giudizio di rinomanza – Lorenzo Albertini

L’importanza del poter azionare un marchio di rinomanza invece che ordinario

Marcel Pemsel su IPKat segnala Cancellation Division EUIPO n. C 57137 del 25 aprile 2024, Luis Vuitton c. Yang, come esempio dell’utilità pratica dell’optare per l’azione basata sulla rinomanza nei casi in cui è dubbio ricorrano i requisiti per quella sulla tutela ordinaria.

Non si può che convenirne. Ma quanto ha speso LV nei decenni per il suo marketing?

Marcbio depositato da Yang:

Abnteriuorità azionata da LV:

Ebbene, la domanda di annullamento è accolta sulla base della rinomanza.,

<<Therefore, taking into account and weighing up all the relevant factors of the present case, it must be concluded that, when encountering the contested mark, the relevant consumers will be likely to associate it with the earlier sign, that is to say, establish a mental ‘link’ between the signs. However, although a ‘link’ between the signs is a necessary condition for further assessing whether detriment or unfair advantage are likely, the existence of such a link is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that there may be one of the forms of damage referred to in Article 8(5) EUTMR (26/09/2012, T‑301/09, CITIGATE / CITICORP et al., EU:T:2012:473, § 96)>>.

Poi sull’unfair advantgege: The Cancellation Division agrees with the applicant’s arguments. The contested sign will, through its similarity with the earlier reputed trade mark, attract more consumers to the EUTM proprietor’s goods and will therefore benefit from the reputation of the earlier trade mark. A substantial number of consumers may decide to turn to the EUTM proprietor’s goods due to the mental association with the applicant’s reputed mark, thus misappropriating its powers of attraction and advertising value. This may stimulate the sales of the EUTM proprietor’s goods to an extent that they may be disproportionately high in comparison with the size of the EUTM proprietor’s own promotional investment. It may lead to the unacceptable situation where the EUTM proprietor is allowed to take a ‘free-ride’ on the investment of the applicant in promoting and building up goodwill for the EUTM proprietor’s sign. This would give the EUTM proprietor a competitive advantage since its goods would benefit from the extra attractiveness they would gain from the association with the applicant’s earlier mark. The applicant’s leather goods are known for their traditional manufacturing methods, handcrafted from the highest quality raw materials. The earlier mark is identified with the image of luxury, glamour, exclusivity and quality of the products, and those characteristics can easily be transferred to the contested goods.

Manca del resto la due cause (difesa ai limiti della responsabilità aggravata, civilprocessualmente):

The EUTM proprietor claimed to have due cause for using the contested mark because (1) a search of trade mark registers with effect in the EU did not reveal any trade marks identical or similar to the contested sign; and (2) the name of the famous Italian Piazza Vittorio is the inspiration for the name ‘VITTORIO’. The applicant wanted to dedicate her brand to Italianism, to Rome and to the place where she lives with her family.

These EUTM proprietor arguments do not amount to ‘due cause’ within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR. Due cause under Article 8(5) EUTMR means that, notwithstanding the detriment caused to, or unfair advantage taken of, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier trade mark, registration and use by the EUTM proprietor of the mark for the contested goods may be justified if the EUTM proprietor cannot be reasonably required to abstain from using the contested mark, or if the EUTM proprietor has a specific right to use the mark for such goods that takes precedence over the earlier trade mark. In particular, the condition of due cause is not fulfilled merely by the fact that a search of trade mark registers having effect in the EU has not revealed any trade marks identical or similar to the contested sign. Nor can the fact that ‘VITTORIO’ coincides with the name of a square in Turin justify its use as part of the sign, which would take unfair advantage of the reputation built up through the efforts of the proprietor of the earlier mark.

