Tag: safe harbour

Safe harbour per Vimeo contro i giganti della musica del gruppo EMI Records (dopo la vittoria del 2025 è arrivata una modestissima liquidazione di spese di lite)

Qui però riferisco solo della sentenza del 2025 sul merito, non avendolo fatto allora, essendo alquanto interessante la discussione sulle red flags di violazione copyrights e sulla invocabilità del safe harbor ex DMCA sec. 512(c).

Si tratta dell’appello del 2° Circuito in Capitol REcords e altri v. Vimeo Inc, 13.01.2025, Docket Nos. 21-2949(L), 21-2974(Con), di cui ci diede notizia Eric Goldman e che ci viene oggi ricordata  per le questione delle spese. Questione qui irrilevante, come detto; mi limito a ricordare la notazione del prof. Goldman  secondo cui , a fronte di una battaglia giudiziaria di 17 anni e a spese legali per 6 milioni di dollari , il Tribunale di New York in questo settembre ha liquidato solo 16.000 dollari , così motivando: “Vimeo itself has previously recognized, this case raised “many difficult or new” issues….An award of attorneys’ fees to Vimeo, however, would not serve the purposes of the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs asserted reasonable claims that raised novel, complex questions of law, and they litigated those claims reasonably and in good faith. This case also presents little need for either compensation or deterrence“).

Andiamo dunque al merito accertato nel 2025.

La domanda venne respinta perchè Vimeo nè aveva notizia di violazioni specifiche sui video allegati nè ricevette financial benefit diretto dalle violazioni. REquisiti che sono i pretesi danneggiati a dover provare.

Il passaggio più interessante è quello sulle red flags:

<<Even if a person without specialized knowledge would have intuited a likelihood that many of the posted videos were not authorized, that would not make it obvious that a particular video lacked authorization to use the music [esatto: è il punto centrale, di solito trascuirato da dottrina e giurisprueenza italiane]. This is all the more true in view of the uncontested fact that, since 2011, Vimeo had run a store from which users could purchase licenses to use music in videos. Accordingly, Vimeo employees were aware of the existence of simplified opportunities available to purchase licenses. Furthermore, because Plaintiffs have not proved that Vimeo employees had specialized knowledge of the music industry, those employees’ awareness that music found on their videos was under copyright did not show that they knew whether the music they heard on user videos came from EMI or another label. Plaintiffs’ evidence does not support it being apparent to Vimeo employees that the music they heard on any particular video came from a label that did not offer licenses through Vimeo’s store or otherwise.

Plaintiffs also rely on the contention that EMI’s cease-and-desist letter, sent to Vimeo in 2008, put Vimeo employees on notice that any EMI music used on the website was unauthorized. Plaintiffs cite EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2016), where we explained that the defendant’s subjective awareness that there had been no legal online distribution of Beatles songs could support red flag knowledge that any online electronic copies of Beatles songs on defendant’s servers were unlicensed. But the same logic does not necessarily apply here. As the district court pointed out, an awareness that EMI sent a letter in the past demanding removal of its music gave no assurance that EMI did not thereafter make contracts licensing the use of its music, especially in view of evidence that some users who posted the videos containing EMI music asserted that EMI had provided them with authorization to use the music. The DMCA does not require service providers to perform research on mere suspicion of a user’s infringement to determine the identity of the music in the user’s video, identify its source, and determine whether the user acquired a license. See Vimeo I, 826 F.3d at 98-99 (explaining, in the context of a contention of willful blindness, that requiring service providers “constantly to take stock of all

information their employees may have acquired that might suggest the presence of infringements in user postings, and to undertake monitoring investigations whenever some level of suspicion was surpassed, . . . would largely undo the value of § 512(m)”).

