<<Nel caso in esame, il rischio di confusione è da escludersi, poiché l’apposizione ben visibile del marchio CMC prima del nome del modello Ferrari riprodotto in scala (cfr. all. 46 e 48 fasc. attrice), accompagnata nelle brochure illustrative dal legal disclaimer di CMC in cui si precisa che l’uso del marchio del fabbricante è a mero scopo di riferimento e non allude in alcun modo all’esistenza di un collegamento di CMC con Ferrari (cfr. all. 20 fasc. attrice), è tale da escludere –
con riferimento al consumatore medio e, a maggior ragione, al pubblico di collezionisti a cui CMC si rivolge – qualsiasi dubbio circa la provenienza del modellino pubblicizzato e commercializzato da CMC con il proprio marchio di produttore di autovetture in miniatura. (…)
Tali considerazioni sono dunque indicative della sussistenza di una forma che dà valore sostanziale al prodotto e che, come tale, impedisce l’applicabilità della tutela come marchio di impresa ai sensi dell’art. 9 c.p.i.
Pertanto, fatto salvo il divieto contrattuale di utilizzo dei marchi Ferrari e di produzione e commercializzazione dei modellini oggetto del cessato contratto di licenza fra le parti, vanno respinte le domande di accertamento della contraffazione dei marchi denominativi e figurativi così come dei marchi di forma azionati dall’attrice . (…)
6.3.2. – Facendo applicazione dei principi appena illustrati, deve ritenersi che nel caso di specie sussistano i requisiti per il riconoscimento della tutela del diritto d’autore, come opere del disegno industriale, soltanto per due modelli di autovetture Ferrari, e segnatamente per la Ferrari 250 GTO e per la Ferrari Testarossa>>
marchi di cui è chiesta l’annullamento (+ altri analoghi)1° anteriorità opposta2° anteriorità opposta
Bene il Trib. conferma che nonostante la uguiaglianza concettuale (seppur in linguje diverse) agevomente percepuibile dal consumatore lituano,non c’è confondibilità: ciò per la scarsa rilevanzz della compmnente denomiantiva rispetto alla compentne figuratia e per la debolezza , direi meglio nullitòa della prima.
<<63 The Board of Appeal concluded, in paragraphs 51 to 53 of the contested decisions, that there was a likelihood of confusion or association on the part of the target public, namely the part of the relevant Latvian public that would understand the contested marks as being the literal translation of the Cyrillic script of the earlier mark, taking into account the identity or similarity of the goods at issue, the average level of attention of that public, and the fact that the conceptually identical nature of the marks at issue outweighed their phonetic and visual differences, irrespective of the normal distinctive character of the earlier mark.
64 The Board of Appeal also found that the average Latvian consumer might believe that the goods covered by the marks at issue came from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings. That public, while noticing the differences between the marks, could perceive the contested marks as being a variation of the earlier mark adapted to meet the needs of consumers throughout the market of the European Union. In that regard, the Board of Appeal stated that the use of different languages was a marketing practice in order to better adapt the marks to different national markets.
65 The applicant submits that there is no likelihood of confusion. It maintains, in essence, that the significant visual and phonetic differences between the marks at issue outweigh any possible conceptual similarity.
66 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
67 EUIPO reproduces, in that regard and in essence, the assessment of the Board of Appeal and notes in particular that, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, account should be taken of the Latvian public and not the entire public of the European Union. After specifying, inter alia, that the method of buying the goods covered by the marks at issue was only one factor among all the elements which it was required to take into account in that global assessment, EUIPO concludes, in essence, that the points of dissimilarity between the signs at issue are not sufficient to dispel the relevant consumer’s impression that those signs are similar.