Ci sono anche ragine considerazione in fatto suilla provba dell’uso di cu iè onerata LV ed art. 64 c.23 -3 EUTMR

Istruzioni sulla prova della rinomanza dei marchi dal Tribunale UE (che viene normalmente acquisita e persa con gradualità)

Trib. UE 24.04.2024, T-157/23, Kneipp GmbH c. EUIPO-Patou:

<<Whether the earlier mark has a reputation and the burden of proof in relation to that reputation

…

19 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in order to satisfy the requirement of reputation, a mark must be known to a significant part of the public concerned by the goods or services covered by that trade mark. In examining that condition, it is necessary to take into consideration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by the earlier mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in promoting it. There is, however, no requirement for that mark to be known by a given percentage of the relevant public or for its reputation to cover all the territory concerned, so long as that reputation exists in a substantial part of that territory (see judgment of 12 February 2015, Compagnie des montres Longines, Francillon v OHIM – Staccata (QUARTODIMIGLIO QM), T‑76/13, not published, EU:T:2015:94, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

20 However, the above list being merely illustrative, it cannot be required that proof of the reputation of a mark pertains to all those elements (see judgment of 26 June 2019, Balani Balani and Others v EUIPO – Play Hawkers (HAWKERS), T‑651/18, not published, EU:T:2019:444, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

21 Furthermore, an overall assessment of the evidence adduced by the proprietor of the earlier mark must be carried out in order to establish whether that mark has a reputation (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 May 2012, Rubinstein and L’Oréal v OHIM, C‑100/11 P, EU:C:2012:285, paragraph 72). An accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, may be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts (see judgment of 26 June 2019, HAWKERS, T‑651/18, not published, EU:T:2019:444, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

22 Next, it should be noted that the reputation of an earlier mark must be established as at the filing date of the application for registration of the mark applied for (judgment of 5 October 2020, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO – SBS Bilimsel Bio Çözümler (apiheal), T‑51/19, not published, EU:T:2020:468, paragraph 112). Documents bearing a date after that date cannot be denied evidential value if they enable conclusions to be drawn with regard to the situation as it was on that date. It cannot automatically be ruled out that a document drawn up some time before or after that date may contain useful information in view of the fact that the reputation of a trade mark is, in general, acquired progressively. The evidential value of such a document is likely to vary depending on whether the period covered is close to or distant from the filing date (see judgment of 16 October 2018, VF International v EUIPO – Virmani (ANOKHI), T‑548/17, not published, EU:T:2018:686, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited; see also, by analogy, order of 27 January 2004, La Mer Technology, C‑259/02, EU:C:2004:50, paragraph 31).

23 In the present case, the reputation of the earlier mark had to be established as at 29 November 2019, the date on which the application for registration of the mark applied for was filed. The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, that, as a whole, the evidence submitted by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO demonstrated convincingly that the earlier mark enjoyed a strong reputation, at least in France, which constitutes a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, in respect of perfumery and fragrances in Class 3 for which, inter alia, the earlier mark was registered.

24 In particular, it should be noted that, in order to find that the reputation of the earlier mark had been established, the Board of Appeal relied on the evidence referred to in paragraph 6 of the contested decision, namely, a statement signed by a representative of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, various copies of licence agreements or agreements conferring rights in respect of a trade mark JOY between that party and third parties, images of products, several extracts from websites of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO and third parties, a large number of articles and press cuttings, extracts from books, advertisements, numerous invoices and extracts from ‘tweets’.

25 In the first place, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s argument that the documents produced by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, the existence of which is not disputed, do not provide evidence of the reputation of the earlier mark in a significant part of the relevant territory in the absence, in particular, of information concerning the market share of the earlier mark.

26 In that regard, as a preliminary point, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments suggesting that the evidence intended to prove the reputation of the earlier mark in Member States other than the French Republic is irrelevant. While it is true that the Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark had a reputation ‘at least in France’ and that that State constituted a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, that does not mean that the evidence relating to other Member States is irrelevant. On the contrary, the latter evidence further supports the Board of Appeal’s finding, by demonstrating in particular the geographical scope of the earlier mark’s reputation, and must therefore be taken into consideration.

