

67. There are sound policy reasons for not taking an over-expansive view of the context of the allegedly infringing use. These can be readily understood in the examples which the Deputy Judge had in mind in [24]. The use of ‘Fake Rolex’ or ‘Imitation Louis Vuitton’ does not escape infringement of the famous marks.

68. Although, as I have indicated, the Cs suggested this case was all about context, the Ds put their case differently. Instead, the Ds submitted the key here was to focus on the nature of the mark, the message it conveys to the consumer and hence on its distinctive character. Implicitly, the Ds therefore agreed with the notion that the relevant context was ‘local’, and so do I.

69. Taking a step back from the detail, if I assume for a moment that RL Polo, USPA and all the other third party ‘polo’ brands had never existed and BHPC was the first ‘polo’ brand which created the market and Sign 3 was freshly launched onto the market (for this purpose, assume UK), the infringement action would look very different – in short, it would be far more likely to succeed.

70. Instinctively, the long-standing presence of RL Polo, USPA and possibly other third party ‘polo’ brands must create a different situation. I agree with the Ds that it is necessary to assess the nature of the Cs mark, what it conveys to the average consumer and its distinctive character in this market which can be characterised as somewhat crowded with ‘polo’ themed brands. This is not a ‘context’ issue, and the distinction is clear: context is concerned with an examination of the use complained of, whereas the Ds are saying that it is the Cs mark which brings to that examination the relevance of other ‘polo’ brands in the market, provided they impinge on the way in which the average consumer views and recalls the Cs’ mark>>

<<.74. Once again, it is apparent that Marcus Smith J. considered that the relevance of other ‘polo’ brands went to distinctiveness or the lack of it. I should make it clear that the point I derive from Greenwich Polo is additional support for the point of law that the relevance of a ‘crowded market’ is to distinctiveness of the registered trade mark in issue. I should also emphasise that, whilst that case involved the same Cs’ registered trade marks as in this case, the Greenwich Signs were very different from those I have to consider. Furthermore and most importantly, I have received different evidence in this case – I have not received any evidence from Mr Durbridge>>.

Sulla (in-)validità di marchio sonoro

Anna Maria Stein in IPKat segnala una decisione dell’ufficio di Alicante che rigetta la domanda di registrazine di marchio musicale (la canzone per bimbi “Johnny Johnny Yes Papa”)

Si tratta di 15.06.2023, applicat. n° 018713855, Mora TV srl (testo inglese automat. trad. qui)

Le ragioni del rigetto attengono alla carenza di distintività; ne è interessante l’applicaizone ai marchi musicali (riporto la sintesi di Anna Maria Stein, ove trovi pure un paio di precedenti amministrativi):

<<a) Length of the sound mark

Although the length of a sound mark does not disqualify it from being considered as an indicator of origin, and the EUTMR is silent in this regard, the EUIPO’s examination guidelines specify the types of sound marks that are not likely to be accepted without proof of acquired distinctiveness, including sounds which are too long to be considered as an indication of origin and sounds which are usually associated with certain goods and services.

b) Lack of easily identifiable and recognisable melodic structure

The sign does not contain an easily identifiable and quickly recognisable melodic structure since it begins with a simple, repetitive motif, which is then accompanied by a few basic tones and sounds, typical of music played in cartoons, movies or songs with lyrics for babies or children. Thus, it does not contain any relevant melodic moment/structure that would allow the public to clearly identify it as a brand, and consequently lacks the ability to function as an identifier of commercial origin.

d) The sound trade mark does not identify the commercial origin of goods or services

Consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of products or services in the absence of any graphic or verbal element, because, in general, a sound in itself is not commonly used in any field of commercial practice as a means of identification. However, marketing habits in an economic sector are not fixed and can evolve in a very dynamic way, including through the use of sound trade marks.

When a sound mark consists of non-distinctive/descriptive/generic verbal elements pronounced in a clear manner and without striking or unusual sound elements, the sound mark will be considered non-distinctive.

The trade mark at issue here contains several phrases taken from a song that is very popular throughout the world and for which there are numerous versions and videos that can easily be found on the internet.

e) No acquired distinctive character

According to the EUIPO, the applicant did not submit any opinion polls/surveys or depositions, nor did it provide details of turnover and sales figures or any document regarding investment in advertising and efforts made to promote the brand.