68 In this instance, it is necessary, first, to note that the marks at issue have many visual differences in respect of both their word elements and, as the applicant states, their figurative elements, which, while they do not dominate the overall impression, are nonetheless not negligible. As regards everyday food products, as the applicant rightly emphasises, purchasing is primarily based on their visual aspects in so far as they are usually sold in self-service stores where consumers choose the product themselves and must therefore rely primarily on the image of the mark applied to that product (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 December 2013, Eckes-Granini v OHIM – Panini (PANINI), T‑487/12, not published, EU:T:2013:637, paragraphs 63 and 65, and of 23 February 2022, Ancor Group v EUIPO – Cody’s Drinks International (CODE-X), T‑198/21, EU:T:2022:83, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
69 Second, it follows from paragraphs 37 and 38 above that the marks at issue had, overall, a very low degree of phonetic similarity, if any.
70 Third, although the signs at issue, as has been concluded in paragraph 59 above, are conceptually identical for a part of the relevant public, the word elements ‘tea’ and ‘чай’, on which, in particular, that conceptual identity is based, are devoid, as has been noted in paragraph 29 above, of distinctive character given that, for that public, they are descriptive of the goods covered by the marks. Those signs being conceptually identical is therefore likely, in the circumstances of the case, to play a limited role in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion on the part of that part of the public, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 62 above.
71 Fourth, as regards the EUIPO decisions relied on by the intervener, it is sufficient to note that, in its review of legality, the Court is not bound by EUIPO’s decision-making practice (judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM, C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65).
72 In those circumstances, and although the goods at issue were directed at the public at large which had a merely average level of attention, it must be held that, taking into account the normal distinctive character of the earlier mark, which is not disputed by the applicant, and the significant visual and phonetic differences between the marks at issue, the Board of Appeal, irrespective of whether the marks are conceptually identical for the part of the relevant public which it took into account in its examination, made an error of assessment in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 in Cases T‑1066/23 and T‑1067/23, and within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 in Cases T‑1068/23 and T‑1069/23.
73 Therefore, as the error of assessment thus made by the Board of Appeal is such as to, in itself, lead to the annulment of the contested decisions in their entirety, it follows that the single plea in law must be upheld, without it being necessary to examine the first complaint of that plea, and, consequently, the contested decisions must be annulled.>>
Lite sui marchi evocanti l’Oktoberfest, decisa dal Board of Appeal EUIPO 11.12.2024, caso 1264/2024-2, FCRB IMPEX SRL v. ANDESHAUPTSTADT MÜNCHEN, correttamente decisa in base alla debolezza dell’anteriorità.
Marchi in lite:
marchio chiesto in registrazioneanteriorità azionata in opposizione
La opposition e il Board of appeal escludono il riscjhio di confuisione.
La parte finale della seconda:
<<54 A global assessment of a likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors, and in particular, the similarity between the trade marks and between the goods or services. Accordingly, a greater degree of similarity between the goods/services may be offset by a lower degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 20; 11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 24; 29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17).
55 As a preliminary point, in accordance with the principle of the interdependence between the factors to be taken into consideration when examining the likelihood of confusion, it must be noted that the ratio legis of trade mark law is to strike a balance between the interest that the proprietor of a trade mark has in safeguarding its essential function, on the one hand, and the interests of other economic operators in having signs capable of denoting their products and services, on the other (18/01/2023, T-443/21, YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL (fig.) / yoga ALLIANCE (fig.), EU:T:2023:7, § 117 and the case-law cited).
56 It follows that excessive protection of marks consisting of elements that, as in the present case, have very weak distinctive character, if any, in relation to the goods or services at issue, could adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trade mark law, if, in the context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the mere presence of such elements in the signs at issue led to a finding of a likelihood of confusion without taking into account the remainder of the specific factors in the present case (18/01/2023, T-443/21, YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL (fig.) / yoga ALLIANCE (fig.), EU:T:2023:7, § 118).
57 In that regard, where the earlier trade mark and the sign whose registration is sought coincide in an element that has a weak distinctive character with regard to the goods and services at issue, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR does not often lead to a finding that such likelihood exists (12/05/2021, T-70/20, MUSEUM OF ILLUSIONS (fig.) / MUSEUM OF ILLUSIONS (fig.), EU:T:2021:253, § 119 and the case-law cited).
