Amazon non è “venditor” (seller) ai fini della responsabilità del produttore

La corte d’appello (9 circuito) conferma che Amazon (A.) non è nè venditore (seller) nè manifacturer ai fini della responsabilità del produttore da prodotto difettoso.

Si tratta di State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2020 WL 6746745 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2020).

Perchè ci sia tale responsabilità, bisogna che <an entity must be an “integral part of an enterprise” that resulted in the defective product being placed in the stream of commerce>, p. 3

E ciò si determina con una valutazione complessiva sui seguenti sette parametri, disse il giudice di primo grado (dell’Arizona):

<<a number of factors when determining if entities participate significantly in the stream of commerce and are therefore subject to strict liability, including whether they: (1) provide a warranty for the product’s quality; (2) are responsible for the product during transit; (3) exercise enough control over the product to inspect or examine it; (4) take title or ownership over the product; (5) derive an economic benefit from the transaction; (6) have the capacity to influence a product’s design and manufacture; or (7) foster consumer reliance through their involvement.>>

Ebbene, la corte di appello accetta tale impostazione e conferma che il loro esame porta a rigettare la domanda verso Amazon:

<<First, Amazon expressly disclaims any warranties in its Business Services Agreement, which applied to the third-party seller of the allegedly defective hoverboards here. Not providing a warranty indicates that Amazon does not take responsibility for the quality of the product. … . Second, while Amazon facilitated the shipping of the third-party seller’s hoverboards from the warehouse to the consumer, this did not make Amazon the seller of the product any more than the U.S. Postal Service or United Parcel Service are when they take possession of an item and transport it to a customer…. . Third, while Amazon could theoretically use its market power to inspect third-party sellers’ products, in practice it does not. Instead, Amazon relies on sellers’ representations regarding the contents of the packages it stores before placing them in an Amazon box for shipping.. . Fourth, while Amazon did store and then mail the hoverboards to the customer on behalf of the third-party seller, at no time did Amazon take title to the hoverboards, which supports the conclusion that it is not the seller of the product. … . Fifth, Amazon derives only a small benefit from each of the transactions of the third-party sellers that use its services, suggesting that Amazon’s interest in the transaction is limited. … . Sixth, while Amazon undoubtedly has the capacity, due to its market power, to influence third-party sellers’ design and manufacturing decisions, State Farm shows little to support the conclusion that Amazon does so in practice…. . Seventh, the consumer reliance factor weighs in Amazon’s favor because the third party is listed as the seller on the website and receipt, and State Farm does not cite to any cases that support its contention that an injured party’s subjective belief about the identity of the seller weighs in favor of finding that entity strictly liable>>.

In conclusione, <<we conclude that under Arizona’s existing body of case law, which requires us to balance various factors and provide a contextual analysis of whether the non-moving party participated significantly in the stream of commerce, summary judgment for Amazon is appropriate here. While Amazon provides a website for third-party sellers and facilitates sales for those sellers, it is not a “seller” under Arizona’s strict liability law for the third-party hoverboard sales at issue here>>.

Per lo stesso motivo, oltre alla domanda basata sulla strict liability, è rigettata pure quella basata sulla ordinaria negligence, p. 6/7

Non di discute affatto di safe harbour ex § 230 CDA.

(notizia e link presi dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Il tema è assai seguito negli USA, molto meno da noi (Ue), ove l’approccio  èdiverso, mirando soprauttto all’utilizzo della disciplina dei prodotti sicuri..

Per un esame comparato USA/UE v. Busch C., Rethinking Product Liability Rules for Online Marketplaces: A Comparative Perspective (February 10, 2021). 2021 Consumer Law Scholars Conference in Boston (March 4-5, 2021), scaricabile da https://ssrn.com/abstract=3784466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3784466 . L’a. auspica che anche da noi venga introdotta una  responsabilità del gestore del marketplace (v . sub V, p. 33 ss)

“Speed filter” di Snapchat tra negligenza e safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

La funzione Speed Filter di Snapchat permette di registrare le velocità tenuta dal veicolo e inserirla in una fotografia (per successivo posting).

Naturalmente farlo mentre si guida  è pericolosissimo.

In un incidente causato proprio da questo e dall’alta velocità, il danneggiato cita in giudizio l’altro conducente e Snapcht (poi: S.) per negligence.

