inadempimento contrattuale – Lorenzo Albertini

Twitter, se sospende un account, può invocare il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Il NOrthern district della California con sentenza 19 luglio 2022, Case 3:21-cv-08062-CRB , Rangel v. Dorsey e altri, conferma la lunga fila di precedenti sulla invocabilità del safe harbour da parte della content moderation operata da Twitter (T.).

Il tweet censurato pare dicesse <HANG THEM ALL>
Sussistono tutti i tre requisiti

<< The three elements of Section 230(c)(1) are easily met.

First, despite Rangel’s insistence to the contrary, e.g., Opp at 8, Twitter clearly is a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service” under the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (the “prototypical” example is an “online messaging board”); Brittain v. Twitter, Inc., 2019 WL 2423375, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) (Twitter is an interactive computer service).

Second, Rangel seeks to hold Twitter liable for decisions regarding “information provided by another information content provider”—that is, information that he, rather than Twitter, provided. Rangel mistakenly believes that he himself cannot be a third-party information provider under this provision, but this view has been repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., Ebeid v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 WL 2059662, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019).

Third, Rangel seeks to “treat [Twitter] as the publisher” because his claims derive entirely from Twitter’s decision to exclude his content and suspend his account—that is, traditional publishing functions. See Fair Hous.
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.”); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103 (“[R]emoving content is something publishers do.”). And Rangel’s contract claim fares no differently because it is based on the Terms of Service, which is discretionary and merely “incorporate[s] . . . [Twitter’s] right to act as a publisher.” King v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 5279823, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2021); see Terms of Service § 4.

Accordingly, Twitter is immune from all of Rangel’s claims. >>

Il punto più interessante è il terzo: anche il titolare dell’account è terzo rispetto al publisher, per cui il requisito di legge è rispettato. Passaggio esatto , anche se scontat.

Anche non concedendo il safe harbour, la domanda sarebbe comunque da rigettare nel merito, prosegue la corte.

<< Even if Twitter were not immune, Rangel’s claims would still fail. Three claims
lack a private right of action or legal theory, and the other two fail as a matter of law.
First, the contract claim fails because Rangel does not plausibly allege two
necessary elements: (1) that Twitter breached a promise, or (2) that the breach caused him
damage. See Richman v. Hartley, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1186 (2014). Under the Terms
of Service, Twitter “may suspend or terminate your account . . . at any time for any or no
reason, including, but not limited to, if we reasonably believe[] you have violated these
Terms or the Twitter Rules and Policies.” Terms of Service § 4. Twitter violated no
promise in suspending Rangel’s account because it is more than “reasonabl[e]” for Twitter
to “believe[]” that a tweet that said “HANG THEM ALL” is “content that wishes, hopes,
or expresses a desire for death . . . against . . . [a] group of people.” See Spector Decl. Ex
B (dkt. 44-3) (Abusive behavior policy). Rangel’s contract claim also fails for the
independent reason that he does not allege damages: though Rangel demands $100 million
in compensatory damages, he nowhere alleges actual harm because of Twitter’s actions.
See Richman, 224 Cal. App. 4th at 1186.2
Second, the claim that Twitter unlawfully interfered with interstate commerce “by denying [Rangel] online Twitter access to shareholder paid-for national advertising” lacks
any identifiable or cognizable legal theory. SAC at 3; see Godecke, 937 F.3d at 1208.
Third, the wire fraud claim fails both because Rangel lacks a private right of action
and he does not allege fraud with particularity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Rangel seems to think that any breach of contract that occurs online is actionable wire
fraud, see SAC at 3, but he has not adequately alleged breach, and that is not the law.
Fourth, the “shareholder fraud/public fraud” claim fails. To the extent that he
alleges shareholder fraud, Rangel has not alleged that he purchased any Twitter stock, so
he lacks standing. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–32 (1975).
As for other fraud, Rangel alleges vaguely that Twitter “misrepresent[ed] . . . to their
shareholders, advertisers, the public and users as to Twitter’s fiduciary responsibility
regarding shareholders’ return on investment and share tradeability.” SAC at 4. This
vague allegation falls far short of the basic requirements of Rule 8, much less the
particularity required by Rule 9(b).
Finally, Rangel’s claim under California’s UETA fails because this law, which
requires that electronic signatures be given legal effect, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.7(a), has
no discernible relevance to his allegations. In any event, it confers no private right of
action. See Burgess v. Forbes, 2009 WL 1068877, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2009)>>

Il punto interessante è la ragionevoe credenza di T. che vi sia una qualche violazione delle proprie TOS.