58 In the present case, taking into account the above comparison of the signs and in particular the existence of the very weak common element ‘OKTOBER()FEST’ in both signs, the differences in the overall impression of the signs, especially the visually more striking and distinctive figurative element of the earlier mark (‘a flying beer mug’) and the figurative element in the contested sign, insofar as it will be seen as abstract, are such that the relevant public with an average level of attention will be able to make a clear distinction between the marks at issue. This applies notwithstanding the identity of the services at issue and the imperfect recollection of the public.
59 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the Opposition Division correctly concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public as regards the fact that the services may come from the same or economically linked undertakings.
60 Therefore, the appeal is dismissed>>
(notizia di Marcel Pemsel in IPKat, da cui il link ai marchi)
L’appello del 9 circuito n. 23-16060 del 22.10.2024, Lerner&Rowe v. Brown Engstrand&Shely decide una lite per violazione di marchio tra due studi legali avvenuta tramite keyword advertising (k.a.).
Il Panel non affronta le legittimità di quest’ultimo strumento secondo la legge marchi, limitandosi a dire che non ricorre confondibilità tra gli esiti della ricerca Google e il nome/i segno dello studio attore.
Rigetta quindi la domanda.
E’ infatti assai fiducioso sull’avvedutezza dell’utente medio di internet:
<<Google’s search engine is so ubiquitous that we can be confident that the reasonably prudent online shopper is familiar with its layout and function, knows that it orders results based on relevance to the search term, and understands that it produces sponsored links along with organic search results. Moreover, in this case, the relevant consumers specifically typed in “Lerner & Rowe” as a search term, suggesting that they would be even more discerning of the results they received. Therefore, because this case involves shopping on Google by using the precise trademark at issue, this factor weighs in favor of ALG.>>
E poi:
<The district court was correct to conclude that this is one of the rare trademark infringement cases susceptible to summary judgment. The generally sophisticated nature of online shoppers, the evidence demonstrating that there is not an appreciable number of consumers who would find ALG’s use of the mark confusing, and the clarity of Google’s search results pages, convince us that ALG’s use of the “Lerner & Rowe” mark is not likely to cause consumer confusion.>>.
Del che c’è da dubitare, come avverte Eric Goldman (dal cui blog prendo notizia della e link alla sentenza)
L’opinione concorrente di J. Desai invece esamina se il k.a. costituisca “uso del marchio”. Ricorda un importante precedente del 2011 del 9 ciruito, che rispose in senso affermativo: ma ora intende rovesciarlo, perchè non esatto.
<<Whether an action, like bidding
on keywords, that involves no display or presentation of a
mark whatsoever satisfies the “use in commerce” definition.
In other words, does a buyer of advertising keywords who
bids on certain terms and phrases “use” its competitor’s
mark when bidding on it?
In Network Automation, we answered, yes. 638 F.3d at
1144–45. But we provided no analysis to support this
holding, id. at 1145, and we relied on cases with
meaningfully different facts. >>
Qui interessa il passaggio dove include la rinomanza del secondo marcbio (di parte di esso: di CHIQUITA) tra i fattori da conteggiare per il giudizio di confondibilità.
<<46 In that regard, EUIPO’s argument that the reputation of the mark applied for, or of its distinct elements, is irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the relative ground for refusal, referred to in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected.
47 It is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the factor based on the distinctive character of the earlier mark, which is linked to the protection granted to such a mark and which is to be taken into consideration in the context of the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion and, on the other, the distinctive character which an element of a composite mark may have, which is linked to its ability to dominate the overall impression produced by that mark and which must be examined from the stage of assessing the similarity of the signs (see, to that effect, order of 27 April 2006, L’Oréal v OHIM, C‑235/05 P, not published, EU:C:2006:271, paragraph 43, and judgment of 25 March 2010, Nestlé v OHIM – Master Beverage Industries (Golden Eagle and Golden Eagle Deluxe), T‑5/08 to T‑7/08, EU:T:2010:123, paragraph 65).
