§ 230 Communication Decency Act

La Suprema Corte USA sulla responsabilità (indiretta) del provider per violazione di copyright

La Corte Suprema 25.03.2026, n. 24-171, Cox v. Sony, chiarisce, con arresto di significativa importanza, che il sapere del (possibile o anche certo) uso del proprio servizio per fini illeciti non rende corresponsabile l’internet provider.

Si tratta dell’istituto della contributory liability, che presuppone volontà di uso illecito dei propri servizi. Volontà che può estrinsecarsi in due modi: il copyright owner can show the requisite intent in two ways. First, it can show that a party affirmatively induced the infringement. Ibid. Second, it can show that the party sold a service tailored to infringement. Id., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). [dal syllabus]

Ebbene il provider Cox , pur ricevendo 163.148 segnalazioni dal software MarkMonitor di Sony e poi chiudendo solo 32 abbonamenti, non è corresponsabile.

<<Thus, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement
of Sony’s copyrights. Cox provided Internet service to its
subscribers, but it did not intend for that service to be used
to commit copyright infringement. Holding Cox liable
merely for failing to terminate Internet service to infringing
accounts would expand secondary copyright liability be-
yond our precedents.
Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided
a service tailored to infringement. As for inducement, Cox
did not “induce” or “encourage” its subscribers to infringe in
any manner. Id., at 930. Sony provided no “evidence of ex-
press promotion, marketing, and intent to promote” in-
fringement. Id., at 926. And, Cox repeatedly discouraged
copyright infringement by sending warnings, suspending
services, and terminating accounts. As for providing a ser-
vice tailored to infringement, Cox’s Internet service was
clearly “capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’
noninfringing uses.” Id., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Cox did not tailor its service to make copyright infringe-
ment easier. Cox simply provided Internet access, which is
used for many purposes other than copyright infringement.>>

L’errore della corte di appello:
<<The Fourth Circuit found otherwise based only on its Cir-
cuit precedent establishing a new form of contributory lia-
bility. The court did not suggest that Cox induced its users
to infringe. 93 F. 4th, at 235, n. 4. And, it did not deny that
Cox’s service was “capable of substantial lawful use and not
designed to promote infringement.” Id., at 236. Rather, the
court held that “supplying a product with knowledge that
the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is . . . suffi-
cient for contributory infringement.” Ibid.; see also BMG,
881 F. 3d, at 311–312. The Fourth Circuit’s holding thus
went beyond the two forms of liability recognized in Grok-
ster and Sony. It also conflicted with this Court’s repeated
admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a
provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient ac-
tion to prevent it. See Kalem Co., 222 U. S., at 62; Sony,
464 U. S., at 439; Grokster, 545 U. S., at 939, n. 12>>

La sentenza è importante: sapere che i propri servizi saranno (possibilmente/probabilmente/certamente: è da distinguere?) usati a fini illeciti, non rende correponsabili.

Connesso è il tema della responsabilità dell’intelligenza artificiale per le riproduzioni illecite da essa causate in base a prompt dell’utente. E’ responsabile l’ente che gestisce il LLM o l’utente? Sono per la seconda Bonadio E. – Frosio G. – Geiger Ch. – Guadamuz A. – Karapapa S. – Stamatoudi I. A., Preserving Balance in the EU Digital Single Market: How Like Company Could Reframe Copyright and Innovation in the Generative AI Era (March 02, 2026) https://ssrn.com/abstract=6326401 , saggio approfondito, relativo al rinvio pregiudiziale alla Corte di Giustizia, caso C-250/2025, Like Company vs Google, § 7.

Breve nota critica del prof. Paul Goldstein, autore del monumentale Goldstein on Copyright, Third Edition, nel sito di Eric Goldman.

Nel medesimo sito, considerazioni meno critiche (nel senso che non tutto è perso per i titolari di diritti, se avranno l’accortezza di ben manovrare gli strumenti offerti loro dall’ordinamento) sono proposte dal prof. Guy Rub.

L’algoritmo di Tiktok , decidendo il feed degli utenti,. fa si che la piattaforma sia corresponsabile dei loro conteuti

Eric Goldman ci informa sull’appello del 3 circuito n. 22-3061,TAWAINNA ANDERSON, v. TIKTOK, INC.; BYTEDANCE, INC, 27.08.2024. relativo ad uno dei purtroppo frequenti demenziali video di challenge, che spingono giovani e giovanissimi a sfide pericolosissime (asfissia)

Per il collegio, il fatto che il newsfeed sia governato da TikTok fa si che i materiali caricati siano attribuibili non solo all’utente, ma anche a Tik Tok, ai fini del safe harbour ex §230 CDA.