Qui il giudice pare aver errato nell’iter motivatorio: infatti la clausola rinvia ad altra clausola (la previsione non è autosuifficiente) , che però il giudice non menziona. Quindi ravvisare la ragionevolezza della sospensione non persuade. Anche se alla fine probabilmente qualche regola violata si troverebbe , dato il grado di notevole offensività dell’espressione censurata.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Interessante sentenza dagli USA sulla chiusura immotivata da parte di Facebook dell’account di un’utente

Si tratta della corte del nord california 12 noiv. 2021, 21–cv–04573–EMC , King v-. Facebbok (dal blog di Eric Goldman).

Il provveidmento interessa, dato che la chiusura immotivata di account FB pare non sia così rara.

L’attrice avanza varie domande (una basata sul § 230.c.2.A CDA : incomprensibile, visto che , la disposizione esime da responsabilità anzichè comminarla!, p. 4 segg.)

Qui ricordo la domanda sub E, p. 10 ss basata sulla violazione contrattuale ex fide bona e correttezza.

Rigettata quella sulla distruzione di contenuto (sub 1: non condivisibelmente però: se manca obbligo specifico per F. di conservare, quanto meno la buona fede impone di dare congruo preavviso della prossima distruzione), viene accolta quella sulla mancanza di motivazione,. sub 2, p. 12 ss

F. si basa sulla pattuita clausola <<If we determine that you have clearly, seriously or repeatedly breached our Terms or Policies, including in particular our Community Standards, we may suspend or permanently disable access to your account.>> per affermare che aveva piena discrezionalità

Il giudice ha buon gioco però nel dire che non è così: <<Notably, the Terms of Service did not include language providing that Facebook had “sole discretion” to act. Compare, e.g., Chen v. PayPal, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 5th 559, 570-71 (2021) (noting that contract provisions allowed “PayPal to place a hold on a payment or on a certain amount in a seller’s account when it ‘believes there may be a high level of risk’ associated with a transaction or the account[,] [a]nd per the express terms of the contract, it may do so ‘at its sole discretion’”; although plaintiffs alleged that “‘there was never any high level of risk associated with any of the accounts of any’ appellants, . . . this ignores that the user agreement makes the decision to place a hold PayPal’s decision – and PayPal’s alone”).

Moreover, by providing a standard by which to evaluate whether an account should be disabled, the Terms of Service suggest that Facebook’s discretion to disable an account is to be guided by the articulated factors and cannot be entirely arbitrary. Cf. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Ins., 467 U.S. 340, 349, 351 (1984) (stating that the “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action . . . may be overcome by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent” – i.e., “whenever the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme’”).

At the very least, there is a strong argument that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposes ome limitation on the exercise of discretion so as to not entirely eviscerate users’ rights>>

Inoltre (sub 3, p. 14) quanto meot una spiegazione era dovuta. (i passaggi sub 2 e il 3 si sovrappontgono)

In breve sono ritenute illegittime la disbilitgazione e la mancanza di motivazione (che si soprappongono, come appena detto: la reciproca distinzione concettuale richiederebbe troppo spazio e tempo)

Da ultimo, l’ovvia eccezione di safe harbour ex § 230.c.1 CDA <Treatment of publisher or speaker> copre la disabilitazione ma non la mancata spiegazione (p. 22).

Sul secondo punto c’è poco da discutere: il giudice ha ragione.

Più difficile rispondere sul primo, importante nella pratica, dato che qualunque disabilitazione costituirà -dal punto del disabilitato- una violazione di contratto.

Il giudice dà ragione a F.: il fatto che esista un patto, non toglie a F. il safe harbour : <<although Ms. King’s position is not without any merit, she has glossed over the nature of the “promise” that Facebook made in its Terms of Service. In the Terms of Service, Facebook simply stated that it would use its discretion to determine whether an account should be disabled based on certain standards. The Court is not convinced that Facebook’s statement that it would exercise its publishing discretion constitutes a waiver of the CDA immunity based on publishing discretion. In other words, all that Facebook did here was to incorporate into the contract (the Terms of Service) its right to act as a publisher. This by itself is not enough to take Facebook outside of the protection the CDA gives to “‘paradigmatic editorial decisions not to publish particular content.’” Murphy, 60 Cal. App. 5th at 29. Unlike the very specific one-time promise made in Barnes, the promise relied upon here is indistinguishable from “‘paradigmatic editorial decisions not to publish particular content.’” Id. It makes little sense from the perspective of policy underpinning the CDA to strip Facebook of otherwise applicable CDA immunity simply because Facebook stated its discretion as a publisher in its Terms of Service>>.