48 Thus, in the present case, since it is not disputed that the mark CHIQUITA enjoys a reputation in the European Union for some fresh fruits, it is possible to take into account, at the stage of the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue, that reputation as a relevant factor for assessing the distinctive character of the element ‘chiquita’ appearing in the sign CHIQUITA QUEEN.
49 Furthermore, since the examination of the distinctive character of the elements of a sign cannot be confused with the examination of the distinctive character of the earlier mark carried out as part of the overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 of the contested decision, as well as that relied on in EUIPO’s response, which refers to the reputation of the earlier mark under the protection granted to the latter in the context of the assessment of the overall risk confusion, is irrelevant.
50 It follows that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in concluding that the term ‘chiquita’, appearing in the sign of the mark applied for, had weak distinctive character>>.
Deicisione probabilmente esatta ma che richiederebbe un esame approfondito, data la non banale questione teorica sottostante.
Marcel Pemsel in IPKat, che dà notizia della sentenza, sostanzialmente concorda, pur evidenziando contrasti con giurisprudenza precedente.
<<Contrary to the opponent’s claims, the Board agrees with the contested decision that consumers will not be able to read any letters in the contested sign but will perceive only vertical bars of different heights, two of which have dots. The contested sign is missing the horizontal lines, which is an essential component of the normal graphic representation of the verbal element ‘hyundai’, without which the relevant public will have difficulty in recognising that verbal element. Consequently, the contested sign will not be immediately and without any mental effort recognised as the verbal element ‘hyundai’. It is much more probable that the contested sign will be recognised only as the combination of some basic figurative elements. Only after an in-depth analysis, which consumers do not tend to perform (26/03/2021, R 551/2018-G, Device (fig.) / Device (fig.), § 52), might very stylised representations of the verbal element ‘hyundai’ be perceive>>
Curiosamente una sua ricerca nella AI Gemini di Google gli dà questo esito: <<The image you sent me appears to be a trademark image filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). It depicts a blue logo on a white background, but without any additional context, it is impossible to say for certain what the logo represents or what company or organization it belongs to. […] >>
A me invece, con uguale prompt, Gemini dà esito opposto, riferendosi proprio alla parola Hyundai:
Ma l’AI non è il consumatore medio, essendo la sua logica operativa assai diversa da quella umana (parrebbe).
L’ufficio esclusde la confondibilità ordinaria, soprattuto per l’assenza di vicinanza concettuale: << A livello concettuale, i segni sono dissimili poiché saanno associati a significati diversi veicolati dagli uccellini e dalla farfalla rispettivamente. Di fatto, la semplice appartenenza alla specie animale non è in alcun modo sufficiente a evocare una similitudine concettuale. Infatti, per giurisprudenza ormai consolidata, il mero fatto che due simboli possano essere raggruppati sotto un termine generico comune non li rende in alcun modo simili dal punto di vista concettuale. Ad esempio, il Tribunale ha ritenuto che, sebbene una mela e una pera possano avere caratteristiche comuni, trattandosi in entrambi i casi di frutti strettamente correlati tra loro in termini biologici e simili in quanto a dimensioni, colore, consistenza, tali caratteristiche comuni incidono in maniera davvero limitata sull’impressione complessiva. Di conseguenza, il Tribunale ha concluso che tali elementi sono insufficienti a controbilanciare le evidenti differenze concettuali esistenti tra i marchi, constatazione questa che li ha resi concettualmente dissimili (31/01/2019, T-215/17, PEAR (fig.) / APPLE BITE (fig.) et al., EU:T:2019:45, § 77-79)>>.
Giudizio dubbio: i) intanto si tratta non solo di animali ma di animali che volano; ii) poi la dimensione probabilmente ridotta rende difficile cogliere subito la differenza , o almeno di coglierla in maniera tale da far pensare a due aziende in concorrenza invece che a varianti di un’unica idea creativa nella scelta dei segni distintivi aziendali.
