Il ruolo di Facebook nella presenza (conosciuta) di marchi contraffatti sul suo marketplace

Direct liability no, ma contributory si, dice il tribunale del Distr. Nord di New York 7.11.2023, caso 5:22-CV-1305 (MAD/ML), Car-Freshner v. Meta.

Si tratta del marchio del noto alberello deodorante di largo uso negli autoveicoli.

responsabilità diretta, no: <<In Tiffany, the Second Circuit concluded that eBay did not directly infringe on Tiffany’s
trademark where it resold genuine Tiffany goods. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103. Tiffany argued that
some of the goods being sold on eBay were counterfeit, which the Second Circuit explained “is
not a basis for a claim of direct trademark infringement against eBay, especially inasmuch as it is
undisputed that eBay promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as counterfeit and
took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany goods.” Id. The Second Circuit
continued, “[t]o impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all of the
purported Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of
genuine Tiffany goods.” Id.
Although Plaintiffs allege that Meta did not promptly remove the infringing products from
its websites, there are no allegations that Meta “placed” the infringing marks on any goods. 15
U.S.C. § 1127(1)(A); see also Lops v. YouTube, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-843, 2023 WL 2349597, *3
(D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2023) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he exhibits indicate that the videos were created
or posted by third parties rather than by YouTube. But YouTube cannot be subject to direct
liability for trademark infringement based on videos uploaded by third parties”);
Nike, Inc. v. B&H Customs Servs., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 3d 498, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[T]he
infringer must have some intention to sell, advertise, or distribute the infringing product or service
in order for strict liability to attach. Mere unwitting transportation of another’s goods is not enough . . . “). As such, the Court grants Meta’s motion and dismisses the direct liability claims>>.

ma contributory liability, si, visto che Meta sapeva delle dopcumentate contestazioni dell’attore:

<<Plaintiffs’ allegations are different from those in Business Casual Holdings because Plaintiffs allege that Meta did not remove the infringing post or products from Facebook or Instagram until Plaintiffs filed their original complaint with this Court. See Dkt. No. 13 at ¶¶ 114-
15, 117, 119, 121. Plaintiffs allege that even after they notified Facebook and Instagram of the alleged infringement, both websites advertised and offered the infringing products. See id. at ¶¶ 110. Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, they have sufficiently stated a contribution claim as they allege that Meta had knowledge of the alleged infringement and instead of removing the posts or products from its websites, it continued to advertise the products. Thus, the Court denies Meta’s motion to dismiss>>.

La sentenza riproduce pure i marchi a confronto (p. 48-49), ravvisandone la sufficiente confondibilità per rigettare l’istanza di dismiss di Meta e per proseguire il processo

La lite sui marchi HAMILTON v. LEWIS HAMILTON

il segno LEWIS HAMILTON (del pilota di F1) è confondibile con HAMILTON (nota marca di orologi svizzeri) per prodotti sostanzialmente eguali?

Risponde positivamente il 1° board dell’appello amministrativo dell’EUIPO 17.10.2023, Case R 336/2022-1, 44IP ltd v. Hamilton International AG .

Si dimostra sempre difficile provare la propria notorietà a livello europeo: qui però, si badi, allo scopo di escludere confondibilità con il previo segno della casa orologiaia svizzera. Si v. la parte VI “Public perception and knowledge of Lewis Hamilton”.

