PROPRIETA’ INTELLETTUALE / DIRITTO INDUSTRIALE/ANTITRUST

L’importanza del poter azionare un marchio di rinomanza invece che ordinario

Marcel Pemsel su IPKat segnala Cancellation Division EUIPO n. C 57137 del 25 aprile 2024, Luis Vuitton c. Yang, come esempio dell’utilità pratica dell’optare per l’azione basata sulla rinomanza nei casi in cui è dubbio ricorrano i requisiti per quella sulla tutela ordinaria.

Non si può che convenirne. Ma quanto ha speso LV nei decenni per il suo marketing?

Marcbio depositato da Yang:

Abnteriuorità azionata da LV:

Ebbene, la domanda di annullamento è accolta sulla base della rinomanza.,

<<Therefore, taking into account and weighing up all the relevant factors of the present case, it must be concluded that, when encountering the contested mark, the relevant consumers will be likely to associate it with the earlier sign, that is to say, establish a mental ‘link’ between the signs. However, although a ‘link’ between the signs is a necessary condition for further assessing whether detriment or unfair advantage are likely, the existence of such a link is not sufficient, in itself, for a finding that there may be one of the forms of damage referred to in Article 8(5) EUTMR (26/09/2012, T‑301/09, CITIGATE / CITICORP et al., EU:T:2012:473, § 96)>>.

Poi sull’unfair advantgege: The Cancellation Division agrees with the applicant’s arguments. The contested sign will, through its similarity with the earlier reputed trade mark, attract more consumers to the EUTM proprietor’s goods and will therefore benefit from the reputation of the earlier trade mark. A substantial number of consumers may decide to turn to the EUTM proprietor’s goods due to the mental association with the applicant’s reputed mark, thus misappropriating its powers of attraction and advertising value. This may stimulate the sales of the EUTM proprietor’s goods to an extent that they may be disproportionately high in comparison with the size of the EUTM proprietor’s own promotional investment. It may lead to the unacceptable situation where the EUTM proprietor is allowed to take a ‘free-ride’ on the investment of the applicant in promoting and building up goodwill for the EUTM proprietor’s sign. This would give the EUTM proprietor a competitive advantage since its goods would benefit from the extra attractiveness they would gain from the association with the applicant’s earlier mark. The applicant’s leather goods are known for their traditional manufacturing methods, handcrafted from the highest quality raw materials. The earlier mark is identified with the image of luxury, glamour, exclusivity and quality of the products, and those characteristics can easily be transferred to the contested goods.

Manca del resto la due cause (difesa ai limiti della responsabilità aggravata, civilprocessualmente):

The EUTM proprietor claimed to have due cause for using the contested mark because (1) a search of trade mark registers with effect in the EU did not reveal any trade marks identical or similar to the contested sign; and (2) the name of the famous Italian Piazza Vittorio is the inspiration for the name ‘VITTORIO’. The applicant wanted to dedicate her brand to Italianism, to Rome and to the place where she lives with her family.

These EUTM proprietor arguments do not amount to ‘due cause’ within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR. Due cause under Article 8(5) EUTMR means that, notwithstanding the detriment caused to, or unfair advantage taken of, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier trade mark, registration and use by the EUTM proprietor of the mark for the contested goods may be justified if the EUTM proprietor cannot be reasonably required to abstain from using the contested mark, or if the EUTM proprietor has a specific right to use the mark for such goods that takes precedence over the earlier trade mark. In particular, the condition of due cause is not fulfilled merely by the fact that a search of trade mark registers having effect in the EU has not revealed any trade marks identical or similar to the contested sign. Nor can the fact that ‘VITTORIO’ coincides with the name of a square in Turin justify its use as part of the sign, which would take unfair advantage of the reputation built up through the efforts of the proprietor of the earlier mark.

Ci sono anche ragine considerazione in fatto suilla provba dell’uso di cu iè onerata LV ed art. 64 c.23 -3 EUTMR

Deferimento alla CG di complessa questione inerente al rapporto tra marchio e posteriore DOP-IGP sul segno vitivinicolo SALAPARUTA

Cass. sez 1 del 8 maggio 2024 n. 12.-563, rel. Iofrida, deferisce alla Corte di Gustizia due questioni interpretative sul tema in oggetto.

Le norme di riferimento sono oggi state abrogate. Ma la seconda questione , non di diritto transitorio (la prima , si), può dare spunti utili pure oggi.

Eccola:

«Ove si affermi, in base alla risposta al primo quesito, la necessaria
applicazione, alla situazione di fatto oggetto del presente giudizio, del Reg. n. 1493/1999, dica la Corte di Giustizia se la disciplina di cui all’Allegato “F” del Reg. 1493/1999, dettata per regolare il conflitto tra un marchio registrato per un vino o un mosto di uve che sia identico a denominazioni d’origine o indicazioni geografiche protette di un vino, esaurisca tutte le ipotesi di coesistenza tra i diversi segni e di proteggibilità delle denominazioni per vini ovvero residui comunque un’ipotesi di invalidità o non proteggibilità delle DOP o IGP posteriori, nel caso in cui l’indicazione geografica possa ingannare il pubblico circa la vera identità del vino a causa della reputazione di un marchio anteriore, in forza del principio generale di non decettività dei segni distintivi»

L’ordinanza esamina analiticamente la disciplina delle denominazioni dei prodotti agricoli (non vini e vini: i due settori hanno discipline autonome, pur se simili). Disciplina complessa per l’intersecarsi di provvedimenti legislativi e amministrativi e per le frequenti modifiche.

(notizia di Jocelyn Bosse in IPKat)

Il marchio di posizione si conferma difficile da registrare, spesso mancando il suo distacco dalla ornamentalità e dagli usi del settore

Anna Maria Stein dà notizia del rigetto di Alicante della domanda di marchio avanzata da Loro Piana , consistente <<nella combinazione di fascetta più nodino e nastrini più pendenti metallici, uno a forma di lucchetto, l’altro a forma di ghiera che, nel suo insieme, è applicata alla mascherina della tomaia che copre la parte superiore del piede, in tutto o in parte, e sempre posizionata più vicino alla linguetta, rispetto alla punta della scarpa>>

Si tratta della decisione 26 aprile 2024, fascicolo n° 018895734 .