27 First, it should be noted that the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced (i) numerous online articles (exhibit 7) showing that the perfume Joy was voted, in 2000, ‘Scent of the Century’ by the UK FiFi Awards, which is described as ‘perfume’s ultimate accolade’, and (ii) a screenshot of the Fragrance Foundation’s website (exhibit 6), referring to the listing of the perfume Joy on the ‘Hall of Fame’ of that foundation in 1990. As noted by the Board of Appeal, those awards are prestigious awards, which involve both longstanding use of the earlier mark and recognition of that mark by the relevant public.

28 Second, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced various extracts from books, articles and press cuttings (exhibits 4, 5, 12 and Annex 2) showing, inter alia, the use of the earlier mark for perfumes and fragrances and attesting that a significant part of the relevant public, in particular in France, knew the perfume Joy. The numerous extracts from articles, the date and place of publication of which can for the most part be identified, relate in particular to the years 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017 and were published in several Member States, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Portugal and, mainly, France, in fashion and beauty magazines of national or international importance, such as Elle, Grazia, Gala or Vogue. Several articles, dated from 2015 to 2017, describe the perfume Joy as the ‘second best-selling perfume of all time’, ‘one of the most popular and successful fragrances in the world’, ‘a strong rival to the number one best-selling fragrance of all time’. Lastly, several books on perfumery deal with the perfume Joy, listing it as one of ‘the five greatest perfumes in the world’, or as one of the ‘111 perfumes you must smell before you die’ or describing it as ‘one of the greatest floral perfumes ever created’. Finally, a selection of ‘tweets’ dated from the period between 2013 and 2015 (exhibit 14) demonstrates the social media presence of the earlier mark.

29 Third, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced 27 invoices (exhibit 11) corresponding to advertising campaigns, which it carried out in 2013, 2014 and 2018, not only in the press, but also on television at a significant cost, in order to promote the earlier mark.

30 Fourth, the abovementioned factors are supported by a large number of invoices (exhibit 16) relating to sales involving several thousand products covered by the earlier mark, in an amount of tens of thousands of euro, to various distributors in several Member States, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal and Romania, for the years 2013 to 2018.

31 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 20 and 21 above, it follows from the foregoing that, assessed as a whole, that evidence establishes that the earlier mark has a reputation in a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, in particular in France, as regards perfumery and fragrances in Class 3.

32 The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO made significant efforts and investments in order to promote the earlier mark among the general public and in particular among the French general public. Those efforts took the form of significant advertising campaigns, a media presence in newspapers and magazines aimed at the general public and widely distributed within the European Union. Furthermore, the sales invoices submitted which related mainly to sales of perfumes and ‘eaux de parfums’ support the abovementioned factors demonstrating, inter alia, the wide geographical coverage of the earlier mark on that territory and a constant effort on the part of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to maintain its market share, at least until 2018.

33 Those documents, as well as the prestigious awards won by the perfume Joy, make it possible to establish that the earlier mark is widely known by the general public, in relation to the goods which it designates, in a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, even though those awards date back several years and sales figures fell between 2013 and 2018. In the latter regard, it should be noted that, in any event, the earlier mark enjoyed a high degree of reputation in the past, which, even if it were to be assumed that it may have diminished over the years, still survived at the date of filing the application for registration of the mark applied for in 2019; accordingly, a certain ‘surviving’ reputation remained at that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca Europe v OHIM – PSA Peugeot Citroën (Simca), T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraphs 46, 49 and 52).

34 Thus, the applicant’s argument that a significant part of the relevant public are teenagers who were not born when the perfume Joy won those awards and that adults aged 18 to 29 were not aware of the historical events, such as the awards and mentions in books at the relevant time, is unfounded. As EUIPO correctly submits, those parts of the relevant public may become aware of the long-lasting reputation of the earlier mark, without necessarily being the witnesses of all the awards and public praise achieved by the earlier mark in the past, and may come into contact with that mark, by way of example, through digital advertising, billboards or the printed press. Moreover, the EU judicature has already held that it cannot be ruled out that a ‘historical’ mark may retain a certain ‘surviving’ reputation, including where that mark is no longer used (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca, T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraphs 46, 49 and 52).