Even if we concluded that Vimeo had red flag knowledge that EMI’s music in user videos was not authorized or licensed, that would be insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs’ burden. Plaintiffs needed in addition to show that it would be apparent to a person without specialized knowledge of copyright law, or, alternatively, persons who have been demonstrated to possess specialized knowledge of copyright law, that the particular use of the music in the Videos-in-Suit was not fair use. Plaintiffs contend that they showed that the Vimeo staff had “legal acumen” as to copyright laws. See Appellants’ Br. at 59. We disagree. Their argument rests solely on Vimeo’s having told its employees not to produce videos containing copyrighted music and Vimeo’s having communicated to users that using copyrighted music “generally (but not always) constitutes copyright infringement.” Id.

Those facts do not support the conclusion that a Vimeo employee, absent familiarity with copyright laws, would have a basis for knowing whether the

use of copyrighted music in a particular video was or was not a fair use. Plaintiffs’ argument goes too far; it would require Vimeo employees to assume that uses of copyrighted material are never fair use. Vimeo’s exercise of prudence in instructing employees not to use copyrighted music and advising users that use of copyrighted music “generally (but not always) constitutes copyright infringement” did not educate its employees about how to distinguish between infringing uses and fair use.

Furthermore, at least during the period in question, the boundaries of fair use were not so well settled as to make clear even to persons well acquainted with copyright law whether and when a dancing, acting, or lip-dubbing performance of copyrighted music might pass muster as a fair use.

The difficulty distinguishing fair use from infringement at the time in question is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent consideration of Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. 508 (2023). The question presented to the Court in that case was whether the first statutory factor for a finding of fair use—“the purpose and character of the use,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)—favored a finding of fair use for a portrait of the singer Prince, created by Andy Warhol in 1984, which incorporated a

copyright-protected photograph of Prince taken by photographer Lynn Goldsmith, while making changes to the original. See Warhol, 598 U.S. at 516-18.

More than 40 copyright experts, as “Copyright Law Professors” and “Art Law Professors,” filed amicus briefs in their own names supporting a finding of fair use and consequently no infringement.10 At the same time, approximately 18 intellectual property professors filed amicus briefs arguing that the copying did not represent fair use.11 The Court itself also proved to be bitterly divided. In the majority opinion, seven Justices rejected the arguments passionately advanced by two dissenters that Warhol’s changes to

10 See Br. of Amici Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508; Br. of Art Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508.

11 See Br. of Professors Peter S. Menell, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, and Jane C. Ginsburg as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508; Br. of Amicus Curiae Jeffrey Sedlik, Professional Photographer and Photography Licensing Expert, in Support of Respondents, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508; Br. of Amicus Curiae Prof. Zvi S. Rosen in Support of Respondents, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508; Br. of Professor Guy A. Rub as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508; Br. of Amici Curiae Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice and Intellectual-Property Professors in Support of Respondents, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508; Br. of Professor Terry Kogan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Warhol, 598 U.S. 508.

the original Goldsmith photograph were transformative and that the ultimate creation was a fair use. See Warhol, 598 U.S. at 548-50.

Where academic scholars specialized in the study of the fair use question and the Justices of the Supreme Court are so divided, we cannot conclude that it was “apparent,” as required by Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), to untutored employees of Vimeo that dancing, acting, or lip-dubbing performances of copyrighted music uses posted by Vimeo users were not fair use>>.

SAfe harbour per una piattaforma di vendita/licenza di fotografie ?

L’appello del 2° circuito 10.02.2026, causa 23-7652, McGuchen v. Shutterstock, affronta il tema dell’applicabilita del porto sicuro ex § 512.(c). US Code title 17 in una lite azionat da un fotografo che vi aveva individuato molte sue fotografie.

I requisiti generali sono ravvisati .