Nè c’è distintività accresciuta (sempre nella confondibilitò ordianria, non da rinomanza) : <<Infatti, il carattere distintivo accresciuto richiede il riconoscimento del marchio da parte del pubblico di riferimento e, nell’effettuare tale valutazione, occorre tenere conto, in particolare, delle caratteristiche intrinseche del marchio, compreso il fatto che esso contiene o meno un elemento descrittivo dei prodotti o dei servizi per i quali è stato registrato; la quota di mercato detenuta dal marchio; l’intensità, l’estensione geografica e la durata dell’uso di tale marchio, l’entità degli investimenti effettuati dall’impresa per promuovere il marchio; la proporzione del pubblico di riferimento che, grazie al marchio, identifica i prodotti o i servizi come provenienti da una determinata impresa; e dichiarazioni di camere di commercio e d’industria o di altre associazioni professionali (22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 23).
Inoltre, le prove dell’acquisizione di un carattere distintivo accresciuto in seguito all’uso devono riguardare sia (i) l’area geografica di riferimento sia (ii) i prodotti e/o servizi pertinenti. La natura, i fattori, le prove e la valutazione del carattere distintivo accresciuto sono gli stessi della notorietà, anche se la soglia per la constatazione di un carattere distintivo accresciuto può essere inferiore.
Quanto al contenuto delle prove, maggiori sono le indicazioni che esse forniscono circa i vari fattori dai quali si può dedurre l’elevato carattere distintivo, tanto più rilevante e determinante. In particolare, le prove che, nel complesso, forniscono scarsi dati e informazioni quantitativi o nessuna, non saranno idonee a fornire indicazioni su fattori vitali quali la conoscenza dei marchi, la quota di mercato e l’intensità dell’uso e, di conseguenza, non saranno sufficienti per affermare l’esistenza di un carattere distintivo accresciuto>>.
Giudicando in base alle stesse prove (sempre profilo interessante per i pratici), è poi rigettata pure la domanda basata sulla rinmmanza.
L’ufficio esclude la confondibilità ordinaria ex art. 8.1, EUTMR per carenza di affinità merceologica (corde e packaging per imballaggio vs. ceramiche etc.)
Riconosce però la tutela allargata per ingiustificato vantaggio dalla notorietà altrui ex art. 8,.5 EUTMR
<<It has to be recalled that the contested goods have a link to the earlier reputed goods and services, as explained in section c) above. Furthermore, the earlier mark enjoys a high reputation in the European Union in connection with video games. Consequently, and according to case-law, earlier marks with a strong reputation will be recognised in almost any context, particularly as a result of their above-average quality, which reflects a positive message, influencing the choice of the consumers as regards goods or services of other producers/providers.
Furthermore, it is important to underline that the earlier trade mark is inherently distinctive in relation to the goods and services they are registered for. This fact makes it even more likely that the applicant will attempt to benefit from the value of the opponent’s sign since such a distinctive trade mark as “Lara Croft” will be recognised in almost any context. The mere fact that the applicant changed the position of two letters will in no way impede such a recognition, as the structure of the contested sign – female Christian name and last name – is still identical to the earlier right.
An unfair advantage occurs when a third party exploits the reputation of the earlier mark to the benefit of its own marketing efforts. In practice, the applicant ‘hooks onto’ the renowned mark and uses it as a vehicle to encourage consumer interest in its own products. The advantage for the applicant is a substantial saving on investment in promotion and publicity for its own mark, since it benefits from that which has made the earlier mark famous. This is unfair because it is done in a parasitic way (08/02/2002, R 472/2001 1, BIBA/ BIBA).
Furthermore, in view of the earlier trade mark special attractiveness, it may be exploited even outside its natural market sector, by merchandising (as demonstrated by the opponent). Hence, as the earlier mark has a high reputation and the commercial and as especially the merchandising context in which the goods are promoted are very close, the Opposition Division can accept the opponent’s claim that consumers of goods in Class 9 and in Class 22 make a connection between the applicant’s goods and the reputed mark Lara Croft used by the opponent.