35 Furthermore, such reasoning also applies to the applicant’s argument that a significant part of the relevant public does not frequent luxury retail outlets, with the result that it cannot know the perfume Joy which is sold only by selected and prominent luxury retailers. First, the public concerned acquires and retains knowledge of a mark in several ways, in particular by visiting in person retail outlets where the corresponding products are sold, but also by other means such as those described in paragraph 34 above. Second, even consumers in the general public who cannot afford to purchase luxury branded goods are often exposed to them and are familiar with them (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 October 2022, Louis Vuitton Malletier v EUIPO – Wisniewski (Representation of a chequerboard pattern II), T‑275/21, not published, EU:T:2022:654, paragraph 47).

36 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the market share held by the earlier mark has not been established by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO does not necessarily mean that the reputation of the earlier mark has not been established. First, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, the list of factors to be taken into account in order to assess the reputation of an earlier mark is indicative and not mandatory, as all the relevant evidence in the case must be taken into account and, second, the detailed and verifiable evidence produced by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO is sufficient in itself to establish conclusively the reputation of the earlier mark for the purposes of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see judgment of 14 September 2022, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO – Save the Duck (ITINERANT), T‑417/21, not published, EU:T:2022:561, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).

37 In the second place, the applicant also relies on the fact that the Board of Appeal assumed that the earlier mark had a reputation and wrongly stated that it was for the applicant to prove a drastic loss of reputation of the earlier mark between 2018 and 29 November 2019, the filing date of the mark applied for.

38 As recalled in the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, it cannot automatically be ruled out that a document drawn up some time before or after the filing date of the application for registration of the mark at issue may contain useful information in view of the fact that the reputation of a trade mark is, in general, acquired progressively. The same reasoning applies to the loss of such a reputation, which is also, in general, lost gradually. The evidential value of such a document is likely to vary depending on whether the period covered is close to or distant from the filing date.

39 Thus, evidence which predates the filing date of the application for registration of the contested mark cannot be deprived of probative value on the sole ground that it bears a date which predates that filing date by five years (judgment of 5 October 2020, apiheal, T‑51/19, not published, EU:T:2020:468, paragraph 112).

40 It is also apparent from the case-law that, as regards the burden of proof in relation to reputation, it is borne by the proprietor of the earlier mark (see judgment of 5 October 2022, Puma v EUIPO – CMS (CMS Italy), T‑711/20, not published, EU:T:2022:604, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

41 In the present case, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, after recalling that the application for registration had been filed on 29 November 2019, emphasised that most of the evidence submitted related to the period between 2013 and 2017 and that some of that evidence dated back to 1990, 2000 or 2006; however, it noted that the evidence in fact contained indications concerning the continuous efforts of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to maintain its market share in 2018, before adding that ‘the loss of reputation rarely happens as a single occurrence but is rather a continuing process over a long period of time, as the reputation is usually built up over a period of years and cannot simply be switched on and off’ and that ‘in addition, such drastic loss of reputation for a short period of time would be up to the applicant to prove’.

42 Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims, that assessment does not constitute a reversal of the burden of proof and is consistent with the case-law cited in paragraphs 38 to 40 above. In the absence of concrete evidence showing that the reputation progressively acquired by the earlier mark over many years suddenly disappeared during the last year under examination, the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that the earlier mark still had a reputation on 29 November 2019, the relevant date (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 79).

43 Therefore, the first complaint of the single plea in law must be rejected>>.

Confondibilità tra marchi: l’appartenenza al genus animali “che volano” (farfalla v. uccelli) non basta per ravvisarla

Si considerino i seguenti segni per prodotti identici (borse, abbigliamento etc.)

Anna Maria Stein su IPKat segnala la decisione EUIPO Div. di Opposizione OPPOSIZIONE N. B 3 179 053, Cris Conf spa v. Passaggio Obbligato spa, del 11.01.2024.