La Corte invece propende per escludere i) quello per cui deve essere un trattamento sotto la direzione dell’utente (ivi, sub (1) IN GENERAL) e, ii) quello simile della assenza di beneficio economico se il “service provider has the right and ability to control such activity” (ivi, sub 1.B);

Sul primo , sub i) :

<<There is evidence in the record that suggests Shutterstock’s review of user images is neither cursory nor automatic. To begin, when a user submits an image to Shutterstock, the image does not immediately appear on the website; rather, the contributor must wait, sometimes for hours, until they receive an email from Shutterstock letting them know which of their images were accepted. See J. App’x at 1293, 1302, 1316. That fact is not dispositive, but it suggests some intervention by Shutterstock between a user upload and the appearance of material on the platform. Moreover, Shutterstock’s website states that it “has high standards and only accepts a portion of the images submitted to be included in [its] collection.” Id. at 1071. Indeed, Shutterstock maintains a page on its website that explains why an image might be rejected and provides advice for successful submissions. Id. at 1071–88. There are “30-odd” reasons that an image might be rejected by a Shutterstock reviewer, id. at 1294–95, which include focus, exposure, lighting, and noise, id. at 1071–75.
The record also contains evidence that Shutterstock’s reviewers exercise some subjective discretion even when applying seemingly rote and straightforward criteria. For instance, when considering an image’s focus, Shutterstock reviewers are “trained to know the difference between something that’s just out of focus and something that’s more intentional.” Id. at 1341–42. And according to Shutterstock, a reviewer may still accept an image that has focus issues if it is “a really unique shot” or a “hard shot to get.” Id. at 1297. That is because, as Shutterstock has explained, “there’s no way to predict what a customer is looking for,” so although “Shutterstock wants to have a high-quality library[,] . . . [t]here’s a lot of value in . . . shots that might not be perfect.” Id. at 1296–97; see also id. at 1366 (Shutterstock employee explaining that reviewers apply “a base guideline . . . but at the same time, it’s not a black-and-white standard”); id. at 1367 (“As our reviewers are humans, they obviously can think for [themselves]. We give them guidelines and we try to give them the best tools possible to review photos and to use their best judgment based on the guidelines we give them.”). In the end, as Shutterstock itself concedes, “photography is an art . . . you can’t just say, ‘This is yes, this is no.’” Id. at 1362. Together, these statements could lead a factfinder to conclude that Shutterstock’s reviewers exercise a considerable degree of case-by-case aesthetic or editorial judgment when determining which images to allow on the platform>>.

Ciò in applicazione del criterio astratto (importante ed espressamente enunciato) per cui <<if a service provider engages in manual, substantive, and discretionary review of user content—if, on a case-by-case basis, it imposes its own aesthetic, editorial, or marketing judgment on the content that appears on its platform—then its storage of infringing material is no longer “at the direction of a user.” In other words, “extensive, manual, and substantive” front-end screening of user content is not “accessibility-enhancing” and is not protected by the § 512(c) safe harbor. Mavrix, 873 F.3d at 1056. That is because, where service providers engage in their own discretionary screening of user content, they can no longer be said to be acting “solely to facilitate access by users.”>>

Sul secondo aspetto, sub ii):

<<There is evidence in the record suggesting “intrusions into user autonomy over their posts” that exceed the bounds set by Congress for the § 512(c) safe harbor. Vimeo II, 125 F.4th at 425. As an initial matter, Shutterstock screens every image before it appears on the platform—this screening determines whether an image ever gets on the platform. By way of contrast, in Vimeo II, “[c]alling attention to selected videos by giving them a sign of approval or displaying them on a Staff Picks channel . . . did not restrict the freedom of users to post whatever videos they wished.” Id. Also in contrast to Vimeo II, there is evidence here that Shutterstock’s image review goes beyond the limited purposes of restricting the site to “selected categories of consumer preferences” and excluding unlawful images. Id. Rather than engaging in categorical content screening—like accepting only holiday-themed images, or images that feature animals—Shutterstock appears to screen user images for their overall aesthetic quality. Curating a “collection,” J. App’x at 1071, of high-quality images is not the same as designing a website “that would be appealing to users with particular interests,” Vimeo II, 125 F.4th at 425.
Further, as McGucken has argued, there is some evidence in the record that Shutterstock extensively advises potential contributors on the types of images it is likely to accept. See J. App’x at 1071–88. That is unlike the service provider in Vimeo II, which “encouraged users to create certain types of content,” but did not condition their ability to post material on whether they created the provider’s preferred types of content. Vimeo II, 125 F.4th at 416. Indeed, in Vimeo II, we cited a website’s practice of giving “its users extensive advice on content” as one fact that can distinguish a service provider that has the right and ability to control infringing activity from one that does not. Id. at 423 (citing Cybernet, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1173). Accordingly, on the current record, a reasonable factfinder might conclude that the advice and instruction Shutterstock provides its contributors, coupled with its image screening process, are sufficiently coercive to constitute substantial influence.