Qui:

Succo della motivazione:

<<In tale contesto, soltanto il marchio che diverga significativamente dalla norma o dagli usi del settore e sia pertanto in grado di soddisfare la sua funzione essenziale originaria non è privo di carattere distintivo ai sensi dell’articolo 7, paragrafo 1, lettera b), RMUE (25/10/2007, C-238/06 P, Plastikflaschenform, EU:C:2007:635, § 81; 04/05/2017, C-417/16 P, DEVICE OF A SQUARESHAPED PACKAGING (fig.), EU:C:2017:340, § 35-36).
Nel caso di specie, il segno in questione è solo un’ulteriore variante dei molti esistenti sul mercato che adottano elementi decorativi più o meno semplici, da sole o in combinazione tra di loro. Infatti, la posizione del segno nonché la sua rappresentazione, non si discostano significativamente dalla norma né dalle consuetudini del settore di riferimento. In particolare, il segno consiste meramente di una fascetta con nodino e nastrini con pendenti metallici apposti sulla mascherina della tomaia>>.

Quanto al potere istruttorio dell’Ufficio:

<<La giurisprudenza europea ha più volte stabilito che l’Ufficio, laddove accerti
l’assenza di carattere distintivo intrinseco del marchio richiesto, può fondare il proprio esame su fatti risultanti dall’esperienza pratica generalmente acquisita nella commercializzazione di prodotti di largo consumo, fatti conoscibili da qualsiasi persona e, soprattutto, dai consumatori di tali prodotti, non essendo obbligato a dedurre esempi tratti da tale esperienza pratica (15/03/2006, T-129/04,
Plastikflaschenform, EU:T:2006:84, § 15; 29/06/2015, T-618/14, Snacks con forma
de taco, EU:T:2015:440, § 29-30, 32 e giurisprudenza ivi citata)>>.

Vedremo l’esito del reclamo (che riterrei probabile).

Sul “carattere individuale” dei disegni e modelli

Ripasso sul carattere individuale dei modelli (art. 6 reg. EU 6 del 2002) offerto da Trib. UE T-654/22 del 10.04.2024, da segnalzione di Marcel Pemsel in IpKat, M&T 1997, a.s. c. EUIPO.

Design sub iudice:

Anteriorità asseritamente provante l’assenza di car. individ.:

Dopo due rigetti amministrativi, l’istante ottiene vittoria giudiziale: chi la dura la vince (stavolta).

<< 25 It should be noted that Regulation No 6/2002 does not define the concept of the ‘informed user’. According to the case-law, the concept of ‘informed user’ must be understood as lying somewhere between that of the ‘average consumer’, applicable in trade mark matters, who need not have any specific knowledge and who, as a rule, makes no direct comparison between the trade marks at issue, and the ‘sectoral expert’, who is an expert with detailed technical expertise. Thus, the concept of the informed user may be understood as referring, not to a user of average attention, but to a particularly observant one, either because of his or her personal experience or his or her extensive knowledge of the sector in question (judgment of 20 October 2011, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, C‑281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679, paragraph 53).

26 As regards the informed user’s level of attention, it should be noted that, although the informed user is not the well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect average consumer who normally perceives a design as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details, he or she is also not an expert or sectoral expert capable of observing in detail the minimal differences that may exist between the designs at issue. Thus, the qualifier ‘informed’ suggests that, without being a designer or a technical expert, the user knows the various designs which exist in the sector concerned, possesses a certain degree of knowledge with regard to the features which those designs normally include, and, as a result of his or her interest in the products concerned, shows a relatively high degree of attention when he or she uses them (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 October 2011, PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, C‑281/10 P, EU:C:2011:679, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).

27 In the present case, as regards the applicant’s argument that it is not only the end user himself or herself who may be regarded as an informed user, but also the handle salesperson, it should be noted that, according to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 25 and 26 above, the concept of ‘informed user’ does not refer to a professional quality linked to the product concerned. Furthermore, the informed user is neither an expert nor a specialist, such as a sectoral expert. The applicant’s argument therefore cannot succeed. (…)

34 According to the case-law, the degree of freedom of the designer of a design is determined by, inter alia, the constraints of the features imposed by the technical function of the product or an element thereof, or by statutory requirements applicable to the product to which the design is applied. Those constraints result in a standardisation of certain features, which will thus be common to the designs applied to the product concerned (see judgment of 29 October 2015, Roca Sanitario v OHIM – Villeroy & Boch (Single control handle faucet), T‑334/14, not published, EU:T:2015:817, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

35 In the present case, the Board of Appeal’s assessment, set out in paragraph 31 above, is consistent with the case-law of the Court according to which the degree of freedom of the designer of a door handle with a grip is high, on account of the fact that that handle can be made in a significant variety of shapes, colours and materials (judgment of 5 July 2017, Gamet v EUIPO – ‘Metal-Bud II’ Robert Gubała (Door handle), T‑306/16, not published, EU:T:2017:466, paragraphs 45 to 47).

36 Contrary to what the applicant claims, the length of the pivoting lever of a door handle with a grip does not appreciably limit the designer’s freedom either in relation to the particular shape of that lever or in relation to the other elements of the appearance of such a handle, as shown by the examples of door handles illustrated in paragraph 25 of the contested decision. (…)

55 Furthermore, as regards the elements which are, for their part, relevant to the comparison of the overall impressions produced by the designs at issue, it should be noted that, when the informed user uses a door handle with a grip in accordance with its normal use, he or she clasps its gripping area with the hand, which corresponds, in the present case, to the grip, in order to exert downward pressure so that the latch of the door slides and allows the door to be opened, which can then be pushed or pulled. Where the informed user approaches the door handle in order to use it normally, that user sees it from above. Accordingly, the most visible elements of the handle are those corresponding to the outward-facing parts of the handle, namely the front, side and top parts of the handle. As the Board of Appeal acknowledged in paragraphs 33 and 35 of the contested decision, the differences at the back, namely the curvature of the edges and the shape of the neck, will also be visible to the informed user and will not be overlooked by him or her. Moreover, as the applicant points out, the rounded curvature of the edges of the contested design is accompanied by a thinner and smoother appearance which the informed user will easily notice.