Non è infatti discussa la questione del se ricorrsse uan notirrietà vicile del corridore nel 2015, anno di deposiuto del marchio della casa orologiaia. Ma una norma come nil n. art. 8.3 cpi nella UE non esiste. pur se la giurisprudenza di fatto ha posto una regola analoga ma non uguale (diritto di continuare ad usare mna no ndi impedire la registaszione altrui):  <<§ 61 In accordance with case-law, famous persons enjoy special protection when applying for trade marks. Insofar as their name is recognized, this recognition neutralizes any similarity with other signs which, under normal circumstances, would lead to a likelihood of confusion (24/06/2010, C-51/09 P, Barbara Becker, EU:C:2010:368; 02/12/2008, T-212/07, Barbara Becker, EU:T:2008:544; 17/09/2020, C-449/18 P & C-474/18 P, MESSI (fig.) / MASSI et al., EU:C:2020:722; 26/04/2018, T-554/14, MESSI (fig.) / MASSI et al., EU:T:2018:230; 16/06/2021, T-368/20, Miley Cyrus / Cyrus et al., EU:T:2021:372)>>


<< 135 According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion. It follows from the very wording of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR that the concept of a likelihood of association is not an alternative to that of a likelihood of confusion, but serves to define its scope (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 29; 22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 17).
136 A likelihood of confusion on the part of the public must be assessed globally. That global assessment implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and in particular similarity between the trade marks and between the goods or services covered.
Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between these goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the signs, and vice versa (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17; 22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 19). The more distinctive the earlier trade mark, the greater the risk of confusion, and trade marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the reputation they possess on the market, enjoy broader protection than trade marks with a less distinctive character (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 18).
137 Where a common element, retains an independent distinctive role in the composite sign, the overall impression produced by that sign may lead the public to believe that the goods or services at issue come, at the very least, from companies which are linked economically, in which case a likelihood of confusion must be held to be established (22/10/2015, C‑20/14, BGW / BGW, EU:C:2015:714, § 40).
138 In numerous members states, family names are given more weight than first names, even if they are at the beginning (03/06/2015, T-559/13, Giovanni Galli, EU:T:2015:353, § 47). In the absence of any arguments or evidence submitted with this respect, the Board considers that the family name has no less importance than the first name in neither Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia nor Lithuania.
139 In light of the at least average degree of similarity between the goods and services, the average degree of similarity of the signs and the normal inherent distinctive character of the earlier trade mark, a likelihood of confusion exists in at least Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania. Despite the fact that the average consumer will display a high level of attention, even these consumers may believe that the EUTM applied for is a sub-brand of the earlier trade mark and that both belong to the same or economically-linked undertakings.
140 For the sake of completeness, the Board would like to add the following:
141 Even if Lewis Hamilton were a famous person in the entire European Union, it needs to be taken into consideration that the evidence in file suggests that he is often referred to by his family name. This is evident from the evidence submitted by the opponent in its response to the statement of grounds (page 27ss, page 6 351 of the file and Annex AN44.1), which proves that newspapers refer to him only as ‘Hamilton’. This does not mean anything else than that the relevant public will immediately associate ‘Hamilton’ with ‘Lewis Hamilton’. Even if ‘Lewis Hamilton’ enjoyed the status of a famous person, the term ‘Hamilton’ alone would also be associated with him, which would lead to the fact that the public could believe that the earlier trade mark is also
endorsed by the applicant, and leading therefore also to a likelihood of confusion since the public might believe, that both trade marks are coming from the same undertaking or belong to undertakings economically-connected.
142 The relevant facts in these proceedings are different from those in the proceedings which led to the judgments on which the applicant relies. Nothing in the file allowed the conclusion that the public would refer to Barbara Becker as Becker alone. The same holds true with respect to Miley Cyrus, who is only known as Miley Cyrus and not as Cyrus. Last, in the Messi case, the opposing trade mark was not Messi. Consequently, in these cases, the fame and repute of Barbara Becker, Miley Cyrus and Leo Messi could exceptionally rule out any likelihood of confusion>>

(segnalazine odierna di Marcel Pemsel su IPKat)

Il giudizio di confondibilità quando il marchio anteriore è di certificazione: il caso Grillhoumi c. Halloumi, con soccombenza del governo cipriota

Altra vicenda nella lite sui segni richiamanti il formaggio cipriota Halloumi.

Si tratta della sentenza Trib. UE 11.10.2023 N, T-415/22 .