L’ufficio esclusde la confondibilità ordinaria, soprattuto per l’assenza di vicinanza concettuale: << A livello concettuale, i segni sono dissimili poiché saanno associati a significati diversi veicolati dagli uccellini e dalla farfalla rispettivamente. Di fatto, la semplice appartenenza alla specie animale non è in alcun modo sufficiente a evocare una similitudine concettuale. Infatti, per giurisprudenza ormai consolidata, il mero fatto che due simboli possano essere raggruppati sotto un termine generico comune non li rende in alcun modo simili dal punto di vista concettuale. Ad esempio, il Tribunale ha ritenuto che, sebbene una mela e una pera possano avere caratteristiche comuni, trattandosi in entrambi i casi di frutti strettamente correlati tra loro in termini biologici e simili in quanto a dimensioni, colore, consistenza, tali caratteristiche comuni incidono in maniera davvero limitata sull’impressione complessiva. Di conseguenza, il Tribunale ha concluso che tali elementi sono insufficienti a controbilanciare le evidenti differenze concettuali esistenti tra i marchi, constatazione questa che li ha resi concettualmente dissimili (31/01/2019, T-215/17, PEAR (fig.) / APPLE BITE (fig.) et al., EU:T:2019:45, § 77-79)>>.

Giudizio dubbio: i) intanto si tratta non solo di animali ma di animali che volano; ii) poi la dimensione probabilmente ridotta rende difficile cogliere subito la differenza , o almeno di coglierla in maniera tale da far pensare a due aziende in concorrenza invece che a varianti di un’unica idea creativa nella scelta dei segni distintivi aziendali.

Nè c’è distintività accresciuta (sempre nella confondibilitò ordianria, non da rinomanza) : <<Infatti, il carattere distintivo accresciuto richiede il riconoscimento del marchio da parte del pubblico di riferimento e, nell’effettuare tale valutazione, occorre tenere conto, in particolare, delle caratteristiche intrinseche del marchio, compreso il fatto che esso contiene o meno un elemento descrittivo dei prodotti o dei servizi per i quali è stato registrato; la quota di mercato detenuta dal marchio; l’intensità, l’estensione geografica e la durata dell’uso di tale marchio, l’entità degli investimenti effettuati dall’impresa per promuovere il marchio; la proporzione del pubblico di riferimento che, grazie al marchio, identifica i prodotti o i servizi come provenienti da una determinata impresa; e dichiarazioni di camere di commercio e d’industria o di altre associazioni professionali (22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 23).

Inoltre, le prove dell’acquisizione di un carattere distintivo accresciuto in seguito all’uso devono riguardare sia (i) l’area geografica di riferimento sia (ii) i prodotti e/o servizi pertinenti. La natura, i fattori, le prove e la valutazione del carattere distintivo accresciuto sono gli stessi della notorietà, anche se la soglia per la constatazione di un carattere distintivo accresciuto può essere inferiore.

Quanto al contenuto delle prove, maggiori sono le indicazioni che esse forniscono circa i vari fattori dai quali si può dedurre l’elevato carattere distintivo, tanto più rilevante e determinante. In particolare, le prove che, nel complesso, forniscono scarsi dati e informazioni quantitativi o nessuna, non saranno idonee a fornire indicazioni su fattori vitali quali la conoscenza dei marchi, la quota di mercato e l’intensità dell’uso e, di conseguenza, non saranno sufficienti per affermare l’esistenza di un carattere distintivo accresciuto>>.

Giudicando in base alle stesse prove (sempre profilo interessante per i pratici), è poi rigettata pure la domanda basata sulla rinmmanza.