56 Furthermore, the rounded and thinner shapes of the edges of the contested design constitute differences from the earlier design which will be perceived by the informed user as influencing the manipulation of the handle and are, therefore, important elements in relation to the overall impression produced by the contested design, in accordance with the considerations set out in paragraphs 49 and 50 above. Those aspects have an impact on the ease of use of the handle, since they correspond to the parts of it which come into direct contact with the hand of the informed user.

57 Consequently, in accordance with the considerations set out in paragraph 49 above, the attention of the informed user is focused on all the elements set out in paragraphs 55 and 56 above.

58 In the light of the information provided in paragraphs 55 and 56 above and the high level of attention of the informed user in the present case (see paragraph 22 above), it must be held that, contrary to what the Board of Appeal found in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, the differences in the angles of the grip and the neck are neither marginal nor minor variations of one and the same design. A more rounded shape generally results in a softening of the lines of the neck and grip, which has a significant effect both on the overall appearance and on the ease of use of the door handle. It is therefore an element which attracts the informed user’s attention.

59 It follows from the foregoing that, although the designer’s freedom is high (see paragraph 35 above), those differences are sufficiently significant to produce a different overall impression of the designs at issue, contrary to the Board of Appeal’s analysis.

60 In the light of those considerations, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the designs at issue produced the same overall impression on the informed user and that the contested design therefore lacked individual character within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002>>.

Mutui al tasso Euribor e contratti a valle di intese vietate perchè restrittive della concorrenza

Cass. sez. 3 sent. 12.007 del 3 maggio 2024, rel. Tatangelo, pone i seguenti principi di diritto (ex art. 363 cpc) (testo da ilcaso.it):

«i contratti di mutuo contenenti clausole che, al fine di determinare la misura di un tasso d’interesse, fanno riferimento all’Euribor, stipulati da parti estranee ad eventuali intese o pratiche illecite restrittive della concorrenza dirette alla manipolazione dei tassi sulla scorta dei quali viene determinato il predetto indice, non possono, in mancanza della prova della conoscenza di tali intese e/o pratiche da parte di almeno uno dei contraenti (anche a prescindere dalla consapevolezza della loro illiceità) e dell’intento di conformare oggettivamente il regolamento contrattuale al risultato delle medesime intese o pratiche, considerarsi contratti stipulati in “applicazione” delle suddette pratiche o intese; pertanto, va esclusa la sussistenza della nullità delle specifiche clausole di tali contratti contenenti il riferimento all’Euribor, ai sensi dell’art. 2 della legge n. 287 del 1990 e/o dell’art. 101 TFUE»; [prova sull’elemento soggettivo? da dare con dati fattuali]
«le clausole dei contratti di mutuo che, al fine di determinare la misura di un tasso d’interesse, fanno riferimento all’Euribor, possono ritenersi viziate da parziale nullità (originaria o sopravvenuta), per l’impossibilità anche solo temporanea di determinazione del loro oggetto, laddove sia provato che la determinazione dell’Euribor sia stata oggetto, per un certo periodo, di intese o pratiche illecite restrittive della concorrenza poste in essere da terzi e volte a manipolare detto indice; a tal fine è necessario che sia fornita la prova che quel parametro, almeno per un determinato periodo, sia stato oggettivamente, effettivamente e significativamente alterato in concreto, rispetto al meccanismo ordinario di determinazione presupposto dal contratto, in virtù delle condotte illecite dei terzi, al punto da non potere svolgere la funzione obbiettiva ad esso assegnata, nel regolamento contrattuale dei rispettivi interessi delle parti, di efficace determinazione dell’oggetto della clausola sul tasso di interesse»;
«in tale ultimo caso (ferme, ricorrendone tutti i presupposti, le eventuali azioni risarcitorie nei confronti dei responsabili del danno, da parte del contraente in concreto danneggiato), le conseguenze della parziale nullità della clausola che richiama l’Euribor per impossibilità di determinazione del suo oggetto (limitatamente al periodo in cui sia accertata l’alterazione concreta di quel parametro) e, prima fra quelle, la possibilità di una sua sostituzione in via normativa, laddove non sia possibile ricostruirne il valore “genuino”, cioè depurato dell’abusiva alterazione, andranno valutate secondo i principi generali dell’ordinamento»

Licenza di marchio quando il licenziante è una comunione (anzichè una titolarità singolare): il caso Acanfora/Legea torna in Cassazione dopo la pausa alla Corte di Giustizia

Acanfora/Legea è il leading case sul tema in oggetto.

Dopo la sosta europea , torna in Italia presso il giudice remittente e viene deciso da Cass. sez. I, sent. 19/04/2024 n. 10.637, rel. Terrusi, che, applicando l’interpretazione della CGUE, cassa con rinvio alla corte di appello napoletana.

<<XI. – Sennonché la sottostante questione di diritto va risolta in senso esattamente opposto, in base alla considerazione – di matrice dottrinale ma in certo qual senso già presente in giurisprudenza – per cui la concessione di licenze esclusive a terzi è un atto dispositivo del marchio, poiché, alterando la destinazione della cosa e impedendo agli altri partecipanti alla comunione di farne uso, incrina l’esclusività del diritto che è tipica della privativa.

Invero, se disposta a maggioranza, la concessione di licenze esclusive sul marchio è lesiva dei diritti di esclusiva dei dissenzienti.

La concessione in licenza implica infatti uno sfruttamento indiretto del bene immateriale. E lo sfruttamento indiretto è idoneo a vulnerare l’esclusiva che i titolari dissenzienti avrebbero diritto a mantenere integra.