Decisione forse esatta sul punto specifico, ma servirebbe analisi ulteriore.

Web/data scraping e secondary ticketing: è inadempimento contrattuale?

Un’agenzia di viaggio acquista biglietti aerei da Southwest Airlines (SA), rivendendoli poi a terzi, ed estrae sistematicamente vari dati, pubblicamente accessibili nel sito web di questa: ciò nonostante le condizioni di acquisto lo proibissero.

SA agisce per varie causae actiones tra cui violazione contrattuale. Decide la NORTHERN DISTRICT COURT OF TEXAS – DALLAS DIVISION , CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-00098-E, Soutwest Airlines c. Kiwi, 30.09.2021, accogliendone la domanda.

Kiwi cita il noto precedente hiQ Labs c. Linkledin del 2019, ove fu ritenuto lecito lo scraping dei dati.

Però prevale l’orientmento del divieto di scrapintg fondato su patto apposito, presente nelle Terms and Conditions : <<Kiwi has purchased over 20,000 flights on the Southwest Digital Platforms. In connection with its sales of Southwest flights, Kiwi specifically acknowledges that: “All services provided by Southwest Airlines are subject to their Terms and Conditions. More information is available on their website.” The Terms are hyperlinked at the bottom of each page of Southwest’s website with a statement that use of the website constitutes acceptance of the Terms. For all online purchases, the user must affirmatively acknowledge and accept the Terms by clicking a button that states: “By clicking ‘Purchase,’ I agree to the Terms and Conditions below, the privacy policy, and the contract of carriage,” which appears just above a yellow “Purchase” button with hyperlinks to the Website Terms, Privacy Policy, and Contract of Carriage. For each purchase, Kiwi affirmatively accepted the Terms. Southwest sent multiple cease-and-desist notices to Kiwi’s chief legal counsel, Kiwi’s CEO, and to Kiwi’s registered agents in the United States. Southwest specifically referenced the Terms and attached a copy of them, pointing out examples of how Kiwi’s conduct violated the Terms. Kiwi acknowledged receipt of one such cease-and-desist notice in September 2019. As in BoardFirst, when Kiwi continued to use the Southwest website in connection with Kiwi’s business with actual knowledge of the Terms, Kiwi “bound itself to the contractual obligations imposed by the Terms.” See BoardFirst, 2007 WL 4823761, at *7>>, p. 7

E’ poi intgersante anche il ragionamemnot sul danno irreparabile , requisito per la cocnessione della cautgela: viene ravvisato e la cautela èconcessa: <<Balance of harms: Southwest must also demonstrate the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted. Southwest argues Kiwi’s business practices interfere with customer communications, misrepresent Southwest customer-friendly policies,
charge customers unnecessary fees, divert traffic away from Southwest’s website, and tarnish Suthwest’s reputation and goodwill. Southwest argues Kiwi will suffer little if any damage by ceasing unauthorized sales of Southwest flights and that Kiwi’s interest in using the Southwest website for its own commercial purposes is entitled to “scant consideration.” Kiwi can continue its business and sell flights for other carriers.
Kiwi alleges the balance of harms tips strongly in its favor. Kiwi argues an injunction poses a significant threat to its business model, reputation, and partner relationships. Kiwi asserts removing Southwest flights from its website will drastically affect its ability to build dynamic travel itineraries for its customers. According to Kiwi, for many key travel routes and destinations,
it is impossible to fly without traveling on Southwest. It also contends that an unspecified “threat of further injunctions against brokering ticket sales poses a potentially existential threat to Kiwi.com’s US operation.”
The Court concludes the threatened injury to Southwest if the injunction is denied outweighs the harm to Kiwi. Southwest has shown that Kiwi’s unauthorized sales of its flights poses a significant disruption to its customer operations. Kiwi has not convinced the Court that the injunction will significantly threaten its business. As Southwest notes, Southwest is not listed as one of Kiwi’s “top 20 airlines” on its website>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Erik Goldman)

Utente Youtube “demonetizzato” si lamenta in corte ma perde la causa

la divisione San Josè della district court californiana decide l’8 luglio 2021, Case 5:20-cv-04687-VKD , Marshall Daniels. c. Alphabet, la lite promossa da utente Youtube che aveva lamentato sia la rimozione di suoi video che la demonetizzaione delle donazioni già maturate tramite la funzione SuperChat , che permette di pagare per avere Chat in primo piano durante una esecuzione in diretta: <<The SuperChat function “allows third parties to donate monies to content creators such as Mr. Daniels during a live stream.” Id.¶ 13.Any viewer watching a YouTube livestream can purchase a “SuperChat,” which is a highlighted chat that remains pinned to the top of the chat stream for up to five hours. Id.¶ 19. According to Mr. Daniels, “Google represents to its users that ‘SuperChat and Super Stickers are ways to monetize your channel through the YouTube Partner Program.’” Id. ¶ 13. SuperChat revenue is “separate and apart from YouTube Partner advertising revenue.” Id.¶ 13 n.4>>, p. 2.