Si tratta quindi non di third-party speech ma di first-party speech.

Tesi che, dice il 3 Circ. , è confermata dalla sentenza della Corte Suprema Moody v. NetChoice, LLC del 2024, per la quale spetta alle piattaforme la tutela del diritto di parola: ne sopportino allora le coerenti conseguenze circa il § 230 CDA.

DA noi l’art. 6 del DSA (reg. UE 2022/2065) ha diversa formulazione: irresponsabilità per “informazioni memorizzate su richiesta di un destinatario”, purchè non sappia o rimuova immediatamente.

Ma il tema si pone lo stesso, alla luce della copiosa giurisprudenza nazionale ed europea sul punto, pur legata alla precedenti disposizioni (d lgs 70 del 2003 e dir. UE 2000/31) (v concetto di hosting provider “attivo”)

Il 230 CDA salva Amazon dall’accusa di corresponsabile di recensioni diffamatorie contro un venditore del suo marketplace

La recensione diffamatoria (lievemente, per vero: sciarpa Burberry’s asseritamenye non autentica) non può vedere Amazon correposanbilòe perchè oepra il safe harbour citato.

Si tatta di infatti proprio del ruolo di publisher/speaker previsto dala legge. Nè può ravvisarsi un contributo attivo di Amazon nell’aver stabilito le regole della sua piattaforma, come vorrebbe il diffamato: il noto caso Roommates è malamente invocato.

Caso alquanto facile.

Così l‘appello del 11 circuito 12 giugn 2023, No. 22-11725, MxCall+1 c. Zotos + Amazon:

<<In that case, Roommates.com published a profile page for each subscriber seeking housing on its website. See id. at 1165. Each profile had drop-down menu on which subscribers seeking housing had to specify whether there are currently straight males, gay males, straight females, or lesbians living at the dwelling. This information was then displayed on the website, and Room-mates.com used this information to channel subscribers away from the listings that were not compatible with the subscriber’s prefer-ences. See id. The Ninth Circuit determined that Roommates.com was an information content provider (along with the subscribers seeking housing on the website) because it helped develop the in-formation at least in part. Id. (“By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of prepopulated answers, Room-mate[s.com] . . . becomes the developer, at least in part, of that in-formation.”).
Roommates.com is not applicable, as the complaint here al-leges that Ms. Zotos wrote the review in its entirety. See generally D.E. 1. Amazon did not create or develop the defamatory review even in part—unlike Roommates.com, which curated the allegedly discriminatory dropdown options and required the subscribers to choose one. There are no allegations that suggest Amazon helped develop the allegedly defamatory review.
The plaintiffs seek to hold Amazon liable for failing to take down Ms. Zotos’ review, which is exactly the kind of claim that is immunized by the CDA—one that treats Amazon as the publisher of that information. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See also D.E. 1 at 5 (“Amazon . . . refused to remove the libelous statements posted by Defendant Zotos”). “Lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider [like Amazon] liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional edi-torial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content—are barred.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. We therefore affirm the dismissal of the claims against Amazon>>.

(notizia e link dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)

Il motore di ricerca è corresponsabile per associazioni indesiderate ma errate in caso di omonimia?

La risposta è negativa nel diritto USA, dato che Microsoft è coperta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA:

Così , confermando il 1° grado, la 1st District court of appeal della Florida, Nos. 1D21-3629 + 1D22-1321 (Consolidated for disposition) del 10 maggio 2023, White c. DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS, ed altri.

fatto:

Mr. White sued various nonresident defendants for damages in tort resulting from an episode of a reality/crime television show entitled “Evil Lives Here.” Mr. White alleged that beginning with the first broadcast of the episode “I Invited Him In” in August 2018, he was injured by the broadcasting of the episode about a serial killer in New York also named Nathaniel White. According to the allegations in the amended complaint, the defamatory episode used Mr. White’s photograph from a decades-old incarceration by the Florida Department of Corrections. Mr. White alleged that this misuse of his photo during the program gave viewers the impression that he and the New York serial killer with the same name were the same person thereby damaging Mr. White.