Ne segue che quale che sia la durata della concessione (infra o ultranovennale o a tempo indeterminato) e la modalità (gratuita o meno) dell’attribuzione a terzi del diritto di utilizzazione in via esclusiva del marchio, quell’attribuzione, proprio perché esclusiva, implica un atto di disposizione giuridica suscettibile di un medesimo unico trattamento.

Poiché ogni decisione inerente allo sfruttamento del diritto comune di proprietà industriale è astrattamente idonea a pregiudicare l’interesse di ciascuno dei contitolari a preservare l’integrità del proprio diritto, la regola che viene in rilievo è quella posta dall’art. 1108, primo e terzo comma, cod. civ. per il modello degli atti pregiudizievoli; quegli atti che – come per es. l’alienazione o la costituzione di diritti reali, o anche la locazione ultranovennale -segnando il limite di compromissione del diritto “di alcuno dei partecipanti”, richiedono l’unanimità dei consensi.

Considerando poi che nella concessione del marchio a terzi è normalmente radicata proprio la concessione del diritto di esclusiva, essendo codesto un predicato della funzione del segno, il principio non può che comportare – nell’ottica dell’art. 6 del c.p.i. – una soluzione opposta a quella sostenuta dalla corte d’appello di Napoli>>.

Poi i principi affermati:

<<XIII. – Vanno quindi affermati i seguenti principi:

– in caso di comunione sul marchio, il contratto di licenza d’uso a terzi in via esclusiva richiede, per il suo perfezionamento, il consenso unanime dei contitolari, perché la concessione al licenziatario dell’esclusiva priva i contitolari del godimento diretto dell’oggetto della comunione, e dunque rileva secondo il disposto dell’art. 1108, primo e terzo comma, cod. civ.;

– ove la licenza sia stata concessa in via esclusiva con l’accordo unanime dei titolari è sempre possibile il venir meno della volontà di prosecuzione di uno dei medesimi, il quale non è vincolato in perpetuo alla manifestazione originaria; tale circostanza implica la necessità di rinegoziare l’atto mediante una nuova concessione, da concordare ancora una volta con unanimità dei consensi>>.

Il primo principio è esatto. Il secondo invece suscita serie perplessità: anzi pare errato, trascurando nella sua assolutezza la regole negozialmente pattuite, che non possono venire caducate dal ripensamento di un contitolare licenziante.

I limiti alla privativa da nuova varietà vegetale sono di ordine pubblico e quindi non sono derogabili contrattualmente

Cass. sez. I, sent. 09/04/2024 n. 9.429, rel. Campese, con sentenza importante per i) la rarità di interventi sul tema, ii) l’importanza del tema trattato (varietà agricole) , iii) per il resoconto analitico della prassi contrattuale in questo settore poco conosciuto.

La motivazione però è troppo scarna circa il punto focale, cioè la derogabilità dell’art. 13 reg. 2100/94 (da noi art. 107 c.p.i.).

Disposizione che recita:

<< Articolo 13 – Diritti dei titolari della privativa comunitaria per ritrovati vegetali e atti vietati

1. In virtù della privativa comunitaria per ritrovati vegetali il titolare o i titolari di tale privativa, in appresso denominati «il titolare», hanno facoltà di effettuare in ordine alle varietà gli atti elencati al paragrafo 2.

2. Fatte salve le disposizioni degli articoli 15 e 16, gli atti indicati in appresso effettuati in ordine a costituenti varietali, o al materiale del raccolto della varietà protetta, in appresso denominati globalmente «materiali», richiedono l’autorizzazione del titolare:

a) produzione o riproduzione (moltiplicazione),

b) condizionamento a fini di moltiplicazione,

c) messa in vendita,

d) vendita o altra commercializzazione,

e) esportazione dalla Comunità,

f) importazione nella Comunità,

g) magazzinaggio per uno degli scopi di cui alle lettere da a) a f).

Il titolare può subordinare la sua autorizzazione a determinate condizioni e limitazioni.

3. Le disposizioni del paragrafo 2 si applicano a prodotti del raccolto soltanto qualora essi siano stati ottenuti mediante un’utilizzazione non autorizzata dei costituenti varietali della varietà protetta e a meno che il titolare abbia avuto una congrua opportunità di esercitare il suo diritto in relazione ai suddetti costituenti varietali>>.

Il contratto dava i diritti sui frutti al titolare della privativa, derogando al c. 3 cit. che invece glieli riserva solo alle condizioni ivi previste (nel caso specifico non ricorrenti).

Ebbene la SC dice che da un lato la corte di appello sbagliò nel riconoscere i diritti sui frutti al titolare, vista la disposizione cit. (§ 4.13). Non dice però perchè sbagliò, dato che ci fu un esplicito patto contrattuale.

Dall’altro esamina la natura della disposizione de qua come norma di ordine pubblico, che costiutisce il fulcro della lite. Se tale è, allora, il patto derogatorio è nullo e così pure il lodo arbitrale che lo ritenne valido.

Purtroppo su quest’ultimo punto la SC si limita a rinviare alle conclusioni del procuratore generale (§ 4.15), qui ripetute:

<<4.15. Fermo quanto precede, ritiene il Collegio che, al fine di configurare la nullità per contrarietà all’ordine pubblico (per violazione di norme imperative sancite dall’art. 13 del Regolamento (CE) 2100/94, posto che il giudice, nel ricercare i principi fondamentali dell’ordinamento italiano, deve tener conto anche delle regole e dei principi entrati a far parte del nostro sistema giuridico in virtù del suo conformarsi ai precetti del diritto internazionale, sia generale che pattizio, e del diritto dell’Unione europea) di una pattuizione come quella complessivamente derivante dalle già riportate clausole contrattuali nn. 3.4 e 4.2. del Contratto Principale suddetto, così da considerare la descritta statuizione del lodo definitivo, a sua volta, contraria all’ordine pubblico, rendendone ammissibile, pertanto, l’impugnazione della stessa avanti alla corte d’appello, secondo quanto previsto dal vigente art. 829, comma 3, cod. proc. civ., è sufficiente, da un lato, osservare, condividendosi quanto si legge nella requisitoria scritta del sostituto procuratore generale, che “richiamata la costruzione concettuale dell’ordine pubblico come l’insieme delle norme fondamentali e cogenti dell’ordinamento dettate a tutela di interessi generali, comprese quelle costituzionali e quelle che caratterizzano la struttura etico-sociale della comunità internazionale in un determinato momento storico, è decisivo considerare che il riconoscimento in favore del titolare della varietà vegetale di un diritto di proprietà su piante e frutti realizzati dalla controparte in conseguenza dell’utilizzo autorizzato dei costituenti varietali integri una lesione dei principi attinenti allo sviluppo dell’attività agricola ed alla libera concorrenza”. Dall’altro, e soprattutto, ribadire le chiare argomentazioni della sentenza CGUE ampiamente illustrata in precedenza laddove ha affermato che dal quinto, dal quattordicesimo e dal ventesimo considerando del Regolamento (CE) 2100/94 “risulta che, sebbene il regime istituito dall’Unione sia inteso a concedere una tutela ai costitutori che sviluppano nuove varietà al fine di incentivare, nell’interesse pubblico, la selezione e lo sviluppo di nuove varietà, tale tutela non deve andare oltre quanto è indispensabile per incentivare detta attività, a pena di compromettere la tutela degli interessi pubblici costituiti dalla salvaguardia della produzione agricola, l’approvvigionamento del mercato di materiale che presenti determinate caratteristiche o di compromettere l’obiettivo stesso di continuare ad incoraggiare la selezione costante di varietà migliorate. In particolare, secondo il combinato disposto del diciassettesimo e del diciottesimo considerando di detto regolamento, la produzione agricola costituisce un interesse pubblico che giustifica l’assoggettamento a restrizioni dell’esercizio dei diritti conferiti dalla privativa comunitaria per ritrovati vegetali. Al fine di rispondere a tale obiettivo, l’articolo 13, paragrafo 3, del regolamento n. 2100/94 dispone che la tutela conferita dal paragrafo 2 di tale articolo al titolare di una privativa comunitaria per ritrovati vegetali si applica soltanto a determinate condizioni ai “prodotti del raccolto”. (…). Inoltre, l’interesse pubblico connesso alla salvaguardia della produzione agricola, di cui al diciassettesimo e al diciottesimo considerando del regolamento n. 2100/94, sarebbe potenzialmente rimesso in discussione se i diritti conferiti al titolare di una privativa comunitaria per ritrovati vegetali dall’articolo 13, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento n. 2100/94 si estendessero, indipendentemente dalle condizioni di cui al paragrafo 3 di tale articolo, al materiale del raccolto della varietà protetta che non può essere utilizzato a fini di moltiplicazione” >>.

Da un lato nascono perplessità su una motivaiozne costituita in toto e solo dal rinvio testuale alle conclusioni di una parte (del processo di legittimità, non della lite: v. Carmelo Sgroi sul tema del PG in Cassazione).

DAll’altro e più imporante, il reg. UE e i suoi considerando spiegano sì la disposizione, ma nulla dicono sulla sua inderogabilità. Si può forse inferirla , ma solo forse.

In ogni caso la SC avrebbe dotuvo offrire tale inferenza e in modo persuasivo. Sostanzialmente, allora, la decisione è immotivata.

Istruzioni sulla prova della rinomanza dei marchi dal Tribunale UE (che viene normalmente acquisita e persa con gradualità)

Trib. UE 24.04.2024, T-157/23, Kneipp GmbH c. EUIPO-Patou:

<<Whether the earlier mark has a reputation and the burden of proof in relation to that reputation

…

19 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, in order to satisfy the requirement of reputation, a mark must be known to a significant part of the public concerned by the goods or services covered by that trade mark. In examining that condition, it is necessary to take into consideration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by the earlier mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in promoting it. There is, however, no requirement for that mark to be known by a given percentage of the relevant public or for its reputation to cover all the territory concerned, so long as that reputation exists in a substantial part of that territory (see judgment of 12 February 2015, Compagnie des montres Longines, Francillon v OHIM – Staccata (QUARTODIMIGLIO QM), T‑76/13, not published, EU:T:2015:94, paragraph 87 and the case-law cited).

20 However, the above list being merely illustrative, it cannot be required that proof of the reputation of a mark pertains to all those elements (see judgment of 26 June 2019, Balani Balani and Others v EUIPO – Play Hawkers (HAWKERS), T‑651/18, not published, EU:T:2019:444, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

21 Furthermore, an overall assessment of the evidence adduced by the proprietor of the earlier mark must be carried out in order to establish whether that mark has a reputation (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 May 2012, Rubinstein and L’Oréal v OHIM, C‑100/11 P, EU:C:2012:285, paragraph 72). An accumulation of items of evidence may allow the necessary facts to be established, even though each of those items of evidence, taken individually, may be insufficient to constitute proof of the accuracy of those facts (see judgment of 26 June 2019, HAWKERS, T‑651/18, not published, EU:T:2019:444, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

22 Next, it should be noted that the reputation of an earlier mark must be established as at the filing date of the application for registration of the mark applied for (judgment of 5 October 2020, Laboratorios Ern v EUIPO – SBS Bilimsel Bio Çözümler (apiheal), T‑51/19, not published, EU:T:2020:468, paragraph 112). Documents bearing a date after that date cannot be denied evidential value if they enable conclusions to be drawn with regard to the situation as it was on that date. It cannot automatically be ruled out that a document drawn up some time before or after that date may contain useful information in view of the fact that the reputation of a trade mark is, in general, acquired progressively. The evidential value of such a document is likely to vary depending on whether the period covered is close to or distant from the filing date (see judgment of 16 October 2018, VF International v EUIPO – Virmani (ANOKHI), T‑548/17, not published, EU:T:2018:686, paragraph 104 and the case-law cited; see also, by analogy, order of 27 January 2004, La Mer Technology, C‑259/02, EU:C:2004:50, paragraph 31).