Finally, for the same reasons articulated above, the duration of Shutterstock’s image review and its 93 percent approval rate are relevant facts, but they are not dispositive. See supra Section II.B.3. Ultimately, it is the factfinder’s role to determine the degree and significance of Shutterstock’s solicitation and screening of user content.>>

Trib. Roma sulla responsabilità del provider per materuiali caricati dagli utenti

Eleonora Rosati su IPKat ci notizia di (e ci linka a) due sentenza 2023 di Trib. Roma sez. spec. impr. sull’oggetto, entrambe tra RTI (attore) e una piattaforma di hosting files (Vimeo e V Kontacte).

Le domande sono respinte, alla luce del precedente della Corte di Giustizia Cyando del 2021.

Si tratta di :

– Trib. Roma 07.04.2023 n. 5700/2023, RG 59780/2017, Giudice rel. Picaro, RTI  c. Vimeo;

– Trib. Roma 12.10.2023 n. 14531/2023, RG 4341/2027, giud. rel.: Cavaliere, RTI v. V Kontakte;

Per Rosati la lettura del pcedente europeo è errata.

Qui io solo evidenzio che i) civilisticamente non ha dignità giuridica da noi la distinzine tra responsabilità primaria e secondaria/indiretta nel caso di materiali illeciti caricati dagli utenti e ii) il safe harbour copre ogni responsabilità da esso conseguente.

Il punto più importante è che, per perdere il safe harbour, bisogna che il provider avesse contezza dell’esistenza degli specifici illeciti azionati, non di una loro generica possibilità.

Altra questione poi è quella del livello di dettaglio della denuncia al provider da parte del titolare dei diritti.   Per il Trib. deve essere elevato: ed è  esatto, stante il principio per cui onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit , regola processuale che va applicata anche alla denuncia de qua (nè c’è ragione per caricare il provider di attività faticose e incerte, a meno che tali non siano più per ragioni ad es. di avanzamento tecnologico).

Differenza tra non applicabilità dello safe harbour e affermazione di responsabilità

La corte distrettuale del Wisconsin -western dist.-  31.03.2023, caso No. 21-cv-320-wmc, Hopson + Bluetype c. Google + Does 1 e 2, ha ben chiara la differenza tra i due concetti: che non sia invocabile il  safe harbour non significa che ricorra in positivo responsabilità (anche se di fatto sarà probabile).

Non altrettanto chiara ce l’hanno alcuni nostri opininisti (dottrina e giurisprudenza).

Nel caso si trattava del safe harbour per il copyright in caso di procedura da notice and take down e in particolare da asserita vioalzione della procedura che avrebbe dovuto condurre google a “rimettere su” i materiali in precedenza “tirati giu” (§ 512.g) del DMCA).

<<Here, plaintiffs allege that defendant Google failed to comply with § 512(g)’s
strictures by: (1) redacting contact information from the original takedown notices; (2) failing to restore the disputed content within 10 to 14 business days of receiving plaintiffs’ counter notices; and (3) failing to forward plaintiffs’ counter notices to the senders of the takedown notices. As Google points out, however, its alleged failure to comply with  § 512(g) does not create direct liability for any violation of plaintiffs’ rights. It merely denies Google a safe harbor defense should plaintiffs bring some other claim against the ISP for removing allegedly infringing material, such as a state contract or tort law claim. Martin, 2017 WL 11665339, at *3-4 (§ 512(g) does not create any affirmative cause of action; it
creates a defense to liability); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (holding plaintiffs may sue under a federal statue only where there is an express or implied private right of action). So, even if Google did not follow the procedure entitling it to a safe harbor defense in this case, the effect is disqualifying it from that defense, not creating liability under § 512(g) of the DMCA for violating plaintiffs’ rights.>>

