conclusione del contratto – Lorenzo Albertini

Conclusione on-line del contratto e clausola di arbitrato

Le piattaforme quasi sempre , quando convenute, eccepiscono la clausola di arbitrato stipulata on line tramite i terms of service TOS, in cui è inserita.

In questo caso il distretto nord della California, S. Josè division, 16 dicembre 2022, Case No. 22-cv-02638-BLF, Houtchens e altri c. Google, affronta il tema del se sia stata o no validamente conclusa la clausola di arbitrato col metodo c.d. clickwrap agreement per l’apertura di un account Fitbit (di proprietà di Google).

Si vedano in sentenza le quattro schermate a seconda del dispositivo (pc, cell. etc): in breve, si deve cliccare per i TOS su un quadratino che ad essi rinvia tramite link, e in essi pure alla clausola di arbitrato.

Per la corte, l’accordo si è validamente formato:

<<The Court finds that the hyperlinks to Fitbit’s Terms of Service in each of the above screens provided Plaintiffs “reasonably conspicuous notice” of the terms. See Berman v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2022). In the first three screens, the hyperlinks to Fitbit’s Terms of Service are presented in blue text in a sentence that otherwise uses gray text; they are next to the box a user must select to accept the terms; and the screens on which they appear are uncluttered. Court’s have routinely found that such a presentation supplies reasonably conspicuous notice of hyperlinked terms. See, e.g., Adibzadeh, 2021 WL 4440313, at *6 (reasonably conspicuous notice provided “where users must agree to the website’s terms and conditions before they can proceed, and the terms and conditions are offset in a blue text, hyperlinked text”). In the final screen, the hyperlinks are again presented next to the box that a user must select to accept the terms and the screen on which they appear is uncluttered; but instead of using blue font to distinguish the hyperlinks from the surrounding text, the page uses boldunderlined font. The Court finds that this page, too, provides reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to which a consumer will be bound. Cf. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177 (“The conspicuousness and placement of the ‘Terms of Use’ hyperlink, other notices given to users of the terms of use, and the website’s general design all contribute to whether a reasonably prudent user would have inquiry notice of a browsewrap agreement.”)>>

Conclusione del patto arbitrale a modifica del rapporto in essere: tra clickwrap e browsewrap agreement

Il distretto nord della california, 8 settembre 2022, Case 4:22-cv-00422-PJH , Alkutkar c. Bumble, affronta una frequente , ma non per questo poco interessante, fattispecie.

Azionata dall’utente una domanda di inadempiumento verso la piattaforma Bumble (sito di conoscenze e incontri) si vede eccepire la clausola di arbitrato: la quale sarebbe stata approvata in corso di rapporto a seguito di 1) notifica via email e soprattutto 2) di finestra di pop up . -c.d. blocker card- che onerava l’utente di accettar per proseguire . Onere bloccante e finestra che come sempre conteneva un link al nuovo testo del contratto aggiornato, ma che già essa riassumeva la più importante modifica (l’arbitrato appunto).

V. lo screenshot del pop up in sentenza (ma tratto dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman):

Ebbene, per la corte la email (simile al browsewrap) non dà prova di accettazione (p. 11) , ma il pop up con i I AGREE (simile al clickwrap) si.

I dati di Bumble infatti dicono che dopo questo pop up l’utente continuò ad usare i suoi servizi , per cui è presumibile che l’avesse vista e accettata (l’utente lo negava).

Ciò per tre motivi:

1) l’unicità delle credenziali,

2) gli accessi successivi rpesuppongono logicamente/informaticamente accettazione: <<plaintiff’s access and use of the app is a demonstrable consequence of
his assent to the updated Terms. Bumble’s records show that all users were shown the
Blocker Card the first time they signed into the app after January 19, 2021. Wong Decl.
¶ 16 (Dkt. 36-1 at 6-7). The declarations of Bumble’s affiliated engineers make clear that
the Blocker Card functions in a straightforward fashion: it “prevents Bumble users from
accessing or using the Bumble app unless they click on the orange-colored button>>