Sul punto in oggetto si legge:

<< The General Court held, in particular, that, where the earlier marks relied on in the opposition were national certification marks, which had been registered under national legislation transposing Directive 89/104, the likelihood of confusion had to be understood – by analogy with the rules governing collective marks – as being the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services covered by those earlier trade marks and those covered by the trade mark applied for all originated from persons authorised by the proprietor of those earlier marks to use them or, where appropriate, from undertakings economically linked to those persons or to that proprietor. It added that, furthermore, although, in the event of opposition by the proprietor of a certification mark, the essential function of that type of mark had to be taken into account in order to understand what was meant by likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, the fact remained that the case-law establishing the criteria with regard to which the existence of such a likelihood of confusion had to be assessed in practice was applicable to cases concerning an earlier certification mark>>.

Confondibilità rigettata in appello EUIPO

marchio posteriore for classes 5, 35 and 44, namely “pharmaceuticals”, “medical preparations”, “food supplements” and “dietetic substances for babies (colori rivendicati)
marchio anteriore designating, inter alia, classes 5, 30 and 32, “ia” designating goods in class 10 and “ia” designating services in class 35.

Il 1st board of appeal EUIPO 31.10.2023, case R 1529/2023-1, INTERAPOTHEK, S.A.U. v. Q4MEDIA rigetta per assebnza di confondibilità ex art. 8.1.b EUTMR.


<<Overall assessment of the likelihood of confusion
36 The enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark was not claimed. Its inherent
distinctiveness results from the distinctive element ‘iaʼ in the central and initial position
but is weakened by the fact that its second word ‘BABYʼ is descriptive. The last word
‘interapothekʼ cannot be seen as a meaningful expression: as explained before, even if its
part ‘apothekʼ can be related to ‘Apothekeʼ (German word for ‘pharmacyʼ) the
combination with the prefix ‘interʼ lacks any tangible sense and is not descriptive. The
element may be seen as allusive but still distinctive. Overall, the inherent distinctiveness
of the earlier mark is under average.
37 The level of attention of both, the professional and the general public is high. The mark
has been found aurally similar to an average degree but conceptually and visually only to
a low degree. For the relevant goods and services the visual aspect is not less important
than the aural one, because the goods are bought on sight and the services are often
contracted on basis of written descriptions (offers, catalogues, Internet searches).
Therefore, taking into consideration the high level of attention of the relevant public and
the weakened distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the likelihood of confusion cannot be
confirmed even for identical goods. Even less so can this likelihood exist for goods that
are only similar.
38 The other earlier marks invoked in the opposition are even less similar to the EUTM
application as they overlap with the latter in only two letters, but differ in a multitude of
factors (beginning, length, font of the letter ‘aʼ, colours, initial letter/sound, number of
syllables). The likelihood of confusion does not exist on the basis of these marks either.>>

Famiglia di marchi (a fini del giudizio di confondibilità)

App. Milano 3057 / 2’023 del 30.10.2023, rg 2355/2021.rel. Cortelloni, Sergio Ricci spa c. Sergio Rossi spa:

<<La Corte rileva che una “famiglia di marchi”, per essere tale, presuppone un “marchio capostipite” e altri marchi che riproducono lo stesso nucleo fondamentale, identificativo ed evocativo di determinati prodotti, con eventuali mere varianti grafiche, che, peraltro, devono apparire accessorie e marginali rispetto al nucleo fondamentale considerato.
Nel caso in esame, i segni di Stefano Ricci spa oggetto di disamina, come detto, sono i seguenti: …