Thus, it was not possible to establish the market share regarding the objected products and services, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of the use of the sound trade mark, or the proportion of the relevant public that identifies the origin of the products and services, before the filing date of the application>>.

Si v. il Chapter 3, § 14 Sound marks, Sect 4 – part B Examination, p. 452 ss, delle Guidelines EUIPO, vers. 1.0, 31 marzo 2023.

L’ emoji I LOVE YOU per servizi finanziari non è distintivo

Il 2° board of appeal dell’EUIPO , 1 giugno 2023, Case R 2305/2022-2, Käselow Holding GmbH (qui la pag. web del fascicolo e qui il link diretto al pdf in inglese, traduz. automat. da orig. tedesco), conferma che l’emoji I LOVE YOU nell’ ASL american sign language non è distintivo per servizi finanziari

E’ irrilevante che di solito avvenga con mano destra.

<<22 In general, it should be pointed out that the main function of an emojis is to provide emotional references which are otherwise lacking in tilted entertainment. Emojis therefore function as a parallel language, which convey a nuanced meaning and make it  easier to express feelings. They are often connected with positive communication. As a rule, they are not perceived as an indication of origin.
23 This finding is also in line with the case-law, which states that it is sufficient for the finding of a lack of distinctive character if the sign exclusively conveys an abstract promotional statement and is primarily interpreted as an advertising slogan and not as an indication of the origin of the service (05/12/2002, T-130/01, REAL PEOPLE, REAL SOLUTIONS, EU:T:2002:301, § 29-30).
24 It also corresponds to the decision-making practice of the Board, according to which the average consumer is accustomed to a large number of pictograms such as emblems and emojis which represent emotions and are generally used in private communication to express generally positive feelings, such as joy, consent, enthusiasm or happiness. Such pictograms (including emojis) are perceived by the relevant public as a general advertising message or purely decorative elements that are devoid of any distinctive character (see, inter alia, 17/01/2018, R 1489/2017-1, DEVICE OF AN emoji WITH A SMILING FACE (fig.); § 24-26 and 34; 04/10/2013, R 788/2013-4, representation of a smiley, § 13; 16/10/2014, R 602/2014-1, LUBILATED:), § 16-17). The pictograms are often also devoid of distinctive character because they are simple geometric shapes, design elements customary in advertising, stylised instructions on the use of the product or the reproduction of the product itself (29/06/2017, R 2034/2016-4, REPRESENTATION OF ZWEI HÄNDEN (fig.), § 11; 21/03/2006, R 1243/2006-4, Biegsame Welle, § 8; see also 02/04/2020, R 2189/2019-4, REPRESENTATION OF A RED (fig.); 02/10/2017, R 570/2017-4, CIRCULAR FIGURE).
25 In connection with the services claimed, namely financial services (Class 36) and, inter alia, building cleaning (Class 37), the sign in question will therefore be perceived as a general advertising message, which means that customers will be particularly satisfied with the services offered under the sign and will think of them on account of their satisfaction with loved affection.
26 In connection with the services objected to, the consumer therefore merely infers from the sign claimed a positive connotation of a general nature, either in the sense of an attractive decoration, in the sense of a general laudatory statement and incitement to purchase. As a simple representation of a positive gesture, the sign does not contain anything that would enable the targeted consumer to assign the goods thus identified commercially.
27 In summary, it must therefore be stated that the sign is not capable of serving to the public concerned as an indication of the origin of the relevant goods>>.

(notizia e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Il logo di Batman è sufficientemente distintivo per maschere e costumi teatrali

Trib. UE 7 giugno 2023, T-735/21, Aprile -Commerciale Italiana v. EUIPO – DC Comics  conferma la decisione del Board amministrativo e rigetta l’opposizione che voleva far dichiarare nulli i marchi sotto riportati .

In effetti la domanda giudiziale pareva assai poco fondata e quindi assai azzardata: non credo che alcuno possa ritenere  il logo descrittivo o indicazione generica del prodotto.


marchio impugnato

Decettività e non distintività della mucca rovesciata (inverted cow)

Anna Maria Stein su IPKat dà notizia di interessante decisione EUIPO 08.05.2023, marchio inter. reg. 1600229, ref. dell’istante 35/RM20K01/EM.

Si tratta di marchio costituito da immagine di mucca rovesciata per prodotti alimentari etc. come sostituti della carne etc..