Momento e modo cui valutare il marchio violato nel giudizio di contraffazione

Cass. sez. I n° 21.738 del 20.07.2023, rel. Falabella (con passaggi non limpidissimi…):

1) il giudizio sulla esistenza o meno della rinomanza va dato alla data del deposito (o di uso, se marchio di fatto) del secondo marchio. Così parrebbe leggendo : <<l’odierna ricorrente ha agito in giudizio per sentir dichiarare la nullità dei marchi di (Omissis) e l’accertamento della contraffazione posta in essere, ai propri danni, attraverso di essi. Sotto il primo profilo i Giudici del merito dovevano evidentemente verificare se alla registrazione dei marchi si frapponesse l’impedimento di cui all’art. 12, lett. e): a tal fine l’indagine circa la rinomanza dei segni in questione andava condotta avendo riguardo all’epoca del deposito del primo dei marchi “(Omissis)” (anno 1999, come è pacifico), non ad epoca successiva. Simile (ma non esattamente coincidente) conclusione si impone in relazione alla sola domanda relativa all’accertamento dell’illecito contraffattivo. Come insegna la Corte di giustizia, il diritto del titolare alla tutela del suo marchio contro le lesioni di quest’ultimo non sarebbe né effettivo né efficace se non permettesse di prendere in considerazione la percezione del pubblico interessato nel momento in cui si è iniziato l’uso del segno che lede il suddetto marchio: quindi, per determinare la portata della tutela di un marchio regolarmente acquisito in funzione della sua capacità distintiva, il giudice deve prendere in considerazione la percezione del pubblico interessato nel momento in cui il segno, il cui uso lede il suddetto marchio, ha iniziato ad essere oggetto di utilizzazione (Corte giust. CE 27 aprile 2006, C-145/05, Levi Strauss & Co., 17 e 20, pure citata da parte ricorrente)>>.

Affermazione scontata.

2) la contraffazione va accertata rispetto al marchio violato così come depositato, non così come concretamente usato. Così parrebbe da <<è senz’altro vero che il giudizio quanto al rischio confusorio determinato dalla somiglianza dei marchi, siccome impiegati per prodotti o servizi identici o affini, può riguardare segni che presentino una differente caratterizzazione (per essere l’uno denominativo e l’altro al contempo denominativo e figurativo: per una ipotesi siffatta cfr. ad es. Cass. 18 giugno 2018, n. 15927). E’ altrettanto vero, però, che, ove si tratti di accertare la nullità della registrazione ex art. 12, comma 1, lett. b), o l’uso illecito del segno che sia simile ad altro marchio precedentemente registrato, a norma dell’art. 20 comma 1, lett. b), occorre guardare a tale titolo di privativa, e cioè al segno oggetto di deposito e registrazione, non al modo con cui esso venga utilizzato dall’avente diritto (sull’irrilevanza delle modalità concrete di applicazione dei marchi denominativi ai prodotti, dovendo la valutazione quanto all’impedimento alla registrazione del marchio effettuarsi sulla base dei segni quali registrati o richiesti: Trib. UE 29 febbraio 2012, T-525/10, Azienda Agricola Colsaliz, 37; Trib. UE 9 giugno 2010, T-138/09, Muñoz Arraiza, 50)>>.

Pure affermazione scontata: la diversità rileva solo al fine di eventuale decadenza per non uso

Tutela extramerceologica di marchio rinomato concessa solo in parte

Trib. UE 24 maggio 2023, T-509/22, Bimbo SA v. Euipo-Bottari euripe srl, decide in modo corretto domanda di tutela della rinomanza (art. 8.5 reg. UE 2017/1001)

marchio chiesto in registratozione ma contestato dall’opponente

L’anteriorità era data da BIMBO (marchio denominativo assai rinomato in Spagna per pane e prodotti relativi) rispetto al marchio de quo , riferito per lo più a prodotti relativi alle biciclette.

Giustamente il Trib. conferma la decisione amministrativa di rigetto della domanda di tutela della rinomanza: non c’è approfittamento indebito da parte dell’uno nè dilution a carico dell’altro.

E’ però assai dubbio che ci sia per quelle poche classi di prodotti per cui l’Ufficio ha concesso la tutela (§ 7: soprattutto per le cl. 3 e 28)

class 3: ‘Detergents; Soap; Grease-removing preparations’;
Class 21: ‘Drinking bottles; Drinking bottles for sports’;
Class 28: ‘Scooters [toys]; Tricycles for infants [toys]; scooters for kids; Gloves for games’.

