Arrivato un altra decisione di appello nell’oggetto: 17.02.2024, Nos. 21-2535; 22-1694, JLM COUTURE , INC., v. HAYLEY PAIGE GUTMAN, del 2 circuito, di cui dà notizia Eric Goldman.
E’ una fattispecie priva di regola specifica e di difficile qualificazione, spesso anche in fatto, oltre che in diritto. E tutt’altro che rara.
Avevo già postato su questa lite in occasione del primo intervento della corte di appello.
Riporto ora i nuovi passaggi sull’oggetto.
La corte critica l’esclusione di titolarità in capo alla designer Gutman per non aver indagato chi avesse creato gli account ed in particolare chi ne fosse proprietario in tale momento.
<<The Disputed Accounts should be treated in the first instance
like any other form of property. This includes determining the
original owner. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805)
(determining original owner of a fox); Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261,
265 (1910) (discussing the principle of title by first possession); see also
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
73, 73 (1985). When Gutman created the Disputed Accounts, any
associated property rights belonged to someone. And if she created
them using her personal information and for her personal use, then
those rights belonged to her, no matter how the Disputed Accounts
may have been used later.5 See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*389.
If the district court concludes that Gutman owned the Disputed
Accounts at creation, it will then need to consider whether JLM
subsequently took ownership by operation of the Contract. 6
Traditional principles of property law guide this analysis. Thus, the
fact that Gutman transferred some or all of her rights in particular
content posted on the Disputed Accounts does not by itself support
an inference that she transferred ownership of the Disputed Accounts
themselves. 7 Nor should it ordinarily matter to the question of
ownership whether an account owner permits others to assist in
managing the account, or whether one or the other party holds itself
out as owning it. See, e.g., Meisels v. Meisels, 630 F. Supp. 3d 400, 411
(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (management of rental property not probative of
ownership); Porter v. Wertz, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 698 (1981) (permitting suit
for recovery of a painting purchased from a middleman who lacked
authority to sell the painting). Determining ownership by reference
to such principles would promote transfer by surprise and complicate
contractual arrangements under which an account owner might agree
to advertise another’s goods on his or her platform.8
Moreover, the district court erred by concluding that JLM is
likely to succeed in demonstrating ownership of the Disputed
Accounts under Paragraph 11 of the Contract.9 See Gutman, 2023 WL
2503432, at *15. That paragraph provides that all “designs,
drawings, notes, patterns, sketches, prototypes, samples,
improvements to existing works, and any other works conceived of
or developed by [Gutman] in connection with her employment with
the Company involving bridal clothing, bridal accessories and related
bridal or wedding items,” are works for hire and the exclusive
property of JLM. Contract ¶ 11.
The district court ruled that the Disputed Accounts themselves
qualify as “any other works” conceived of or developed by Gutman
in connection with her employment. It thus concluded that Gutman
likely assigned them to JLM in the Contract. But the ordinary
meaning of general terms at the end of a list must be interpreted to
“embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated
by the preceding specific words.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528,
545 (2015) (quoting Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v.
Guardianship Est. of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003)) (applying ejusdem
generis). Otherwise, giving general terms an “all-encompassing”
meaning would render specifically enumerated terms surplusage.
See id. at 545-46 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142
(2008)).
Here, the specific terms—“designs, drawings, notes, patterns,
sketches, prototypes, samples, [and] improvements to existing
works”—are all closely related. Contract ¶ 11. They describe steps
in the process of fashion design and capture much (if not all) of the
creative output that Gutman might produce in her role as a designer.
Moreover, the enumerated terms are all items that JLM might
conceivably sell to the public and appear to be presumptively
copyrightable. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) et seq. The Disputed Accounts
by contrast share none of these core attributes, despite featuring
content that does, such as sketches and drawings of wedding
dresses.10 It would thus be inconsistent with ordinary principles of
contract interpretation to conclude that Paragraph 11 of the Contract
assigned the Disputed Accounts to JLM.
To summarize: the analysis of social-media-account ownership
begins where other property-ownership analyses usually begin—by
determining the account’s original owner. The next step is to
determine whether ownership ever transferred to another party. If
a claimant is not the original owner and cannot locate their claim in a
chain of valid transfers, they do not own the account.
We thus remand to the district court to analyze ownership of
the Disputed Accounts under the framework discussed above>>.