The opponent has invested large sums of money and effort in creating a certain brand image associated with its trade mark, by creating a fictious character which attracts the admiration of the public, inciting them to be a close as possible to this character (for instance women dressed like Lara Croft in fan events), and one way of doing this is by buying merchandising goods, bearing the name Lara Croft.
This image associated with a trade mark confers on it an – often significant – economic value, which is independent of that of the goods for which it is registered. Consequently, Article 8(5) EUTMR aims at protecting this advertising function and the investment made in creating a certain brand image by granting protection to reputed trade mark, irrespective of the similarity of the goods or services or of a likelihood of confusion, provided it can be demonstrated that use of the contested application without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark.
The notion of taking unfair advantage of distinctiveness or repute covers cases where the applicant benefits from the attractiveness of the earlier right by using for its services a sign that is similar (or identical) to one widely known in the market and, therefore, misappropriating its attractive powers and advertising value, or exploiting its reputation, image and prestige. This may lead to unacceptable situations of commercial parasitism, where the applicant is allowed to take a ‘free ride’ on the investment of the opponent in promoting and building up goodwill for its mark, as it may stimulate sales of its products to an extent that is disproportionately high for the size of its promotional investment. In its judgement of 18/06/2009, C 487/07, L’Oréal, EU:C:2009:378, § 41, 49, the Court indicated that unfair advantage exists where there is a transfer of the image of the mark, or of the characteristics that it projects, to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign. By riding on the coat-tails of the reputed mark, the applicant benefits from the power of attraction, reputation and prestige of the reputed mark. The applicant also exploits, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the earlier mark in order to create and maintain the image of that mark.
The use of the mark applied for in connection with the abovementioned goods will almost certainly draw the relevant consumer’s attention to the opponent’s highly similar and very well-known mark. The contested mark will become associated with the aura of fame that surrounds the Lara Croft brand. Many consumers are very likely to think that there is a direct connection between the goods of the applicant, and the famous Lara Croft character, as the sings are made up of identical letters, or might not even notice the difference.
Article 8(5) EUTMR exists to prevent this type of situation, where one mark takes unfair advantage of its distinctive character and repute. The applicant could take unfair advantage of the fact that the public knows the trade mark Lara Croft so well, in order to introduce its own similar trade mark without incurring any great risk and the cost of introducing a totally unknown trade mark to the market.
On the basis of the above, the Opposition Division concludes that the contested trade mark will take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.
The opponent also argues that use of the contested trade mark would be detrimental to the repute of the earlier trade mark.
As seen above, the existence of a risk of injury is an essential condition for Article 8(5) EUTMR to apply. The risk of injury may be of three different types. For an opposition to be well founded in this respect it is sufficient if only one of these types is found to exist. In the present case, as seen above, the Opposition Division has already concluded that the contested trade mark would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the earlier trade mark. It follows that there is no need to examine whether other types also apply>>.
Anteriorità opposta: ROYAL nonchè ROYAL UNIBREW (ma l’esame ha riguardato solo il primo segno)
Giustamente il BoA esclude confondibilità data la assenza di distintività di ROYAL (“segno di uso comune negli usi costanti del commercio”, se si applicasse il ns diritto, art. 13.1A cpi)
<<Overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion
45 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors, in particular between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the signs, and vice versa (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17; 18/12/2008, C-16/06 P, Mobilix, EU:C:2008:739, § 46; 05/03/2020, C-766/18 P, BBQLOUMI (fig.) / HALLOUMI, EU:C:2020:170, § 69).
46 It is also settled case-law that the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion, and therefore trade marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the recognition they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character (11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 24; 29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 18; 22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 20).
47 On the other hand, where the signs overlap in a descriptive, non-distinctive or weak element, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion will not often lead to a finding that that likelihood exists (12/06/2019, C-705/17, ROSLAGSÖL, EU:C:2019:481, § 55).