Ancora nulla circa tale procedura in UE: gli artt. 16-17 del DSA reg. UE 2022/2065 non ne parlano (pare lasciarla all’autonomia contrattuale) e nemmeno lo fa la dir. specifica sul copyright,  art. 17 dir. UE 790/2019.

(notizia e link dal sito del prof. Eric Goldman)

Youtube non è corresponsabile delle violazioni di copyright consistite in ripetuti upload sulla sua piattaforma

Youtube non è corresponsabile delle violazioni di copyright date da ripetuti upload sulla sua piattaforma. Così US distr. court southern district of Florida 16 maggio 2023, Case No. 21-21698-Civ-GAYLES/TORRES, Athos overseas ltc c. Youtube-Google.

domanda attorea:

According to Plaintiff, Defendants are liable under direct and secondary infringement theories for YouTube’s failure to prevent the systematic re-posting of Plaintiff’s copyrighted movies to its platform. Plaintiff contends that YouTube has turned a blind eye to rampant infringement of Athos’ copyrights by refusing to employ proprietary video-detection software to block or remove from its website potentially infringing clips, and not just clips specifically identified by URL in Plaintiff’s DMCA takedown notices. In essence, Plaintiff argues that evidence of YouTube’s advanced video detection software, in conjunction with the thousands of takedown notices Athos has tendered upon YouTube, give rise to genuine issues of fact as to whether Defendants have forfeited the DMCA’s safe harbor protections.

Domanda rigettata: il provider non pèerde il suo safe harbour ex 17 US code § 512 per assenbza dell’element soggettivo:

<<Indeed, in Viacom the Second Circuit rejected identical arguments to the ones asserted here by Athos, which were presented in a lawsuit brought by various television networks against YouTube for the unauthorized display of approximately 79,000 video clips that appeared on the website between 2005 and 2008. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26. Among other things, the Viacom plaintiffs argued that the manner in which YouTube employed its automated video identification tools—including liming its access certain users—removed the ISP from the safe harbor. Id. at 40–41. Yet, the court unequivocally rejected plaintiffs’ arguments, holding that the invocation of YouTube’s technology as a source of disqualifying knowledge must be assessed in conjunction with the express mandate of § 512(m) that “provides that safe harbor protection cannot be conditioned on ‘a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity[.]’”9 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1))>>

poi:

<<Plaintiff conflates two concepts that are separate and distinct in the context of YouTube’s copyright protection software: automated video matches and actual infringements. As explained by YouTube’s copyright management tools representative, software-identified video matches are not necessarily tantamount to  copyright infringements. [D.E. 137-7, 74:21–25]. Rather, the software detects code, audio, or visual cues that may match those of a copyrighted work, and presents those matches to the owner for inspection. Thus, while YouTube systems may be well equipped to detect video matches, the software does not necessarily have the capacity to detect copyright infringements. See id. Further, the accuracy of these automatically identified matches depends on a wide range of factors and variable. [Id. at 75:1–10, 108:2–110:17, 113:3–114:25]. That is why users, not YouTube, are required to make all determinations as to the infringing nature of software selected matches. [Id.].
Second, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence showing that YouTube, through its employees, ever came into contact, reviewed, or interacted in any way with any of the purportedly identified video matches for which Athos was allegedly required to send subsequent DMCA takedown notices (i.e., the clips-in-suit). As explained by YouTube’s product manager, the processes of uploading, fingerprinting, scanning, and identifying video matches is fully automated, involving minimal to no human interaction in the part of YouTube. [Id. at 68:22–69:18, 118:17–119]. The record shows that upon upload of a video to YouTube, a chain of algorithmic processes is triggered, including the automated scanning and matching of potentially overlapping content. If the software detects potential matches, that list of matches is automatically directed towards the copyright owner, by being displayed inside the user’s YouTube interface. [Id. at 68:22–70:25]. Therefore, the record only reflects that YouTube does not rely on human involvement during this specific phase of the scanning and matching detection process, and Plaintiff does not proffer any evidence showing otherwise>>.