3) << Lastly, the timeline of events indicates that plaintiff clicked his assent through the
Blocker Card. On January 18, 2021, the Terms governing use of the Bumble app were
updated to include an Arbitration Agreement. Chheena Decl. ¶ 7 (Dkt. 30-1 at 3). On the
same day, the Blocker Card was implemented into the app for existing users, requiring
assent to the updated Terms to access the app the first time a user signed in after
January 18. Chheena Decl. ¶ 11 (Dkt. 30-1 at 3-4); Wong Decl. ¶ 12 (Dkt. 36-1 at 4).
Plaintiff reports that the first time he signed into the app after January 18, 2021, was in
March 2021. Alkutkar Decl., May 14, 2021, ¶ 5 (Dkt. 32-2 at 2). This corresponds neatly
with Bumble’s records, which show that he accessed and used the app on March 4,
2021. Wong Decl. ¶ 18 (Dkt. 36-1 at 7). On that date, plaintiff added new photos to his
profile and swiped on other user profiles, activities that might correspond with a user’s
first time accessing the app following a hiatus. Wong Decl. ¶ 18 (Dkt. 36-1 at 7). Plaintiff
additionally accessed and used the app on March 5, 7, and 11, activities only achievable
following clicking assent on the Blocker Card. Id., ¶ 18. Indeed, plaintiff would not have
been able to purchase the premium features that are the subject of this suit in March,
August, and September 2021 unless he clicked to accept the updated Terms and
Arbitration Agreement. Id., at ¶ 18 >>

In altre più brevi parole <<Bumble has shown that plaintiff used unique credentials to access the app on March 4, 2021, that his access and use of the app on that date was a demonstrable a consequence of his assent to the updated Terms because he only could have done so by clicking through the Blocker Card, and that the timeline of events indicates that plaintiff clicked his assent to the updated Terms. These facts are similar to those found sufficient to authenticate an electronic signature in Ngo, 2018 WL 6618316, at *6, and they are sufficient to authenticate an electronic signature here. Bumble thus establishes by a preponderance of evidence that clicking through the Blocker Card was “the act of” plaintiff necessary to show that he electronically signed and agreed to the updated Terms, including the Arbitration Agreement. >>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Consenso contrattuale (anche alla clausola di arbitrato) cliccando sul pulsante “I agree”: il c.d. sign-in-wrap

Il 9° circuito conferma una sentenza californiana per cui non è validamente prestato il consenso alla clausola arbitrale , quando l’utente si sia limitato a premere un pulsante I AGREE , preceduto da minuscolo richiamo dal tenore << “I understand and agree to the Terms & Conditions which includes mandatory arbitration and Privacy Policy.” >>.

Si tratta di oggetto del connseso esposto documentalmente in caratteri troppo poco visibili, per cui il connseso non può dirsi validamente formato (manca la reasonably conspicuous notice).

In particolare << The webpages
reproduced in Appendix A and Appendix B did not provide
reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms and conditions
for two reasons. First, to be conspicuous in this context, a
notice must be displayed in a font size and format such that
the court can fairly assume that a reasonably prudent Internet
user would have seen it. See id. at 30; Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177. The text disclosing the existence of the terms and
conditions on these websites is the antithesis of conspicuous.

It is printed in a tiny gray font considerably smaller than the
font used in the surrounding website elements, and indeed in
a font so small that it is barely legible to the naked eye. The
comparatively larger font used in all of the surrounding text
naturally directs the user’s attention everywhere else.

And the textual notice is further deemphasized by the overall
design of the webpage, in which other visual elements draw
the user’s attention away from the barely readable critical
text.

Far from meeting the requirement that a webpage must
take steps “to capture the user’s attention and secure her
assent,” the design and content of these webpages draw the
user’s attention away from the most important part of the
page. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178 n.1.
Website users are entitled to assume that important
provisions—such as those that disclose the existence of
proposed contractual terms—will be prominently displayed,
not buried in fine print.

Because “online providers have
complete control over the design of their websites,” Sellers
v. JustAnswer LLC, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 16 (Ct. App. 2021),
“the onus must be on website owners to put users on notice
of the terms to which they wish to bind consumers,” Nguyen,
763 F.3d at 1179.

The designer of the webpages at issue here
did not take that obligation to heart.

Second, while it is permissible to disclose terms and
conditions through a hyperlink, the fact that a hyperlink is
present must be readily apparent. Simply underscoring
words or phrases, as in the webpages at issue here, will often
be insufficient to alert a reasonably prudent user that a
clickable link exists. See Sellers, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 29.
Because our inquiry notice standard demands
conspicuousness tailored to the reasonably prudent Internet user, not to the expert user, the design of the hyperlinks must
put such a user on notice of their existence. Nguyen,
763 F.3d at 1177, 1179.
A web designer must do more than simply underscore
the hyperlinked text in order to ensure that it is sufficiently
“set apart” from the surrounding text. Sellers, 289 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 29.