Diritto :

The persons who posted the information on the eight URLs provided by Mr. White were the “information content providers” and Microsoft was the “interactive service provider” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) and (3). See Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that a search engine falls within the definition of interactive computer service); see also In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W. 3d 80, 90 (Tex. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (“The ‘national consensus’ . . . is that ‘all claims’ against internet companies ‘stemming from their publication of information created by third parties’ effectively treat the defendants as publishers and are barred.”). “By presenting Internet search results to users in a relevant manner, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft facilitate the operations of every website on the internet. The CDA was enacted precisely to prevent these types of interactions from creating civil liability for the Providers.” Baldino’s Lock & Key Serv., Inc. v. Google LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d 276, 283 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., 925 F.3d at 1265.
In Dowbenko v. Google Inc., 582 Fed. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2014), the state law defamation claim was “properly dismissed” as “preempted under § 230(c)(1)” since Google, like Microsoft here, merely hosted the content created by other providers through search services. Here, as to Microsoft’s search engine service, the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment finding Microsoft immune from Mr. White’s defamation claim by operation of Section 230 since Microsoft did not publish any defamatory statement.
Mr. White argues that even if Microsoft is immune for any defamation occurring by way of its internet search engine, Microsoft is still liable as a service that streamed the subject episode. Mr. White points to the two letters from Microsoft in support of his argument. For two reasons, we do not reach whether an internet streaming service is an “interactive service provider” immunized from suit for defamation by Section 230.
First, the trial court could not consider the letters in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The letters were not referenced in Mr. White’s written response to Microsoft’s motion. They were only in the record in response to a different defendant’s motion for a protective order. So the trial court could disregard the letters in ruling on Microsoft’s motion. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(5); Lloyd S. Meisels, P.A. v. Dobrofsky, 341 So. 3d 1131, 1136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Without the two letters, Mr. White has no argument that Microsoft was a publisher of the episode.
Second, even considering the two letters referenced by Mr. White, they do not show that Microsoft acted as anything but an interactive computer service. That the subject episode was possibly accessible for streaming via a Microsoft search platform does not mean that Microsoft participated in streaming or publishing the episode

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Responsabilità del Registrar di domain names per l’uso illecito del dominio da parte del nuovo assegnatario? Si applica il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA?

L’appello del 9° circuito 3 febbrio 2023, No. 21-16182, Scotts Rigby v. Godaddy, sull’uso indebito del nome di dominio “scottrigsbyfoundation.org;” dato a un terzo e divenuto sito di giochi d’azzardo.

dal Summary iniziale:

<<When Rigsby and the Foundation failed to pay
GoDaddy, a domain name registrar, the renewal fee for
scottrigsbyfoundation.org, a third party registered the thenavailable domain name and used it for a gambling
information site. (…)
The panel held that Rigsby could not satisfy the “use in
commerce” requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis
GoDaddy because the “use” in question was being carried
out by a third-party gambling site, not GoDaddy, and Rigsby
therefore did not state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). As
to the Lanham Act claim, the panel further held that Rigsby
could not overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which limits
the secondary liability of domain name registrars and
registries for the act of registering a domain name. The
panel concluded that Rigsby did not plausibly allege that
GoDaddy registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name
with a bad faith intent to profit, nor did he plausibly allege
that GoDaddy’s alleged wrongful conduct surpassed mere
registration activity>>

E sorpttutto sul § 230 CDA , che protegge da molte domande:

<<The panel held that § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which immunizes providers of interactive
computer services against liability arising from content
created by third parties, shielded GoDaddy from liability for
Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy, publicity,
trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s Consumer
Fraud Act.

The panel held that immunity under § 230
applies when the provider is an interactive computer
services, the plaintiff is treating the entity as the publisher or
speaker, and the information is provided by another
information content provider.

Agreeing with other circuits,
the panel held that domain name registrars and website
hosting companies like GoDaddy fall under the definition of
an interactive computer service.

In addition, GoDaddy was
not a publisher of scottrigsbyfoundation.org, and it was not
acting as an information content provider.>>

SAfe harbour ex § 230 CDa per danni da database informativo su privati messo in vendita?