Orbene, con riferimento a tali segni, sembra a questa Corte che la possibilità di ravvisare in essi un “nucleo fondamentale comune” incontri un forte ostacolo nel fatto che l’utilizzo delle lettere “SR” avviene – in ciascuno dei marchi considerati – con modalità del tutto particolari e differenti: talvolta, mediante l’impiego di forme “classicheggianti” (1); altre, con l’ulteriore inserimento di una cornice geometrica e decorata, a forma ottagonale, dentro la quale le lettere sono inserite su sfondo bianco (2); ancora, mediante l’utilizzo di decori intrecciati tali da rendere meno riconoscibili ed evidenti le lettere e da evidenziare maggiormente l’aspetto decorativo (3); in un altro caso, mediante l’utilizzo delle lettere con modalità non intrecciate e distanti fra loro, in “stampatello” maiuscolo e aventi fondo bianco /sfumato (4); infine, utilizzando forme moderne e quasi geometriche ove, ancora una volta, il richiamo alle lettere “SR” appare molto meno evidente e riconoscibile (5).
Pertanto, in assenza di un “nucleo fondamentale comune” – che non si ripete in modo costante ed evidente – non sembra possibile ravvisarsi, in concreto, l’esistenza di una “famiglia di marchi”, nel senso auspicato da parte appellante>>

Marchio “Emoji” usato solo a fini descrittivi della propria attività

Eric Goldman dà notizia di NORTHERN DISTRICT Court OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION 29 settembre 2023, No. 22-cv-2378, Emoji company v. vari soggetti .

La convenuta aveva usato il marchio denominativo (la parola) “Emoji” nel descrivere i propri prdotti, dato che vendeva stickers che ricordavano la forma di emojis.

Si tratta di fair use secondo il diritto dei marchi usa  (da noi art. 21 c.1 c.p.i., xa vedere se lettere b) o c)), dice la corte.

Là è l’argt. 15 US Core § 1115.b. (4): << That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin;>> (la Corte non menziona la fattispecie sub (4), ma altre paiono non adatte)

Interessante è anche la questione della volgarizzazione del segno.

La corte dice che, impregiudicato se lo sia per digital icons, non lo è per altri prodottio come gli stickers fisici sub iudice: <<But those facts do not strip Emoji Company of trademark protection for the term “emoji”
on classes of products other than digital icons, such as, as relevant here, stickers. That’s because
“emoji” is not a generic term for stickers or emoji-themed stickers. See McCarthy, supra at 12:1
(stating that when a name is generic, “the name of the product answers the question ‘What are
you?’”); see also H.D. Michigan, Inc., 496 F.3d at 760 (“A company’s name may be generic as to
one of its products, but not generic as to its other products, even those related to the first
product. Two Second Circuit decisions illustrate this principle. In one, the court . . . held that the
word ‘safari’ is generic as applied to a type of khaki hat and jacket, but not generic as applied to
boots, shoes, shirts, ice chests, and tobacco. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc.,
537 F.2d 4, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1976). In another, the court held that the word ‘self-realization’ is a
generic name for a yoga organization (people performing yoga attempt to attain self-realization),
but descriptive as applied to yoga books and classes. See Self–Realization Fellowship Church v.
Ananda Church of Self–Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1995).”). Thus, Winlyn has not
shown that Emoji Company has a less-than-likely shot at success on the merits on the basis that its
mark is generic and therefore unprotectable>>.

Questa la pubblicità della covnenuta (su Amazon; immagine rpesa dal blog di Eric Goldman):

Marchio e ricambisti indipendenti : il caso della mascherina del radiatore riproducente il marchio Audi nel supporto per fissarci il marchio originale

Molto intessante (pure se assai altrettanto particolare…) caso C-334/22 Audi AG v. GQ, nel quale l’avvocato generale Medina ha presentato il 21.09.2023 le sue conclusioni.

Ne dà notizia Marcel Pemsel in IPKat ove anche una riproduzione della mascherina (assente nel documento con le Conclusioni):

Per l’ AG,  non si impinge nella privativa.

La risposta è condivisibile.