Marcel Pemsel su Ipkat offre un utile suggerimento operativo per favorire il riconoscimenot della tutela allargata: <<In order to show that the reputation of a trade mark goes beyond the public targeted by the goods or services for which the trade mark is famous, evidence on collaboration with companies from different sectors can be useful. Also, other efforts to extend the brand beyond the sector for which it enjoys a reputation can show that consumers in other sectors are familiar with it, such as merchandising producs or sponsorships>>.

Giusto: bravo Marcel!

Un caso da manuale di tutela della rinomanza: il marchio denominativo GOOGLE CAR

Trib. UE 01.02.2023, T-569/21, Zoubier Harbaoui c. EUIPO-Google LLC decide la lite.

Naturalmente applica la tutela della rinomanza (art. 8.5 reg. 2017/1001) : se non lo fa con Google , uno dei brand più famosi al mondo, non si sa quando mai possa applicarla!

Si noti che è stato (giustamente) ritenuto irrilevante il fatto che Google :

i) non lo avesse registrato per autoveicoli ma per prodotti-servizi diverse; e che

ii) commercializzasse le proprie auto con altro marchio (WAYMO : v. https://waymo.com/).

Riporto solo il passo sull’indebito vantaggio/unfair advantage: << The risk of unfair advantage covers the situation in which the image of the mark with a reputation or the characteristics which it projects are transferred to the goods covered by the mark applied for, with the result that the marketing of those goods is made easier by that association with the earlier mark with the reputation (see judgment of 26 September 2018, PUMA, T‑62/16, EU:T:2018:604, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). In order to determine whether the use of the later mark takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, it is necessary to undertake a global assessment, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned. As regards the strength of the reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the earlier mark, it follows from the case-law that the stronger that mark’s distinctive character and reputation are, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it (judgment of 18 June 2009, L’Oréal and Others, C‑487/07, EU:C:2009:378, paragraph 44; see also judgment of 28 May 2020, Galletas Gullón v EUIPO – Intercontinental Great Brands (gullón TWINS COOKIE SANDWICH), T‑677/18, not published, EU:T:2020:229, paragraph 121). The more immediately and strongly the earlier mark is brought to mind by the later mark, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the later mark is taking unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark (judgment of 27 November 2008, Intel Corporation, C‑252/07, EU:C:2008:655, paragraph 67)>>.

Interessante è il passaggio processuale relativo al fatto che il giudizio dell’Ufficio non debba analiticamente cpnsiderere tutti i prodotti indicati nelle classi scelte ma possa raggrupparli, §§ 29-30

Affinità merceologica (assente) tra abbigliamento e gioelleria + requisiti per la tutela extramerceologia della rinomanza: il Tribunale UE sul caso Rolex

Trib. UE 18.01.2023, T-726/21, Rolex SA cv. EUIPO-PWT A/S , sull’oggetto.

Di fronte a segni assai simili, la domanda di Rolex è stata ugualmente rigettata per assenza dell’affinità merceologica.

Questo quanto alla tutela ordinaria.

Quanto a quella straordinaria da rinomanza (tutto da vedere se sia esatto qualificarla <extra ordinem>), è anche essa pure rigettata : per carenza dei requisi posti dallrt. 12.1.e) cpi, anzi polsti dall’art. 8.5 reg. 207/2009.

In sostanza Rolex si è mantenuta nel vago anzichè addurre circostanze precise sul pregiudizio e/o sull’indebito vantaggio, previsti in dette disposizioni (basta quindi la prova di uno solo dei tre requisiti posti in alternativa -se si può dire così, dato che non sono due).

Punto importante. Stante la notorietà di Rolex, si potrebbe essere sorpresi, ma forse il T. ha visto giusto: non esiste in diritto il danno in re ipsa.

Gli operatori prendano nota.

Insufficiente affinità merceologica tra abbigliamento ed orologi di lusso: non raggiuntra la prova dell’abuso di notorietà o del danno ad essa

Trib. UE 18.01.2023, T-726/21, Rolex SA c. EUIPO-PWT A/S nell’opposizione di Rolex (alta orologeria) contro marchio simile per abbigliamento.