L’idea commerciale -parrebbe- era quella di indicare l’assenza di carne marcandoli tramite l’immagine di una mucca rovesciata anzichè diritta.

Ma le cose vanno doppiamente male: da un lato è ingannatoria perchè l’utente continua a pensare invece alla presenza (non all’assenza) di carne; dall’altro, è comunque descrittivo.

I giudizio sulla decettità non sono frequenti.

Quindi domanda rigettata


Di marchi numerici/alfabetici e di buona fede

Tre notazioni su Trib. Milano n. 6542/2021 del 27 luglio 2021, RG 32332/2016, rel. Fazzini E.:
1°)  <<. Il Collegio ritiene, comunque, che tale eccezione
sia anche infondata, atteso che essa si basa esclusivamente sul fatto che esso sarebbe formato da
semplici lettere dell’alfabeto, “senza alcuna caratteristica di fantasia”, dovendosi ritenere al riguardo
che i marchi numerici (o alfabetici) sono privi di tutela solo quando sono usati per esigenze di
comunicazione imprenditoriale, come per indicare la serie o il tipo di prodotto o la loro quantità, ma
non quando sono utilizzati, come nel caso di specie, in funzione distintiva, tenuto conto che l’art. 7
c.p.i. prevede espressamente che possono costituire oggetto di registrazione come marchio d’impresa
tutti i segni, in particolare, fra gli altri, le parole, compresi i nomi di persone, i disegni e le lettere. Si
ritiene, in particolare, che il marchio, rappresentato da lettere dell’alfabeto, non possa automaticamente
essere considerato nullo, o comunque debole, essendo, comunque, necessaria la prova contraria da
parte di chi ne contesti la validità come marchio, la quale, nel caso di specie, non è stata in alcun modo

2°)   <<Alla luce di tale motivazione, il Collegio ritiene, pertanto, tenuto conto della pluralità dei casi indicati
da parte attrice e non oggetto di specifica contestazione e del comportamento assunto dal Riva Faccio e
dalla società convenuta anche nelle more del giudizio, continuando a porre in essere atti in violazione
dell’accordo, che sia provata la reiterata violazione degli obblighi negoziali per la palese e insistita
inosservanza sia di quanto sancito specificatamente nel contratto, concluso tra le parti nel novembre
2012, sia del canone della buona fede nella sua esecuzione. Si ritiene, in particolare, alla luce del consolidato indirizzo interpretativo della Suprema Corte, che la buona fede nella esecuzione del
contratto si sostanzia in un generale obbligo di solidarietà che impone a ciascuna delle parti di agire in
modo tale da preservare gli interessi dell’altra, a prescindere tanto da specifici obblighi contrattuali,
quanto dal dovere extracontrattuale del neminem laedere, trovando tale impegno solidaristico il suo
limite precipuo unicamente nell’interesse proprio del soggetto, tenuto, pertanto, al compimento di tutti
gli atti giuridici e/o materiali che si rendano necessari alla salvaguardia dell’interesse della controparte,
nella misura in cui essi non comportino un apprezzabile sacrificio a suo carico (cfr. per tutte Cass. 4
maggio 2009, n. 10182). Si ritiene, pertanto, come già affermato anche da questo tribunale, che un
compromesso negoziale fondato anche su particolari piccoli impone alle parti di uniformare i propri
comportamenti a un livello molto elevato di correttezza, tale da evitare che anche in via indiretta si
possano generare o anche solo avallare fraintendimenti ed equivoci (cfr. tribunale di Milano, sentenza
6454/2016, pubblicata il 26.05.2016). La violazione continuata e duratura delle disposizioni
contrattuali, nonché del canone di lealtà costituisce inadempimento contrattuale di indubbia rilevanza e
oggettiva gravità, tale, quindi, da giustificare l’accoglimento della domanda di risoluzione. Trattandosi
di contratto a esecuzione continuata, in conformità della previsione di cui all’art. 1458 c.c., l’efficacia
della pronuncia retroagisce al momento della litispendenza, con conseguente cessazione degli effetti
dei contratti alla data della notificazione dell’atto di citazione introduttivo del presente giudizio,
effettuata in data 20.05.2016 (cfr. Cass. 20894/2014)>>.

3°)  danno da royalties ipotetiche: 15% del fatturato (ammontare assai diffuso)