23 In the present case, the reputation of the earlier mark had to be established as at 29 November 2019, the date on which the application for registration of the mark applied for was filed. The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 46 of the contested decision, that, as a whole, the evidence submitted by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO demonstrated convincingly that the earlier mark enjoyed a strong reputation, at least in France, which constitutes a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, in respect of perfumery and fragrances in Class 3 for which, inter alia, the earlier mark was registered.

24 In particular, it should be noted that, in order to find that the reputation of the earlier mark had been established, the Board of Appeal relied on the evidence referred to in paragraph 6 of the contested decision, namely, a statement signed by a representative of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, various copies of licence agreements or agreements conferring rights in respect of a trade mark JOY between that party and third parties, images of products, several extracts from websites of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO and third parties, a large number of articles and press cuttings, extracts from books, advertisements, numerous invoices and extracts from ‘tweets’.

25 In the first place, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s argument that the documents produced by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, the existence of which is not disputed, do not provide evidence of the reputation of the earlier mark in a significant part of the relevant territory in the absence, in particular, of information concerning the market share of the earlier mark.

26 In that regard, as a preliminary point, it is necessary to reject the applicant’s arguments suggesting that the evidence intended to prove the reputation of the earlier mark in Member States other than the French Republic is irrelevant. While it is true that the Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark had a reputation ‘at least in France’ and that that State constituted a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, that does not mean that the evidence relating to other Member States is irrelevant. On the contrary, the latter evidence further supports the Board of Appeal’s finding, by demonstrating in particular the geographical scope of the earlier mark’s reputation, and must therefore be taken into consideration.

27 First, it should be noted that the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced (i) numerous online articles (exhibit 7) showing that the perfume Joy was voted, in 2000, ‘Scent of the Century’ by the UK FiFi Awards, which is described as ‘perfume’s ultimate accolade’, and (ii) a screenshot of the Fragrance Foundation’s website (exhibit 6), referring to the listing of the perfume Joy on the ‘Hall of Fame’ of that foundation in 1990. As noted by the Board of Appeal, those awards are prestigious awards, which involve both longstanding use of the earlier mark and recognition of that mark by the relevant public.

28 Second, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced various extracts from books, articles and press cuttings (exhibits 4, 5, 12 and Annex 2) showing, inter alia, the use of the earlier mark for perfumes and fragrances and attesting that a significant part of the relevant public, in particular in France, knew the perfume Joy. The numerous extracts from articles, the date and place of publication of which can for the most part be identified, relate in particular to the years 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017 and were published in several Member States, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Italy, Portugal and, mainly, France, in fashion and beauty magazines of national or international importance, such as Elle, Grazia, Gala or Vogue. Several articles, dated from 2015 to 2017, describe the perfume Joy as the ‘second best-selling perfume of all time’, ‘one of the most popular and successful fragrances in the world’, ‘a strong rival to the number one best-selling fragrance of all time’. Lastly, several books on perfumery deal with the perfume Joy, listing it as one of ‘the five greatest perfumes in the world’, or as one of the ‘111 perfumes you must smell before you die’ or describing it as ‘one of the greatest floral perfumes ever created’. Finally, a selection of ‘tweets’ dated from the period between 2013 and 2015 (exhibit 14) demonstrates the social media presence of the earlier mark.

29 Third, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO produced 27 invoices (exhibit 11) corresponding to advertising campaigns, which it carried out in 2013, 2014 and 2018, not only in the press, but also on television at a significant cost, in order to promote the earlier mark.

30 Fourth, the abovementioned factors are supported by a large number of invoices (exhibit 16) relating to sales involving several thousand products covered by the earlier mark, in an amount of tens of thousands of euro, to various distributors in several Member States, namely, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal and Romania, for the years 2013 to 2018.

31 In the light of the case-law cited in paragraphs 20 and 21 above, it follows from the foregoing that, assessed as a whole, that evidence establishes that the earlier mark has a reputation in a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, in particular in France, as regards perfumery and fragrances in Class 3.

32 The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO made significant efforts and investments in order to promote the earlier mark among the general public and in particular among the French general public. Those efforts took the form of significant advertising campaigns, a media presence in newspapers and magazines aimed at the general public and widely distributed within the European Union. Furthermore, the sales invoices submitted which related mainly to sales of perfumes and ‘eaux de parfums’ support the abovementioned factors demonstrating, inter alia, the wide geographical coverage of the earlier mark on that territory and a constant effort on the part of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to maintain its market share, at least until 2018.

33 Those documents, as well as the prestigious awards won by the perfume Joy, make it possible to establish that the earlier mark is widely known by the general public, in relation to the goods which it designates, in a substantial part of the territory of the European Union, even though those awards date back several years and sales figures fell between 2013 and 2018. In the latter regard, it should be noted that, in any event, the earlier mark enjoyed a high degree of reputation in the past, which, even if it were to be assumed that it may have diminished over the years, still survived at the date of filing the application for registration of the mark applied for in 2019; accordingly, a certain ‘surviving’ reputation remained at that date (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca Europe v OHIM – PSA Peugeot Citroën (Simca), T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraphs 46, 49 and 52).

34 Thus, the applicant’s argument that a significant part of the relevant public are teenagers who were not born when the perfume Joy won those awards and that adults aged 18 to 29 were not aware of the historical events, such as the awards and mentions in books at the relevant time, is unfounded. As EUIPO correctly submits, those parts of the relevant public may become aware of the long-lasting reputation of the earlier mark, without necessarily being the witnesses of all the awards and public praise achieved by the earlier mark in the past, and may come into contact with that mark, by way of example, through digital advertising, billboards or the printed press. Moreover, the EU judicature has already held that it cannot be ruled out that a ‘historical’ mark may retain a certain ‘surviving’ reputation, including where that mark is no longer used (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Simca, T‑327/12, EU:T:2014:240, paragraphs 46, 49 and 52).