sintesi:

<<As the relevant case law makes clear, evidence of the technologies that ISPs independently employ to enhance copyright enforcement within their system cannot form the basis for ascribing disqualifying knowledge of unreported infringing items to the ISP. Such a conception of knowledge would contradict the plain mandate of § 512(m), “would eviscerate the required specificity of notice[,] . . . and would put the provider to the factual search forbidden by § 512(m).” Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 528. Thus, we find that Athos’ theory that specific knowledge of non-noticed infringing clips can be ascribed to Defendants by virtue of YouTube’s copyright management tools fails as a matter of law>>.

Notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof Eric Goldman

Azione contrattuale contro Facebook parzialmente protetta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Il distreto nord della Californa 21 .09.2022 , CASE NO. 22-cv-02366-RS, Shared.com c. Meta, affronta il tema della invocabilità del porto sicuro  ex § 230 CDA nel caso venga azionata responsabilità contrattuale di tipo editoriale del PROVIDER per materiali non propri.

Nel caso ricorreva anche un contratto di pubblicità dell’utente con  Facebook, tipo assai diffuso e  al centro delle vendite digitali odierne.

Fatti: << Shared is a partnership based out of Ontario, Canada that “creates and publishes original,
timely, and entertaining [online] content.” Dkt. 21 ¶ 9. In addition to its own website, Plaintiff also
operated a series of Facebook pages from 2006 to 2020. During this period, Shared avers that its
pages amassed approximately 25 million Facebook followers, helped in part by its substantial
engagement with Facebook’s “advertising ecosystem.” This engagement occurred in two ways.
First, Shared directly purchased “self-serve ads,” which helped drive traffic to Shared.com and
Shared’s Facebook pages.

Second, Shared participated in a monetization program called “Instant
Articles,” in which articles from Shared.com would be embedded into and operate within the
Facebook news feed; Facebook would then embed ads from other businesses into those articles
and give Shared a portion of the ad revenue. Shared “invested heavily in content creation” and
retained personnel and software specifically to help it maximize its impact on the social media
platform. Id. ¶ 19.
Friction between Shared and Facebook began in 2018. Shared states that it lost access to
Instant Articles on at least three occasions between April and November of that year. Importantly,
Shared received no advance notice that it would lose access. This was contrary to Shared’s averred
understanding of the Facebook Audience Network Terms (“the FAN Terms”), which provide that
“[Facebook] may change, withdraw, or discontinue [access to Instant Articles] in its sole
discretion and [Facebook] will use good faith efforts to provide Publisher with notice of the
same.” Id. ¶ 22; accord Dkt. 21-5. Shared asserts that “notice,” as provided in the FAN Terms,
obliges Facebook to provide advance notice of a forthcoming loss of access, rather than after-thefact notice. (…)>.

Facebook (F.) poi sospese l’account e impedì il funzionamento del programma di advertisment

Alla domanda giudiziale, F. (anzi Meta) si difende preliminarmente con il safe harbour, quale decisione editoriale e quindi libera:

LA CORTE: << Defendant is only partially correct. Plaintiff raises three claims involving Defendant’s
decision to suspend Plaintiff’s access to its Facebook accounts and thus “terminate [its] ability to
reach its followers”: one for conversion, one for breach of contract, and one for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Dkt. 21, ¶¶ 54–63, 110–12, 119. Shared
claims that, contrary to the Facebook Terms of Service, Defendant suspended Shared’s access to
its Facebook pages without first determining whether it had “clearly, seriously or repeatedly
breached [Facebook’s] Terms or Policies>>.