Dice di no l’appello del 4 circuito n. 21-1678, TYRONE HENDERSON, SR e altri c. THE SOURCE FOR PUBLIC DATA, L.P. (dal distretto est della Virginia)

Attività dei convenuti:

<< Public Data’s business is providing third parties with information about individuals.
Plaintiffs allege that it involves four steps.
First, Public Data acquires public records, such as criminal and civil records, voting
records, driving information, and professional licensing. These records come from various
local, state, and federal authorities (and other businesses that have already collected those
records).
Second, Public Data “parses” the collected information and puts it into a proprietary
format. This can include taking steps to “reformat and alter” the raw documents, putting
them “into a layout or presentation [Public Data] believe[s] is more user-friendly.” J.A.
16. For criminal records, Public Data “distill[s]” the data subject’s criminal history into
“glib statements,” “strip[s] out or suppress[es] all identifying information relating to the
charges,” and then “replace[s] this information with [its] own internally created summaries
of the charges, bereft of any detail.” J.A. 30.
Third, Public Data creates a database of all this information which it then
“publishes” on the website PublicData.com. Public Data does not look for or fix
inaccuracies in the database, and the website disclaims any responsibility for inaccurate
information. Public Data also does not respond to requests to correct or remove inaccurate
information from the database.
Fourth, Public Data sells access to the database, “disbursing [the] information . . .
for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” J.A. 19. All things told,
Plaintiffs allege that Public Data sells 50 million consumer searches and reports per year.
Public Data knows that traffic includes some buyers using its data and reports to check
creditworthiness and some performing background checks for employment pURPOSE >>

La domanda di danno è basata su violazioni di alcune disposizioni del Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), anche ma non solo di tipo data protection.

L’invocazione del safe harbout è rigettata su due dei tre requisiti di legge.

RAvvisata la qualità di internet provider, è però negato sia (per alcuni claims) che venisse trattaato come publisher o speaker sia (per altri claims) che le infomazioni fossero di terzi.

Analisi dettagliata ma forse nell’esito poco condivisibile.

Le informazioni erano pur sempre tutte di terzi, solo che il convenuto le formattava in modalità più fruibili ai propri scopi (magari con qualche omissione …)-

Soprattutto, dir che non erano trattati come puiblisher/speaker è dubbio.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Discriminazione e safe harbour ex § 230 Cda in Facebook

LA Eastern district of Pennsylvania 30.09.2022 Case 2:21-cv-05325-JHS D , Amro Ealansari c. Meta, rigtta la domanda volta a censurare presunta discriminazione da parte di Facebook verso materiali islamici ivi caricati.

E’ rigettata sia nel merito , non avendo provato discrimnazione nè che F. sia public accomodation (secondo il Civil Rights Act), sia in via pregiudiziale per l’esimente ex § 230 CDA.

Nulla di particolarmente interessante e innovativo

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman)

Azione contrattuale contro Facebook parzialmente protetta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Il distreto nord della Californa 21 .09.2022 , CASE NO. 22-cv-02366-RS, Shared.com c. Meta, affronta il tema della invocabilità del porto sicuro ex § 230 CDA nel caso venga azionata responsabilità contrattuale di tipo editoriale del PROVIDER per materiali non propri.

Nel caso ricorreva anche un contratto di pubblicità dell’utente con Facebook, tipo assai diffuso e al centro delle vendite digitali odierne.

Fatti: << Shared is a partnership based out of Ontario, Canada that “creates and publishes original,
timely, and entertaining [online] content.” Dkt. 21 ¶ 9. In addition to its own website, Plaintiff also
operated a series of Facebook pages from 2006 to 2020. During this period, Shared avers that its
pages amassed approximately 25 million Facebook followers, helped in part by its substantial
engagement with Facebook’s “advertising ecosystem.” This engagement occurred in two ways.
First, Shared directly purchased “self-serve ads,” which helped drive traffic to Shared.com and
Shared’s Facebook pages.

Second, Shared participated in a monetization program called “Instant
Articles,” in which articles from Shared.com would be embedded into and operate within the
Facebook news feed; Facebook would then embed ads from other businesses into those articles
and give Shared a portion of the ad revenue. Shared “invested heavily in content creation” and
retained personnel and software specifically to help it maximize its impact on the social media
platform. Id. ¶ 19.
Friction between Shared and Facebook began in 2018. Shared states that it lost access to
Instant Articles on at least three occasions between April and November of that year. Importantly,
Shared received no advance notice that it would lose access. This was contrary to Shared’s averred
understanding of the Facebook Audience Network Terms (“the FAN Terms”), which provide that
“[Facebook] may change, withdraw, or discontinue [access to Instant Articles] in its sole
discretion and [Facebook] will use good faith efforts to provide Publisher with notice of the
same.” Id. ¶ 22; accord Dkt. 21-5. Shared asserts that “notice,” as provided in the FAN Terms,
obliges Facebook to provide advance notice of a forthcoming loss of access, rather than after-thefact notice. (…)>.