Successivamente l’AG si occupa del caso in cui la Corte non lo segua. Dice che allora non si può applicare la limitazione posta dall’art. 14.1.c) del reg. 2017/1001, per  cui <<Il diritto conferito dal marchio UE non consente al titolare di impedire ai terzi l’uso in commercio: (…) c) del marchio UE per identificare o fare riferimento a prodotti o servizi come prodotti o servizi del titolare di tale marchio, specie se l’uso di tale marchio è necessario per contraddistinguere la destinazione di un prodotto o servizio, in particolare come accessori o pezzi di ricambio>>.

Letteralmente non è applicabile, è vero. La questione è intricata : una risposta affermativa non mi parrebbe a prima vista impossibile, anche se meriterebbe analisi approfondita

Marchio denominativo anticipato da marchio complesso

Trib. ue 13.09.2023, T-167/22, Transformers Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd c. EUIPO – H&F srl, decide la tra i seguenti segni (prodotti quasi uguali):

segno denominativo TMC TRANSFORMERS , chiesto in registrazione;

marchio anteriore azionato dall’opponente

Il Trib conferma le decisioni amministrative che danno ragione all’opponente: il secondo marchio crea confondibilità.

Centrale è l’espressione TMc in entrambi, la quale a sua volta è sufficientemente distintiva.

C’è somiglianza fonetica e visiva, non concettuale

La confondibilità dei marchi nel caso Jagermeister

Il secondo non è vero che sia dissimilar  dal primo: è similar,  anche se solo in parte.

Si noti l’evidente tentatico del secondo di porre una netta differenza nel nome, la cui rilevanza è duplicemente notevole all’interno di ciascun marchio: sia perchè il nome prevale sul disegno nella percezione cnsumeristica (lo stesso BoA lo ricorda) sia perchè è scritto assai ingrande nel caso specifico.

Quindi il rigetto dell’opposizione era ingiustificato e la procedura torna alla Opposition Division per vedere se ciò basta per un giudizio di confondibilità (essenzialmente data la rinomanza dell’anteriorità: <<It must be borne in mind, in particular, that, depending on the degree of recognition of the earlier trade mark, even a low degree of similarity between the signs may be sufficientfor the assumption of a link within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR>>, § 25)

Così il 1 Board of appeal dell’ EUipo 20 giuigno 2023In Case R 1952/2022-1Mast-Jägermeister SE c. Tin Kakuszi (ungheria) (v pag. web euipo  e accouint del fascicolo nel database ove trovi trad. automat. dall’ioriginale tedesco)