S. si difende anche con l’invocazione del safe harbour ex § 230 CDA, unico profilo qui considerato.

In primo grado l’eccezione viene accolta. Si v. IN THE STATE COURT OF SPALDING COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA, 20.01.2017, file n° 16-SV-89, Maynard v. McGee.Sanapchat.

Il ragionamento condotto dal giudice non è molto comprensibile. Il § 230 chiede infatti che si tratti di informazione proveniente da terzi e che si consideri il provider come “publisher or editor”: ma nessuno dei due requisiti ricorre qui.

Infatti in appello questo capo di sentenza viene riformato.

la Court of Appeals of Georgia chiarisce che i casi invocati per fruire del § 230 CDA (Barnes , Fields, Backpage) riguardano tutti fattispecie di danno provocato da post di utenti terzi.  Nel caso in esame, al contrario, <there was no third-party content uploaded to Snapchat at the time of the accident and the Maynards do not seek to hold Snapchat liable for publishing a Snap bya third-party that utilized the Speed Filter. Rather, the Maynards seek to hold Snap chat liable for its own conduct, principally for the creation of the Speed Filter and its failure to warn users that the Speed Filter could encourage speeding and unsafe driving practices. Accordingly, we hold that CDA immunity does not apply because there was no third-party user content published>> ( Corte di Appello della Georgia, 5 giugno 2018, A18A0749. MAYNARD etal. v. SNAPCHAT, INC., p. 9-10 ). Affermazione esatta.

Tornata in primo grado, la causa prosegue solo in punto di negligenza extracontrattuale: secondo il danneggiato, S. avrebbe dovuto prevedere la pericolosità del servizio offerto agli utenti e avvisarli adeguatamente (in pratica: da prodotto difettoso).

Rigiunta in appello solo sulla negligence, la Corte afferma che non c’è responsabilità di S. dato che, da un lato, <there is no “general legal duty to all the world not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm>, e, dall’altro, non c’è una special relationship che giustifichi un dovere di protezione, p. 6.  In breve <Georgia law does not impose a general duty to prevent people from committing torts while misusing a manufacturer’s product. Although manufacturers have “a duty to exercise reasonable care in manufacturing its products so as to make products that are reasonably safe for intended or foreseeable uses,” this duty does not extend to the intentional (not accidental) misuse of the product in a tortious way by a third party>, (Corte di Appello della Georgia 30.10.2020, n° 20A1218. MAYNARD et al. v. SNAPCHAT, INC., DO-044,  p. 7)

C’è però giurisprudenza contraria sull’invocabilità del § 230 CDA. Per una sentenza che in un caso uguale (preteso concorso dello Speed Filter di Snapchat alla causazione dell’incidente stradale) spiega in dettaglio tale invocabilità, vedasi  US District Court – Central District of California, 25.02.2020, Carly Lemmon v. Snapchat, n° CV 19-4504-MWF (KSx) , sub III.B.

Questa Corte segue la tesi per cui <<other courts have determined that CDA immunity applies where the website merely provides a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes by the user. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (CDA immunity applies to a dating website even though some of the content was formulated in response to the website’s questionnaire because “the selection of the content was left exclusively to the user”) (emphasis added); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (CDA immunity applies where the plaintiff alleged that Google’s suggestion tool, which used an algorithm to suggest specific keywords to advertisers, caused advertisers to post unlawful advertisements more frequently)>>, p. 11.

E applicando al caso specifico,  conclude che <<the Speed Filter is a neutral tool, which can be utilized for both proper and improper purposes. The Speed Filter is essentially a speedometer tool, which allows Defendant’s users to capture and share their speeds with others. The Speed Filter can be used at low or high speeds, and Defendant does not require any user to Snap a high speed. While Plaintiffs allege that some users believe that they will be rewarded by recording a 100-MPH or faster Snap, they do not allege that Snap actually rewards its users for doing so. In fact, when a user first opens the Speed Filter, a warning appears on the app stating “Please, DO NOT Snap and drive.” (RJN, Ex. A). When a user’s speed exceeds 15 m.p.h., another similar warning appears on the app. (RJN, Ex. B). While a user might use the Speed Filter to Snap a high number, the selection of this content (or number) appears to be entirely left to the user, and based on the warnings, capturing the speed while driving is in fact discouraged by Defendant.>>, p. 11 .

Il punto però è che il § 230 CDA richiede che la responsabilità derivi da informazione proveniente da terzo rispetto all’internet provider invocante il safe harbour: il che non ricorre nelle azioni basate sull’uso di Speed Filter.

Notizia dei casi presa dal blog di Eric Goldman.