Con l’importante sentenza del 1 novembre 2019, [2019] EWHC 2923 (Ch) Case No: IL-2017-000025, la High Court of Justice-Business & Property Courts of England and Wales. Intellectual Property List, a firma del giudice Birss , interviene sul dibattito inerente la comunicazione al pubblico di opere già rese pubbliche in precedenza (esiste poi una seconda sentenza parallela nella medesima lite, [2019] EWHC 3374 (Ch) – claim No. IL-2017-000025, relativa solo ad inibitoria e costi, qui non esaminata). Ne dà notizia
Nella fattispecie Warner Music e Sony Music Entertainment sostenevano che la TuneIn Incorporated, quale aggregatore di internet radio stations, dovesse ottenere da loro licenza (§ 11), come avviene quando le radio si rivolgono a collecting societies per diffondere musica dei loro repertori (§§ 3-4). TuneIn lo contestava, affermando di limitarsi a fornire hyperlinks ad opere già rese pubbliche.
La Corte (EWHC) affronta la questione con pregevole approfondimento, tutto concentrato sui fatti e sulla giurisprudenza, come nella prassi anglosassone.
Prima compare un’introduzione sui fatti (§§ 1-10: v. spt. quelli che descrivono l’attività di TuneIn) e l’esame della (fondamentale, per gli operatori) questione di giurisdizione, c.d. audience targeting test (§§ 12-34), usato in common law (v. ad es. Belfield, Establishing personal jurisdiction in an internet context: reconciling the fourth circuit “targeting” test with Calder v. Jones using awareness, in UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW vol. 80, winter 2018).
Poi il giudice Birss affronta la questione relativa alla comunicazione al pubblico. Inizia ricordando la normativa rilevante (§§ 35 ss) e poi -con un apprezzabile dettaglio- la giurisprudenza europea (§§ 48 ss)
In particolare come ovvio si riferisce essenzialmente ai casi Svensson del 2014 e GS Media del 2016: si v. ad es. § 66 dove coglie la novità costituita dalla rilevanza dello stato soggettivo di conoscenza in capo alla persona che crea il link per capire se o meno ha commesso comunicazione al pubblico , rilevanza propria della accessory tort liability (corresponsabilità aquiliana), che non è armonizzata in UE.
Al § 90 esamina la sentenza Renckhoff del 2018, che potrebbe essere ritenuta confliggente con GS Media . La conciliazione da parte del giudice è trovata nei §§ 101-102. Il punto è molto importante: quando taluno acconsente alla pubblicazione su un sito, è vero che prende in considerazione tutti i potenziali utenti del web, ma solo come destinatari di link al sito stesso, non dei file ivi presenti (si v. al § 109 la sintesi di altra sentenza inglese del 2013 sull’acquis europeo in tema di comunicazione al pubblico ).
Questo passo centrale della motivazione è però di dubbia esattezza: si v. in senso contrario le conclusioni dell’Avvocato Generale Sanchez-Bordona nella causa Renckhoff , andate disattese dalla Corte europea.
Il giudice Birss ricorda che la differenza tra Renckhoff e Soulier del 2016, da una parte, e Svensson, dall’altra, sta nel fatto che la divulgazione tramite link permette al titolare di rimuovere da internet il materiale, quando lo voglia; il che invece non è possibile se la divulgazione è avvenuta riproducendo il file su un nuovo sito (§ 104).
Questo però -preciso io- non toglie che i pubblici considerati siano i medesimi: allora la differenza non è tra i pubblici considerati in assoluto , ma tra pubblici considerati a seconda del possibile successivo mezzo di diffusione del materiale e o della notizia. Si tratta di fictio iuris. Il punto -centrale, lo ripeto- richiederebbe approfondimento.
Al § 113 il giudice categorizza le internet radio stations in quattro tipi, per poi analizzarli partitamente:
i) music radio stations which are licensed in the UK (Category 1);
ii) music radio stations which are not licensed in the UK or elsewhere (Category 2);
iii) music radio stations which are licensed for a territory other than the UK (Category 3); and
iv) Premium music radio stations (Category 4).
Ssuccessivamente valuta l’applicabilità della comunicazione al pubblico al servizio di TuneIn ( § 120 ss.).