35 Furthermore, such reasoning also applies to the applicant’s argument that a significant part of the relevant public does not frequent luxury retail outlets, with the result that it cannot know the perfume Joy which is sold only by selected and prominent luxury retailers. First, the public concerned acquires and retains knowledge of a mark in several ways, in particular by visiting in person retail outlets where the corresponding products are sold, but also by other means such as those described in paragraph 34 above. Second, even consumers in the general public who cannot afford to purchase luxury branded goods are often exposed to them and are familiar with them (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 October 2022, Louis Vuitton Malletier v EUIPO – Wisniewski (Representation of a chequerboard pattern II), T‑275/21, not published, EU:T:2022:654, paragraph 47).

36 Furthermore, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the market share held by the earlier mark has not been established by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO does not necessarily mean that the reputation of the earlier mark has not been established. First, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraphs 19 and 20 above, the list of factors to be taken into account in order to assess the reputation of an earlier mark is indicative and not mandatory, as all the relevant evidence in the case must be taken into account and, second, the detailed and verifiable evidence produced by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO is sufficient in itself to establish conclusively the reputation of the earlier mark for the purposes of Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001 (see judgment of 14 September 2022, Itinerant Show Room v EUIPO – Save the Duck (ITINERANT), T‑417/21, not published, EU:T:2022:561, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited).

37 In the second place, the applicant also relies on the fact that the Board of Appeal assumed that the earlier mark had a reputation and wrongly stated that it was for the applicant to prove a drastic loss of reputation of the earlier mark between 2018 and 29 November 2019, the filing date of the mark applied for.

38 As recalled in the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, it cannot automatically be ruled out that a document drawn up some time before or after the filing date of the application for registration of the mark at issue may contain useful information in view of the fact that the reputation of a trade mark is, in general, acquired progressively. The same reasoning applies to the loss of such a reputation, which is also, in general, lost gradually. The evidential value of such a document is likely to vary depending on whether the period covered is close to or distant from the filing date.

39 Thus, evidence which predates the filing date of the application for registration of the contested mark cannot be deprived of probative value on the sole ground that it bears a date which predates that filing date by five years (judgment of 5 October 2020, apiheal, T‑51/19, not published, EU:T:2020:468, paragraph 112).

40 It is also apparent from the case-law that, as regards the burden of proof in relation to reputation, it is borne by the proprietor of the earlier mark (see judgment of 5 October 2022, Puma v EUIPO – CMS (CMS Italy), T‑711/20, not published, EU:T:2022:604, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

41 In the present case, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, after recalling that the application for registration had been filed on 29 November 2019, emphasised that most of the evidence submitted related to the period between 2013 and 2017 and that some of that evidence dated back to 1990, 2000 or 2006; however, it noted that the evidence in fact contained indications concerning the continuous efforts of the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO to maintain its market share in 2018, before adding that ‘the loss of reputation rarely happens as a single occurrence but is rather a continuing process over a long period of time, as the reputation is usually built up over a period of years and cannot simply be switched on and off’ and that ‘in addition, such drastic loss of reputation for a short period of time would be up to the applicant to prove’.

42 Thus, contrary to what the applicant claims, that assessment does not constitute a reversal of the burden of proof and is consistent with the case-law cited in paragraphs 38 to 40 above. In the absence of concrete evidence showing that the reputation progressively acquired by the earlier mark over many years suddenly disappeared during the last year under examination, the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that the earlier mark still had a reputation on 29 November 2019, the relevant date (see, by analogy, judgment of 7 January 2004, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, C‑204/00 P, C‑205/00 P, C‑211/00 P, C‑213/00 P, C‑217/00 P and C‑219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, paragraph 79).

43 Therefore, the first complaint of the single plea in law must be rejected>>.

Marchi musicali: difficile registrarli!

Marcel Pemsel in IPKat ci notizia di una decisione di appello dell’Ufficio europeo sulla registrazione (che viene negata, confermando il 1 grado) di un jingle sonoro di due secondi (ascoltabile qui): 5° BoA EUIPO 02.04.2024, Case R 2220/2023-5, Berliner Verkehrsunternehmen (BVG), (trad. inglese automatica, orig. tedesco)

<<18 The sign applied for is a sound sign of two seconds, which consists only of a simple sequence of four different perceptible sounds. The applicant’s argument that the sound mark consisted of many different sounds that were played at the same time by several votes is incorrect in this respect. The sign is so short that only four sounds are perceived.
19. The sign applied for is so short and commonplace that it has no resonance or a certain recognition value that would enable the targeted consumers to regard it as an indication of origin and not merely as a functional element or as a reference without message.
20. It is a generally known fact, which is argued both by the examiner and by the applicant, that a short sound sequence is usually played before loudspeaker messages in relation to information on means of transport, so that travellers direct their attention to the following message. Normally, these announcements take place in environments with many different sounds, which means that it is not easy for the pushchair to distinguish the message from other background sounds. Loudspeaker messages, which are initiated by a Jtelevisions, become part of transport; Passenger transport in Class 39, that is to say, for example, at airport maintenance halls, on traction and bus transport. If the relevant consumer heard the sound sign applied for before passing through a loudspeaker, he will not associate it with a particular undertaking without familiarisation and will simply perceive it as a sound which is intended to attract the attention of the reader and direct it to the subsequent loudspeaker diffusers. It is therefore a sound sign that simply has a functional task, namely to announce or causes a loudspeaker penetration.
21. Also in relation to the services packaging of goods; Storage of goods; The sign applied for is not capable of performing its main function as an indication of commercial origin. If the trade circles targeted come into contact with this very short and simple sound sequence in connection with these services, they will at most assume that the sound refers to certain aspects of the service (e.g. the beginning of an announcement) or is used in advertising for
these services. The sign is therefore devoid of distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) EUTMR in relation to all the services applied for in Class 39>>.

Effettivamente, oltre ad essere brevissimo, è pure un suono banale.