Facebook (F.) poi sospese l’account e impedì il funzionamento del programma di advertisment

Alla domanda giudiziale, F. (anzi Meta) si difende preliminarmente con il safe harbour, quale decisione editoriale e quindi libera:

LA CORTE: << Defendant is only partially correct. Plaintiff raises three claims involving Defendant’s
decision to suspend Plaintiff’s access to its Facebook accounts and thus “terminate [its] ability to
reach its followers”: one for conversion, one for breach of contract, and one for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Dkt. 21, ¶¶ 54–63, 110–12, 119. Shared
claims that, contrary to the Facebook Terms of Service, Defendant suspended Shared’s access to
its Facebook pages without first determining whether it had “clearly, seriously or repeatedly
breached [Facebook’s] Terms or Policies>>.

E poi: << At bottom, these claims seek to hold Defendant liable
for its decision to remove third-party content from Facebook. This is a quintessential editorial
decision of the type that is “perforce immune under section 230.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102
(quoting Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–
71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Ninth Circuit courts have reached this conclusion on numerous
occasions. See, e.g., King v. Facebook, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 3d 776, 795 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Atkinson
v. Facebook Inc., 20-cv-05546-RS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020); Fed. Agency of News LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1306–07 (N.D. Cal. 2019). To the extent Facebook’s Terms
of Service outline a set of criteria for suspending accounts (i.e., when accounts have “clearly,
seriously, or repeatedly” breached Facebook’s policies), this simply restates Meta’s ability to
exercise editorial discretion. Such a restatement does not, thereby, waive Defendant’s section
230(c)(1) immunity. See King, 572 F. Supp. 3d at 795. Allowing Plaintiff to reframe the harm as
one of lost data, rather than suspended access, would simply authorize a convenient shortcut
through section 230’s robust liability limitations by way of clever pleading. Surely this cannot be
what Congress would have intended. As such, these claims must be dismissed. >>

In breve, che i materiali di cui si contesta la rimozione siano dell’attore/contraente (anzichè di un utente terzo come nei più frequenti casi di diffamazione), nulla sposta: il safe harbour sempre si applica, ricorrendo i requisiti previsti dal § 230 CDA

La frode informatica tramite app scaricata da Apple Store non preclude ad Apple di fruire del safe harbour ex 230 CDA

Il Trib. del North Dist. dell aCalifornia, 2 settembre 2022, HADONA DIEP, et al., Plaintiffs, v. APPLE, INC., Defendant. , Case No. 21-cv-10063-PJH , decide su una domanda contro Apple per aver favorito/omesso controlli su una app (Toast Plus) del suo store , che le aveva frodato diversa criptocurrency

L’immancabile eccezione di porto sicuro ex § 230 CDA viene accolta.

Ed invero difficile sarebbe stato un esito diverso, trttandosi di caso da manuale.

Naturalmenten gli attori tentano di dire i) che avevano azionato anche domande eccedenti il suo ruolo di publisher e ii) che Apple è content provider (<<The act for which plaintiffs seek to hold Apple liable is “allowing the Toast Plus application to be distributed on the App Store,” not the development of the app>>) : ma questo palesement non eccede il ruolo di mero hosting.

Conclusion: Plaintiffs’ allegations all seek to impose liability based on Apple’s role in vetting the app and making it available to consumers through the App Store. Apple qualifies as an interactive computer service provider within the meaning of the first prong of the Barnes test. Plaintiffs seek to hold Apple liable for its role in reviewing and making the Toast Plus app available, activity that satisfies the second prong of the Barnes test as publishing activity. And plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that Apple created the Toast Plus app; rather, it was created by another information content provider and thus meets the third prong of the Barnes test. For each of these reasons, as well as the inapplicability of an exemption, Apple is immune under § 230 for claims based on the conduct of the Toast Plus developers.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Twitter, se sospende un account, può invocare il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Il NOrthern district della California con sentenza 19 luglio 2022, Case 3:21-cv-08062-CRB , Rangel v. Dorsey e altri, conferma la lunga fila di precedenti sulla invocabilità del safe harbour da parte della content moderation operata da Twitter (T.).

Il tweet censurato pare dicesse <HANG THEM ALL>
Sussistono tutti i tre requisiti

<< The three elements of Section 230(c)(1) are easily met.