48 The ratio legis of trade mark law is to strike a balance between the interest of the proprietor of a trade mark in safeguarding its essential function, and the interests of other economic operators in having signs capable of denoting their goods and services. Therefore, excessive protection of marks consisting of elements that are devoid of any distinctive character or have a very weak distinctive character could adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trade mark law, if the mere presence of these elements in the signs at issue led to a finding of a likelihood of confusion without taking into account theremainder of the specific factors in the case (18/01/2023, T-443/21, YOGA ALLIANCE INDIA INTERNATIONAL, EU:T:2023:7, § 117-118).
49 In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the goods covered by the signs at issue are identical or similar, the low degree of visual and phonetic similarity and at most low degree of conceptual similarity between them, in conjunction with the weak distinctiveness of the earlier mark, rule out the possibility that the relevant public might think that the goods at issue come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings.
50 For the part of the public which perceives the contested sign as a conceptual unit clearly referring to the Duke and Duchess of Sussex (namely Prince Harry and Megan Markle), no likelihood of confusion exists, as the conceptual difference between the signs counteracts any visual and phonetic similarities that exist (04/05/2020, C-328/18 P, BLACK LABEL BY EQUIVALENZA (fig.) / LABELL (fig.) et al., EU:C:2020:156, § 74 and the case-law cited).
51 For the remaining part of the public, the coincidence in an allusion to luxury and superb quality (being a result of the common word ‘ROYAL’) is sufficiently outweighed by the additional verbal element ‘SUSSEX’ at the beginning of the contested sign. There is no risk that this difference will not be noted by the consumers. As a result, there is no direct likelihood of confusion. The contested sign will not be taken for the earlier mark (05/02/2007, T‑501/04, ROYAL / ROYAL FEITORIA et al., EU:T:2007:54, § 47-49).
52 The opponent claims that the contested sign will be perceived as a sub-brand of the earlier mark. However, for such an indirect likelihood of association to occur, the trade mark applied for must display such similarities to the earlier mark that might lead the consumer to believe that the sign is somehow connected with the earlier right (and therefore, that the goods covered by it have the same or a related commercial origin). This likelihood of association may occur only if the trade mark applied for shares with the earlier mark characteristics capable of associating the signs with each other (by analogy 15/03/2023, T‑174/22, Breztrev / Brezilizer et al., EU:T:2023:134, § 83; 25/10/2023, T‑511/22, HPU AND YOU (fig.) / DEVICE OF THREE HEXAGONS (fig.) et al., EU:T:2023:673, § 80). If the similarity between the signs resides only in an element that has a minimal degree of distinctiveness, such an association is not likely. For such an association to occur the signs would need to overlap in a distinctive element, or at least in the structure and/or stylisation. Average consumers do not usually take one component of a composite trade mark and compare it with another mark (even less if it is weakly distinctive).
53 The earlier mark has a low degree of inherent distinctiveness. It is apparent from the case-law, that such marks enjoy less extensive protection and, therefore, the likelihood of confusion is, in such cases, not likely (12/05/2021, T‑70/20, MUSEUM OF ILLUSIONS (fig.) / MUSEUM OF ILLUSIONS (fig.), EU:T:2021:253, § 91-92, 95).
54 Bearing in mind the above, the Board finds that no likelihood of confusion exists on the basis of the inherent distinctiveness of earlier international registration No 854 092 designating the European Union for any part of the public.
55 As a result, the claim of enhanced distinctive character and reputation of the earlier mark needs to be examined (as it might substantially affect the global assessment of likelihood of confusion)>>.
Rimanda però per l’esame dell’altro segno e della domanda basata sulla rinomanza (improbabilissima , direi, per tali sgni)
Resta da capire come secondo il diritto internazionale si possa impedire lo sfruttamento della notorietà altrui (i duchi del Succesx, Harry e Meghan), a prescindere da loro registraizoni come marchio