Il marchio denominativo PABLO ESCOBAR è non registrabil eper contrarietòà all’ordine poujbblucio

Trib. UE 17 April 2024 , T-25/23, Escobar inc c EUIPO, sull’art. 7.1.f reg. 2017/1001 applicato al marchio costituito dal nome del noto boss della droga:

<<17 As the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out in paragraphs 21 to 23 of the contested decision, the relevant public cannot be limited, for the purposes of the examination of the ground for refusal provided for in Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001, solely to the public to which the goods and services in respect of which registration is sought are directly addressed. Consideration must be given to the fact that the sign caught by that ground for refusal will shock not only the public to which the goods and services designated by the sign are addressed, but also other persons who, without being concerned by those goods and services, will encounter that sign incidentally in their day-to-day lives (see judgment of 15 March 2018, La Mafia Franchises v EUIPO – Italy (La Mafia SE SIENTA A LA MESA), T‑1/17, EU:T:2018:146, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).

18 In addition, in order to apply that ground for refusal, it is necessary to take account not only of the circumstances common to all Member States of the European Union but also the particular circumstances of individual Member States which are likely to influence the perception of the relevant public within those States (see judgment of 15 March 2018, La Mafia SE SIENTA A LA MESA, T‑1/17, EU:T:2018:146, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

19 In paragraph 24 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the goods and services covered by the mark applied for were aimed at a professional public and at the general public, whose level of attention would vary from low, in respect of everyday consumer goods, to high, in respect of very sophisticated goods or services. However, as stated in paragraphs 28 to 34 of the contested decision, it chose to assess, in the present case, the existence of the ground for refusal referred to in Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001 in relation to the Spanish public, on the ground that that was the public most familiar with the Colombian national called Pablo Escobar, born on 1 December 1949 and presumed to be a drug lord and narco-terrorist who founded and was the sole leader of the Medellín cartel (Colombia), on account of the privileged links, in particular historical links, between Spain and Colombia.

20 Those assessments, which, moreover, are not disputed by the parties, appear to be well founded and may be upheld, with the result that, in the present case, it is necessary to focus on the relevant Spanish public in order to assess, for the purposes of examining the present plea, the existence of the absolute ground for refusal referred to in Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001.

21 In paragraphs 46 to 54 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that at least a non-negligible part of the relevant Spanish public would associate the mark applied for with Pablo Escobar, perceived as a symbol of a drug lord and a narco-terrorist.

22 In paragraphs 55 to 69 of the contested decision, it found that the mark applied for, understood in the manner referred to in paragraph 21 above, would be perceived as being contrary to public policy and to accepted principles of morality by the non-negligible part of the relevant Spanish public which would associate it with the crimes committed by the Medellín cartel or directly attributed to Pablo Escobar, which were unacceptable in modern democratic societies, as they were absolutely contrary to the recognised ethical and moral principles, not only in Spain but also in all EU Member States, and constituted one of the most serious threats to the fundamental interests of society and the maintenance of social peace and order. The mark applied for contradicts, for a non-negligible part of the general public exposed to it, the indivisible and universal values on which the European Union is founded, namely human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, and the principles of democracy and the rule of law, as proclaimed in the Charter, and the right to life and physical integrity. Furthermore, for the many consumers of the goods and services at issue who, in particular in Spain, share those values, the mark applied for could be perceived as being highly offensive or shocking, as an apology of crime and a trivialisation of the suffering caused to thousands of people killed or injured by the Medellín cartel, of which Pablo Escobar was the presumed leader. That suffering is not erased by the actions in favour of the poor or the role of ‘Robin Hood’ which the applicant or many Colombians attribute to Pablo Escobar in Colombia, or by the fact that he has become an icon of popular culture in Spain.

23 Lastly, in paragraphs 70 to 78 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal rejected the applicant’s arguments alleging that signs identical with, or similar to, the mark applied for had already been applied for or registered, as trade marks, by national offices or by EUIPO, observing that, in some of those decisions, the signs at issue had been refused registration on the ground that they were contrary to public policy and to accepted principles of morality, and that, in any event and according to the case-law, the Board of Appeal was not bound by those decisions and had to rule solely on the basis of Regulation 2017/1001.

24 However, the applicant complains that the Board of Appeal did not examine, in the contested decision, whether the majority of that public would perceive the mark applied for as being immoral. It should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, the assessment of the existence of a ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001 cannot be based either on the perception of the majority of the relevant public taken into account or on that of the parts of that public that does not find anything shocking or that may be very easily offended, but must be based on the standard of a reasonable person with average sensitivity and tolerance thresholds (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 March 2018, La Mafia SE SIENTA A LA MESA, T‑1/17, EU:T:2018:146, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2020, Constantin Film Produktion v EUIPO, C‑240/18 P, EU:C:2020:118, paragraph 42).

25 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal correctly referred, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 24 above, to the perception of the persons who, within the relevant Spanish public taken into account, could be regarded as reasonable and having average sensitivity and tolerance thresholds and who, as such, shared the indivisible and universal values on which the European Union is founded.

26 Accordingly, the applicant is not justified in claiming that the Board of Appeal misinterpreted or misapplied or applied Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001 too liberally, by not referring, in that regard, to the perception of the majority of the persons making up the relevant Spanish public taken into account.

27 Furthermore, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal was justified in finding that the persons referred to in paragraph 25 above would associate the name of Pablo Escobar with drug trafficking and narco-terrorism and with the crimes and suffering resulting therefrom, rather than with his possible good deeds in favour of the poor in Colombia, and would therefore perceive the mark applied for, corresponding to that name, as running counter to the fundamental values and moral standards prevailing within Spanish society.

28 The fact, evidenced by the documents produced in the file by the applicant, that the names of Bonnie and Clyde, Al Capone or Che Guevara have already been registered as EU trade marks, which have subsequently either expired or been cancelled, is not such as to call into question the assessments by which the Board of Appeal correctly interpreted and applied, in the present case, Article 7(1)(f) of Regulation 2017/1001, as interpreted by the case-law, by referring to the specific perception of the name Pablo Escobar by the persons referred to in paragraph 25 above.

29 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the decisions concerning the registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which EUIPO is led to take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of those decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the Courts of the European Union, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM, C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65)>>. –> Il precedente non è vincolante: il giudice (l’Ufficio EUIPO) è soggetto solo alla legge