Sulle funzioni SuperChat e Super Sticker v. la pagina guida di Youtube.

Notiamo che è data per scontata la qualifica contrattuale del rapporto tra utente e Youtube, anche se il primo nulla deve monetariamente alla seconda.

In precedenza la corte aveva rigettato per quattro ragioni la domanda di Daniels e qui le ricorda:

<<First, with respect to Mr. Daniels’s allegation that defendants breached YouTube’s Terms of Service by failing to inform him when one of his videos was flagged or removed, the Court found that Mr. Daniels did not plead any facts suggesting that defendants were required to notify him of the specific reasons for the removal of his content or that YouTube’s alleged failure to provide advance notification was inconsistent with the highly discretionary policy described in the Terms of Service. SeeDkt. No. 31 at 14; Dkt. No. 18–2 at 4.

Second, with respect to Mr. Daniels’s allegation that defendants breached the Terms of Service by failing to provide an appeals process, the Court found that the Terms of Service did not guarantee an appeals process in any particular form, andeven if it did, Mr. Daniels had acknowledged that he engaged in an appeals process for both of his removed videos. Dkt. No. 31 at 14.

Third, with respect to Mr. Daniels’s allegation that defendants breached the Terms of Service by failing to permit Mr. Daniels to post his videos, the Court found that theexpress terms of theTerms of Service contradicted Mr. Daniels’s claim that the Terms of Service permit YouTube to remove content only in the event that that content violates the Community Guidelines. SeeDkt. No. 31 at 14–15; Dkt. No. 18–2 at 4(“YouTube is under no obligation to host or serve Content” and “may remove or take down that Content in our discretion”).

Fourth, with respect to Mr. Daniels’s allegation that defendants failed to pay him based on SuperChat views and donations, the Court found that Mr. Daniels had failed to adequately allege apromise that was breached because theTerms of Service on which Mr. Danielsrelies do not address any kind of arrangement to pay users based on SuperChat views and donations. SeeDkt. No. 31 at 15. However, the Court observed that Mr. Daniels might be able to plead a proper breach of contract claim based on a different agreement, such as the YouTube Partner Program agreement.>>.

La domanda modificata contempla il denaro che Y. aveva promesso di girargli tramite le donazioni su SuperChat ma che non gli girò. Secondo l’attore viola il contratto dato che l’unica ragione per cui avrebbe potuto non girarglielo era la clausola sui sei mesi di inattività (six months dormant), però non operante nel caso specifico.

La corte rigetta: <<Defendants argue, and Mr. Daniels concedes, that the Terms of Service do not contain any provisions regarding the SuperChat function.Seeid.¶ 20; Dkt. No. 33 at 5. Mr. Danielsrespondsthat Defendants’ posted SuperChat policies are incorporated into and/or governed by YouTube’s Terms of Service. Dkt.No. 34 at 3–4. Essentially, he suggests that the Terms of Service encompass any statements about the SuperChat function posted elsewhere by Defendants.In the FAC, Mr. Daniels alleges that“YouTube has promised the users of the SuperChatfunction that there is one situation in which the SuperChat may be demonetized: if the creator has been dormant for six months.” Dkt. No. 32 ¶20. In opposing dismissal, Mr. Daniels identifies the source of this alleged promiseas a document already of record in this proceeding: Exhibit 122to the declaration of Lauren White. Dkt. No. 18–13.

That document, titled “YouTube Partner Program overview & eligibility,” includes the following statement: “We updated this article to provide more transparency thatYouTube may disable monetization for channels that haven’t uploaded a video or posted to the Communitytab for 6 months or more.” Id.

Mr. Daniels’s assertion that this statement constitutes a promise by Defendants to pay Mr. Daniels for SuperChat donations so long as his channel is not dormant from six months or more is simply implausible.3

The statement does not refer to the SuperChat function, nor does it contain a promise that the only circumstancein which monetization will be disabled is if a channel is dormant for six months.

Mr. Daniels describes no other basis for Defendants’ purported breach of a promise to pay him for SuperChat donations already earned.

In sum, Mr. Daniels’s FAC does not state a claim for breach of contract because,as before,he fails to identify any contractual obligation that Defendants breached>>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)