Customary design elements denoting the existence
of a hyperlink include the use of a contrasting font color
(typically blue) and the use of all capital letters, both of
which can alert a user that the particular text differs from
other plain text in that it provides a clickable pathway to
another webpage. See id. (finding “Terms of Service”
insufficiently conspicuous because it did not use all capital
letters or contrasting font color).

Consumers cannot be
required to hover their mouse over otherwise plain-looking
text or aimlessly click on words on a page in an effort to
“ferret out hyperlinks.” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179. The
failure to clearly denote the hyperlinks here fails our
conspicuousness test. Cf. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78–79 (finding
hyperlinks reasonably conspicuous because they were both
in blue and underlined). >>

Esito condivisibile: e probabilmente non solo per il diritto dei consumatori ma ancbe per il diritto contrattuale generale.

Le due videate contenenti il minuscolo richiamo alle terms and conditiions son questa

e questa

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal post di Venkat Balasubram nel blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Sulla conclusione (mancata) di contratto on line con Uber

La corte suprema del Maine ritiene non concluso il contratto on-line di modifica delle condizioni generali originarie: modifica volta ad introdurre una pattuizione di arbitrato.

Si tratta di MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT del 27.01.20222, Decision: 2022 ME 8, docket: Cum-21-117 , Sarchi v. Uber.

La corte inizia con un un’interessante esposizione dei quattro quattro tipi di conclusione on line (browsewrap, clickwrap, scrollwrap, and sign–in wrap; p. 11 ss ai §§ 18 ss).

Afferma poi che il contratto sub iudice è <<characterized as a sign-in wrap agreement because, rather than requiring an affirmative manifestation of assent by the user, it informs the user that she is assenting to the Terms by creating an Uber rider account>>. Ricorda però che la modalità è diversa per i drivers: <<in contrast, Uber’s registration process for drivers involves a clickwrap agreement in which the user must affirmatively signify agreement with the terms.>> (§ 30).

Ricorda ancora che deve esserci stata sia la notifica della modifica che la sua accettazione (two step inquiry; § 25 ss) .

Nel caso de quo, infine, è però mancata già la notifica (reasonable notice): << The first step focuses on whether a user had reasonable notice of the online contract terms “consider[ing] the perspective of a reasonably prudent . . . user” of online technology. Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75, 77 …. Whether an interface provides reasonable notice of the terms of an online contract does not necessarily turn on the classification of the agreement as a scrollwrap, clickwrap, browsewrap, or sign-in wrap agreement; rather, it is essentially a function of how likely the terms and conditions themselves, or a hyperlink to them, are to come to the attention of the reasonably prudent user. [¶27] The requirement of reasonable notice is necessarily satisfied if the user has actual notice of the terms, either by reviewing them or by otherwise interacting with them, such as by having to scroll through them. See Kauders, 159 N.E.3d at 1049>>

In particolare il problema sta nel rinvio ad altra pagina tramite hyper link, troppo poco visibile: <<all of the observations about the Uber registration interface for riders in Cullinane and Kauders that led those courts to decide that Uber had not provided reasonable notice of its terms apply fully here. The appearance of the hyperlink to the Terms, specifically the lack of underlining and the muted gray coloring, means that it is not obviously identifiable as a hyperlink. The sequence in which it appears during the registration process renders it less likely to draw the user’s attention. Its placement on the screen, particularly in light of the more prominent features on the same page, renders it relatively inconspicuous. Based on the totality of the features of the Uber interface that Sarchi utilized in registering—the focus on entering payment information rather than on the Terms; the small, lowercase font in which the notice and the Terms appeared; and the lightly outlined box containing the link to the Terms that did not have the appearance of a hyperlink or a clickable button—we conclude that the Uber interface Sarchi used to register failed to provide a prudent user with reasonable notice of the Terms. >>

Conclude osservando che, anche ritenendo perfetta la notifica, sarebbe comunque assente un’adeguata manifestazione di assenso: ciò per la non sufficientemente limpida serie di passaggi (pulsanti da premere sullo schermo) allo scopo predisposti da Uber, § 37 ss.

Sentenza dettagliata ed interessante anche per eventuali liti nel ns. ordinamento.

(notizia e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Conclusione del contratto via e arbitrabilità

nel dubbio sulla conclusione o meno del contratto relativo alla arbitrabilità con Walmart, la corte di appello rinvia a processo sulla stessa arbitrabilità, come prevede la legge federale.

Si tratta dell‘appello dell’8 circuito n. 20-1787 dell’8 ottobre 2021 .