E poi: << At bottom, these claims seek to hold Defendant liable
for its decision to remove third-party content from Facebook. This is a quintessential editorial
decision of the type that is “perforce immune under section 230.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102
(quoting Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–
71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Ninth Circuit courts have reached this conclusion on numerous
occasions. See, e.g., King v. Facebook, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 3d 776, 795 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Atkinson
v. Facebook Inc., 20-cv-05546-RS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020); Fed. Agency of News LLC v.
Facebook, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1306–07 (N.D. Cal. 2019). To the extent Facebook’s Terms
of Service outline a set of criteria for suspending accounts (i.e., when accounts have “clearly,
seriously, or repeatedly” breached Facebook’s policies), this simply restates Meta’s ability to
exercise editorial discretion. Such a restatement does not, thereby, waive Defendant’s section
230(c)(1) immunity. See King, 572 F. Supp. 3d at 795. Allowing Plaintiff to reframe the harm as
one of lost data, rather than suspended access, would simply authorize a convenient shortcut
through section 230’s robust liability limitations by way of clever pleading. Surely this cannot be
what Congress would have intended. As such, these claims must be dismissed. >>

In breve, che i materiali di cui si contesta la rimozione siano dell’attore/contraente (anzichè di un utente terzo come nei più frequenti casi di diffamazione), nulla sposta: il safe harbour sempre si applica, ricorrendo i requisiti previsti dal § 230 CDA

La violazione contrattuale è coperta da safe harbour editoriale ex § 230 CDA?

La questione è sfiorata dalla Appellate Division di New York 22.03.2022, 2022 NY Slip Op 01978, Word of God Fellowship, Inc. v Vimeo, Inc., ove l’attore agisce c. Vimeo dopo aver subito la rimozione di video perchè confusori sulla sicurezza vaccinale.

L’importante domanda trova a mio parere risposta negativa: la piattaforma non può invocare il safe harbour se viola una regola contrattuale che si era assunta liberamente.

Diverso è se, come nel caso de quo, il contratto di hosting preveda la facoltà di rimuovere: ma allora il diritto di rimozione ha base nel contratto e non nell’esimente da safe harbour

(notizia della sentenza e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Safe harbour ex 230 CDA per l’omesso avviso e l’omessa rimozione di materiale sensibile? Si.

La madre di un bambino le cui immagini sessualmente significative avevva notato caricate su Tikl Tok cita la piattaforma per i segg. illeciti: did not put any warning on any of the videos claiming they might contain sensitive material; did not remove any of the videos from its platform; did not report the videos to any child abuse hotline; did not sanction, prevent, or discourage the videos in any way from being viewed, shared, downloaded or disbursed in any other way; and “failed to act on their own policies and procedures along with State and Federal Statutes and Regulations.”

Il distretto nord dell’Illinois, west. division, 28.02.2022, Case No. 21 C 50129, Day c. Tik Tok, accoglie l’eccezione di safe harbour ex § 230 CDA sollevata dalla piattaforma (e citando il noto precedente Craiglist del 2008):

“What § 230(c)(1) says is that an online information system must not ‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by’ someone else.” Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
In Chicago Lawyers’, plaintiff sought to hold Craigslist liable for postings made by others on its platform that violated the anti-discrimination in advertising provision of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)). The court held 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) precluded Craigslist from being  liable for the offending postings because “[i]t is not the author of the ads and could not be treated as the ‘speaker’ of the posters’ words, given § 230(c)(1).” Id. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that Craigslist could be liable as one who caused the offending post to be made stating “[a]n interactive computer service ‘causes’ postings only in the sense of providing a place where people can post.” Id. “Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination.” Id. “If craigslist ‘causes’ the discriminatory notices, then, so do phone companies and courier services (and, for that matter, the firms that make the computers and software that owners use to post their notices online), yet no one could think that Microsoft and Dell are liable for ‘causing’ discriminatory advertisements.” Id. at 672. The court concluded the opinion by stating that plaintiff could use the postings on Craigslist to identify targets to investigate and “assemble a list of names to send to the Attorney General for prosecution. But given § 230(c)(1) it cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”