First, despite Rangel’s insistence to the contrary, e.g., Opp at 8, Twitter clearly is a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service” under the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2); Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (the “prototypical” example is an “online messaging board”); Brittain v. Twitter, Inc., 2019 WL 2423375, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) (Twitter is an interactive computer service).

Second, Rangel seeks to hold Twitter liable for decisions regarding “information provided by another information content provider”—that is, information that he, rather than Twitter, provided. Rangel mistakenly believes that he himself cannot be a third-party information provider under this provision, but this view has been repeatedly rejected. See, e.g., Ebeid v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 WL 2059662, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019).

Third, Rangel seeks to “treat [Twitter] as the publisher” because his claims derive entirely from Twitter’s decision to exclude his content and suspend his account—that is, traditional publishing functions. See Fair Hous.
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.”); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103 (“[R]emoving content is something publishers do.”). And Rangel’s contract claim fares no differently because it is based on the Terms of Service, which is discretionary and merely “incorporate[s] . . . [Twitter’s] right to act as a publisher.” King v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 5279823, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2021); see Terms of Service § 4.

Accordingly, Twitter is immune from all of Rangel’s claims. >>

Il punto più interessante è il terzo: anche il titolare dell’account è terzo rispetto al publisher, per cui il requisito di legge è rispettato. Passaggio esatto , anche se scontat.

Anche non concedendo il safe harbour, la domanda sarebbe comunque da rigettare nel merito, prosegue la corte.

<< Even if Twitter were not immune, Rangel’s claims would still fail. Three claims
lack a private right of action or legal theory, and the other two fail as a matter of law.
First, the contract claim fails because Rangel does not plausibly allege two
necessary elements: (1) that Twitter breached a promise, or (2) that the breach caused him
damage. See Richman v. Hartley, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 1186 (2014). Under the Terms
of Service, Twitter “may suspend or terminate your account . . . at any time for any or no
reason, including, but not limited to, if we reasonably believe[] you have violated these
Terms or the Twitter Rules and Policies.” Terms of Service § 4. Twitter violated no
promise in suspending Rangel’s account because it is more than “reasonabl[e]” for Twitter
to “believe[]” that a tweet that said “HANG THEM ALL” is “content that wishes, hopes,
or expresses a desire for death . . . against . . . [a] group of people.” See Spector Decl. Ex
B (dkt. 44-3) (Abusive behavior policy). Rangel’s contract claim also fails for the
independent reason that he does not allege damages: though Rangel demands $100 million
in compensatory damages, he nowhere alleges actual harm because of Twitter’s actions.
See Richman, 224 Cal. App. 4th at 1186.2
Second, the claim that Twitter unlawfully interfered with interstate commerce “by denying [Rangel] online Twitter access to shareholder paid-for national advertising” lacks
any identifiable or cognizable legal theory. SAC at 3; see Godecke, 937 F.3d at 1208.
Third, the wire fraud claim fails both because Rangel lacks a private right of action
and he does not allege fraud with particularity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Rangel seems to think that any breach of contract that occurs online is actionable wire
fraud, see SAC at 3, but he has not adequately alleged breach, and that is not the law.
Fourth, the “shareholder fraud/public fraud” claim fails. To the extent that he
alleges shareholder fraud, Rangel has not alleged that he purchased any Twitter stock, so
he lacks standing. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–32 (1975).
As for other fraud, Rangel alleges vaguely that Twitter “misrepresent[ed] . . . to their
shareholders, advertisers, the public and users as to Twitter’s fiduciary responsibility
regarding shareholders’ return on investment and share tradeability.” SAC at 4. This
vague allegation falls far short of the basic requirements of Rule 8, much less the
particularity required by Rule 9(b).
Finally, Rangel’s claim under California’s UETA fails because this law, which
requires that electronic signatures be given legal effect, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.7(a), has
no discernible relevance to his allegations. In any event, it confers no private right of
action. See Burgess v. Forbes, 2009 WL 1068877, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2009)>>

Il punto interessante è la ragionevoe credenza di T. che vi sia una qualche violazione delle proprie TOS.

Qui il giudice pare aver errato nell’iter motivatorio: infatti la clausola rinvia ad altra clausola (la previsione non è autosuifficiente) , che però il giudice non menziona. Quindi ravvisare la ragionevolezza della sospensione non persuade. Anche se alla fine probabilmente qualche regola violata si troverebbe , dato il grado di notevole offensività dell’espressione censurata.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)