<<18. The earlier figurative mark likewise consists of a rectangular shape which resembles a-bottle label. On a dark-green background there is a white rectangle bordered by a green line followed by a white line. There is a horizontal banderolein orange in the middle of the Zei chens, which contains the text ‘Jägermeister’ in black stylised letters. Underneath it is the word element ‘SELECTED 56 BOTANICALS’ in considerably smaller lettering together with further details, which are barely legible on account of their even smaller font. Above the orange stripred is a white and golden green circle which is decorated with golden-coloured leaves on its underside. The stylised head of a stag with antlers in a jet-circle is depicted in the green circle. Above and framed by the anchor is a circle in a lighter green with a white Latin cross. For the above reasons, the most distinctive element of the earlier sign is the word element ‘Jägermeister’. Nevertheless, the brown targeted will not-neglect the graphic design as a whole and in particular the representation of a stag’s head on a green circle with a cross and the green and orange colour schema in the overall impression of the earlier trade mark.
19. Despite the differences that exist, in particular the differences in the most distinctive word components ‘ST. Joseph’ and ‘Jägermeister’ and in terms of the figurative elements (head of a man in contrast to the head of a deer), the opposing signs have a low degree of visual similarity, as theirgraphic arrangement is very similar overall. The signs are identical in terms of their colour schema (green, white, gold and orange/red), their basic rectangular shape, their construction and their essential graphic elements and their arrangement to one another (circular green element with a portraitsimilar strip above an orange-coloured/red banderole).
20. Both the earlier sign and the central left-hand part of the sign applied for consist of an inner (dark) white rectangle which is firstly bordered by a green, then a dark-green white line and then a dark green line. Both signs contain a red or orange band positioned in the centre with a black lettering above which a dark-and-white and golden green circle with a gold floral decoration is attached. In the dark green circle, there is in each case a stylised front view of a head (by a man in the contested sign and a stag in the earlier sign), which is surrounded by a jet circle in each case.
21. The signs under comparison therefore have a low degree of visual similarity.
22. The signs are aurally dissimilar, as the most distinctive word elements ‘ST. Joseph’ of the contested sign and ‘Jägermeister’ of the earlier sign un are pronounced differently-depending onthe different relevant languages.
23. The signs are conceptually dissimilar. Some of the consumers will understand the word element ‘ST. Joseph’ of the contested sign as a reference to the naked Josef. The word-element ‘Jägermeister’ of the earlier sign as a whole has no meaning. Nevertheless, the German-speaking consumer in any case immediately recognises therein thefact that the terms ‘Jäger’ and ‘Meister’ are combined, and therefore a meaning that differs from ‘ST. Joseph’. Furthermore, for all the consumers targeted, the signs differ in the meaning of the respective figurative elements, namely the depiction of a head of a man in the application, in contrast to the depiction of a head of a deer in the earlier trade mark.
24. Overall, the signs under comparison therefore have a low degree of similarity.
25. The Opposition Division considered the signs to be dissimilar and therefore, from their point of view, did not examine the further requirements ofthe asserted opposition. However, since, as stated above, the signs have a low degree of visual similarity, this must be remedied. It must be borne in mind, in particular, that, depending on the degree of recognition of the earlier trade mark, even a low degree of similarity between the signs may be sufficientfor the assumption of a link within the meaning of Article 8(5) EUTMR (-16/01/2018, 398/16, COFFEE ROCKS (fig.)/STARBUCKS COFFEE (fig.) et al., EU:T:2018:4, § 78)>>.

La componente denominativa prevale su quella grafica del marchio: conferma del trend

Trib. UE 6 settembre 2023 , T-576/22, Bora creation slk c. EUIPO-Truie Skincare:

Marchio posterioore: denouinativo TRUE SKIN

Marchio anteriore:

Classe 3: make up e simili

Rifl soggettivO: consumatore spagnolo.

Il trib. conerma che non c’è rischio di confuisione

<<69 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).

70 In the present case, the Board of Appeal concluded that, in the light of the identity of the goods at issue, the average degree of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the below-average degree of visual similarity and the average degree of phonetic similarity of the signs at issue as well as the finding that the conceptual comparison remained neutral or that there were no relevant conceptual differences that could help to distinguish between the signs at issue, there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the Spanish-speaking public which did not understand English, the level of attention of which was average.

71 In that regard, first, the applicant submits that the earlier mark is not essentially perceived as the word mark ‘true’, but that it is the figurative representation of that mark which makes it distinctive because, if that were not the case, that mark could not have been registered on account of the descriptiveness of the term ‘true’ for the English-speaking public. However, it must be pointed out that that argument is similar to that set out in paragraph 46 above and must therefore, for the reasons already stated in that paragraph, be rejected.

72 Secondly, as regards the conceptual comparison, which the Board of Appeal incorrectly found to be neutral, whereas the signs at issue are conceptually different, it must be held that that error of assessment does not have any consequences in the context of the analysis of the likelihood of confusion. As the Board of Appeal pointed out and as the Court has held in paragraph 67 above, the concept is conveyed by one of the two word elements in the mark applied for, namely the element ‘skin’, which is understood as referring to the skin and which is, at best, weakly distinctive with regard to the goods at issue, with the result that the conceptual dissimilarity cannot counteract the overall similarity between the signs at issue.

73 Consequently, in spite of the error of assessment which was made as regards the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue and although there are certain differences between those signs, it must be held that, following a global assessment, the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the part of the relevant public>>.