La sentenza è interessante per l’esame delle modalità di conclusione dei contratti via internet, “clickwrap” arrangements oppure “browsewrap” arrangements.

Nel caso de quo era relativo a gift cards di Walmart cui erano stati sottratti ilecitamente i denari ivi caricati.

Il punto per decidere la conclusione o meno del patto è capire se vi sia stata o meno <notice> adeguata: il rinvio alle condizioni generali di Walmart stava sul retro della carta (ove si leggeva “[s]ee Walmart.com for complete terms.” ), condizioni reperibili nel sito web.

In primo grado la corte aveva escluso la conclusione di patto sul punto; la corte di appello invece è in dubbio e perciò rinvia al trial per decidere sul punto.

(sentenza e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Web/data scraping e secondary ticketing: è inadempimento contrattuale?

Un’agenzia di viaggio acquista biglietti aerei da Southwest Airlines (SA), rivendendoli poi a terzi, ed estrae sistematicamente vari dati, pubblicamente accessibili nel sito web di questa: ciò nonostante le condizioni di acquisto lo proibissero.

SA agisce per varie causae actiones tra cui violazione contrattuale. Decide la NORTHERN DISTRICT COURT OF TEXAS – DALLAS DIVISION , CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-00098-E, Soutwest Airlines c. Kiwi, 30.09.2021, accogliendone la domanda.

Kiwi cita il noto precedente hiQ Labs c. Linkledin del 2019, ove fu ritenuto lecito lo scraping dei dati.

Però prevale l’orientmento del divieto di scrapintg fondato su patto apposito, presente nelle Terms and Conditions : <<Kiwi has purchased over 20,000 flights on the Southwest Digital Platforms. In connection with its sales of Southwest flights, Kiwi specifically acknowledges that: “All services provided by Southwest Airlines are subject to their Terms and Conditions. More information is available on their website.” The Terms are hyperlinked at the bottom of each page of Southwest’s website with a statement that use of the website constitutes acceptance of the Terms. For all online purchases, the user must affirmatively acknowledge and accept the Terms by clicking a button that states: “By clicking ‘Purchase,’ I agree to the Terms and Conditions below, the privacy policy, and the contract of carriage,” which appears just above a yellow “Purchase” button with hyperlinks to the Website Terms, Privacy Policy, and Contract of Carriage. For each purchase, Kiwi affirmatively accepted the Terms. Southwest sent multiple cease-and-desist notices to Kiwi’s chief legal counsel, Kiwi’s CEO, and to Kiwi’s registered agents in the United States. Southwest specifically referenced the Terms and attached a copy of them, pointing out examples of how Kiwi’s conduct violated the Terms. Kiwi acknowledged receipt of one such cease-and-desist notice in September 2019. As in BoardFirst, when Kiwi continued to use the Southwest website in connection with Kiwi’s business with actual knowledge of the Terms, Kiwi “bound itself to the contractual obligations imposed by the Terms.” See BoardFirst, 2007 WL 4823761, at *7>>, p. 7

E’ poi intgersante anche il ragionamemnot sul danno irreparabile , requisito per la cocnessione della cautgela: viene ravvisato e la cautela èconcessa: <<Balance of harms: Southwest must also demonstrate the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted. Southwest argues Kiwi’s business practices interfere with customer communications, misrepresent Southwest customer-friendly policies,
charge customers unnecessary fees, divert traffic away from Southwest’s website, and tarnish Suthwest’s reputation and goodwill. Southwest argues Kiwi will suffer little if any damage by ceasing unauthorized sales of Southwest flights and that Kiwi’s interest in using the Southwest website for its own commercial purposes is entitled to “scant consideration.” Kiwi can continue its business and sell flights for other carriers.
Kiwi alleges the balance of harms tips strongly in its favor. Kiwi argues an injunction poses a significant threat to its business model, reputation, and partner relationships. Kiwi asserts removing Southwest flights from its website will drastically affect its ability to build dynamic travel itineraries for its customers. According to Kiwi, for many key travel routes and destinations,
it is impossible to fly without traveling on Southwest. It also contends that an unspecified “threat of further injunctions against brokering ticket sales poses a potentially existential threat to Kiwi.com’s US operation.”
The Court concludes the threatened injury to Southwest if the injunction is denied outweighs the harm to Kiwi. Southwest has shown that Kiwi’s unauthorized sales of its flights poses a significant disruption to its customer operations. Kiwi has not convinced the Court that the injunction will significantly threaten its business. As Southwest notes, Southwest is not listed as one of Kiwi’s “top 20 airlines” on its website>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Erik Goldman)