Ed allora la domanda attorea nel caso specifico < does not allege defendant created or posted the videos. It only alleges defendant allowed and did not timely remove the videos posted by someone else. This is clearly a complaint about “information provided by another information content provider” for which defendant cannot be held liable by the terms of Section 230(c)(1).>

Difficile dar torto alla corte, alla luce del dettato della disposizione invocata da TikTok

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Google non è responsabile per la presenza di app ad uso illecito nel suo play-store, stante il safe harbour ex 230 CDA

Un ex ambasciatore statunitense, di religione ebraica, chiede l’accetameonto di responsabilità di Google perchè permette la presenza sul PlayStore di un social (Telegram) notoriamente usato -anche- da estremisti autori di propaganda antisemita.

In particollare afferma che G. non fa rispetare la propria policy vincolante i creatori di app sullo  Store.

La corte californiana U.S. D C NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA , SAN JOSE DIVISION, Case No. 21-cv-00570-BLF, Ginsberg c .Google, 18.02.2022, però ,accoglie l’eccezione di safe harbour ex 230 CDA sollevata da Google.

Dei tre requisiti chiesti allo scopo (che sia un service provider; che sia chiamato come Publisher; che si tratti di informazione di terzi), è il secondo quello di solito più litigato.

Ma giustamente la corte lo ravvisa anche in questo caso: <<In the present case, Plaintiffs’ claims are akin to the negligence claim that the Barnes court found to be barred by Section 230. Plaintiffs’ theory is that by creating and publishing guidelines for app developers, Google undertook to enforce those guidelines with due care, and can be liable for failing to do so with respect to Telegram. As in Barnes, however, the undertaking that Google allegedly failed to perform with due care was removing offending content from the Play Store.
“But removing content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103. Plaintiffs in the present case do not allege the existence of a contract – or indeed any interaction – between themselves and Google. Plaintiffs do not allege that Ambassador Ginsberg purchased his smartphone from Google or that he downloaded Telegram or any other app from the Play Store. Thus, the Barnes court’s rationale for finding that Section 230 did not bar Barnes’ promissory estoppel claim is not applicable here.>>

(notizia a link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Safe harbour per Youtube circa la diffusione di immagini di persona fisica

La corte di Dallas 17.05.21, KANDANCE A. WELLS c. Youtube, civil action No. 3:20-CV-2849-S-BH, decide una domanda giudiziale risarcitoria (per dollari 504.000,00) basata sulla illecita diffusione (da parte di terzi utenti) della propria immagine, finalizzata alla minacaccia personale.

Diverse erano le leggi invocate come violate.

Immancabilmente Y. eccepisce il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA , unico aspetti qui esaminato.

La corte accoglie l’eccezione e giustamente.

Esamina i consueti tre requisiti e come al solito il più interssante è il terzo (che la domanda tratti il convenuto come publisher o speaker): <<Plaintiff is suing Defendant for “violations to [her] personal safety as a generalconsumer” under the CPSA, the FTCA, and the “statutes preventing unfair competition, deceptiveacts under tort law, and/or the deregulation of trade/trade practices” based on the allegedlyderogatory image of her that is posted on Defendant’s website. (See doc. 3 at 1.) All her claimsagainst Defendant treat it as the publisher of that image. See, e.g., Hinton, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 690(quoting MySpace, 528 F.3d at 418) (“[T]he Court finds that all of the Plaintiff’s claims againsteBay arise or ‘stem[ ] from the [ ] publication of information [on www.ebay.com] created by thirdparties….’”); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“[I]ndeed, the very essence of publishing is making thedecision whether to print or retract a given piece of content—the very actions for which Klaymanseeks to hold Facebook liable.”). Accordingly, the third and final element is satisfied>>.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)