<< it has already been held that jewellery and watches, even precious stones, one the one hand, and items of clothing, on the other, could not be regarded as similar (see, to that effect, judgments of 24 March 2010, 2nine v OHIM – Pacific Sunwear of California (nollie), T‑364/08, not published, EU:T:2010:115, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited, and of 10 October 2018, Cuervo y Sobrinos 1882 v EUIPO – A. Salgado Nespereira (Cuervo y Sobrinos LA HABANA 1882), T‑374/17, not published, EU:T:2018:669, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). (…)

In addition, it must be pointed out that the fact that the goods at issue may be sold in the same commercial establishments, such as department stores, is not particularly significant, since very different kinds of goods may be found in such shops, without consumers automatically believing that they have the same origin (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, BH Stores v OHIM – Alex Toys (ALEX), T‑657/13, EU:T:2015:449, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).>>, §§ 25 E 31.

Sullo sfruttamento della e/o sul danno alla rinomanza:

<< 42 In order to benefit from the protection introduced by the provisions of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, the proprietor of the earlier mark must, first of all, adduce proof, either that the use of the mark applied for would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, or that it would be detrimental to that distinctive character or that repute (see, by analogy, judgment of 27 November 2008, Intel Corporation, C‑252/07, EU:C:2008:655, paragraph 37).

43 In that regard, although the proprietor of the earlier trade mark is not required to demonstrate actual and present injury to its mark for the purposes of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, it must, however, prove that there is a serious risk that such an injury will occur in the future (judgment of 4 March 2020, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO, C‑155/18 P to C‑158/18 P, EU:C:2020:151, paragraph 75; see also, by analogy, judgment of 27 November 2008, Intel Corporation, C‑252/07, EU:C:2008:655, paragraph 38).

44 The Board of Appeal noted that, in order to demonstrate the existence of one of the types of injury referred to in Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, the applicant had not submitted observations to it, but that, before the Opposition Division, it had argued that the intervener could take unfair advantage of the degree of recognition of the earlier composite mark on account of the fact that the signs at issue were almost identical and the immense reputation acquired by the earlier marks, which allegedly convey images of prestige, luxury and an active lifestyle. It found that, by those arguments, the applicant had in fact merely referred to the wording of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, without submitting any coherent arguments as to why one of such injuries would occur. The Board of Appeal inferred from this that no injury referred to in that provision was established>>.

la notorietà del titolare incide sul giudizio di confondibilità

La Corte europea si pronuncia nella lite tra Lione Messi e un produttore di prodotti simili circa i rispettivi marchi, regolata dall’art. 8/1 reg. 207/2009.

Il calciatore depositò il marchio seguente:

L’opponente era titolare del marchio denominativo “MASSI”

la fase amministrativa fu sfavorevole al calciatore, che invece ottenne ragione davanti al Tribunale di 1 grado: il quale ritenne che la sua notorietà compensasse le somiglianze visive e fonetiche.

La C.G. concorda col Tribunale.

La Corte osserva che, al pari della notorietà del marchio anteriore, << l’eventuale notorietà della persona che chiede che il proprio nome sia registrato come marchio è uno degli elementi rilevanti per valutare il rischio di confusione, dal momento che tale notorietà può avere un’influenza sulla percezione del marchio da parte del pubblico di riferimento. Il Tribunale non è pertanto incorso in errore nel considerare che la notorietà del sig. Messi Cuccittini costituiva un elemento rilevante al fine di stabilire una differenza sul piano concettuale tra i termini «messi» e «massi» >>(così il comunicato stampa 108/20 del 17.09.2020)

Conferma poi che la notorietà del calciatore costituisce <fatto notorio>, autonomamente accertabile dal giudice.

Si tratta della sentenxza Corte Giustizia 17.09.2020, C‑449/18 P et C‑474/18 P, EUIPO c. Messi ed altri, (solo in francese e spagnolo)