Al § 121 esamina i normali motori di ricerca e quindi afferma che Tunein non è equiparabile ad un ordinario search engine ( § 121) :
<<In argument neither party put it this way but it seems to me that when making a comparison with internet search engines it is necessary to identify the appropriate comparator. The relevance of the comparison is to illuminate where the balance lies between the functioning of the internet and the freedoms associated with that on the one hand, and the high protection to be afforded to intellectual property rights on the other. The issue is whether TuneIn does something different from the kind of search engine service which is a necessary part of the normal functioning of the internet. I call that a conventional search engine. A conventional search engine provides a service which the functioning of the internet depends on. It has a database with a search facility. It will no doubt have a prominent box for search on its home page. It will (internally) have structured indices of what is on the database. It may use fuzzy logic and automatic completion of text strings. When a search term is entered, the engine simply provides links to other websites in response to search terms. If a user selects the link then, at least from their point of view, the user is taken to that other website and the involvement of the search engine ceases. The search function is optimised in all sorts of ways to try and offer users what the search engine provider thinks the user really wants, nevertheless the search results provided are essentially neutral. Sponsored links (i.e. advertisements) may also be provided, reflecting a direct relationship between the search engine and particular websites or advertisers, but that sort of material is provided alongside the search results, not instead of them>>
Al § 123 elenca le caratteristiche del servizio Tunein: aggregation, categorization, curation of stations Lists, personalisation of content, search functionality, Station information, Artist information:
i) Aggregation: TuneIn collates and provides access to a vast array of international radio station streams. It essentially acts as a ‘one-stop shop’ for users, who are easily able to browse, search for and listen to stations in one place. The alternative for users is to use a standard internet search engine to locate a webcast / simulcast station by using tailored search terms, and then click-through to their websites to listen to the specific stream. One aspect of the difference there is that in the latter case the advertising targeted to the user once they access the stream will be entirely distinct in the two cases.
ii) Categorisation: TuneIn Radio enables users to browse by categories of music, such as location, genre and language, including sub-categories within those categories. This is the most commonly used method for users to find audio content. Music stations are placed in categories based on information provided by the stations and factors such as geographical location.
iii) Curation of station lists: In addition to categorising stations, TuneIn curates lists of radio stations and programmes to present them to users as part of the browsing experience on its website and via the apps. These stations are collated by factors such as location and language or themed around current events. For example, TuneIn promotes lists of stations to users, such as “Spin the Globe” (comprising international music stations) and “Editor’s Choice – Music” (a hand-curated list of music stations). Certain stations are also listed in a “Featured” section, which is frequently updated by TuneIn to keep content relevant and non-repetitive.
iv) Personalisation of content: TuneIn Radio provides a personalised service to users, which facilitates their ability to find and listen to radio stations. TuneIn recommends stations to users based on their location, the reliability of audio streams and (in respect of registered users) the user’s listening history. Registered users are also able to view their listening history and tag their ‘favourite’ stations and/or artists, which enables them to quickly access radio stations they have previously listened to via TuneIn Radio or their favourite stations and artists.
v) Search functionality: Users are able to search TuneIn Radio for specific radio stations and artists by name. The search functionality prioritises inter alia reliable station streams and stations which are popular at that time.
vi) Station information: TuneIn collates information about music stations, which is presented on individual station pages. This includes the genre of the station and, where available, the artist and track currently playing, the station’s show timetable and related podcasts or featured shows.
vii) Artist information: TuneIn also collates information about artists on dedicated artist pages, which can be accessed by searching for the particular artist. The artist pages include a list of stations which play the particular artist (based on metadata provided by the stations) and a list of the artist’s albums. Users are also able to click-through to each album page, which displays the individual tracks on each album.
Ai §§ 127-128 indica perché TuneIn non è paragonabile al motore di ricerca che fornisce link. Si tratta del punto centrale della sentenza (§ 128):
i) The fact that TuneIn aggregates links to audio streams as opposed to links to some other form(s) of content is relevant. The audio streams carry music and as a result they engage various intellectual property rights, as TuneIn is well aware.
ii) The data collected and curated by TuneIn allows for searches of stations to be carried out by artist. Such a search returns internet radio stations which are playing music by the artist at that moment. As I understand it this is only possible as a result of TuneIn’s own monitoring stream metadata and the AIR APIs. There was evidence about what a search for internet radio stations would produce on the commonly used Google search engine but, as far as I am aware, there is no evidence that a similar search on that search engine would produce results of the same kind as TuneIn.
iii) The fact that when a station is selected, although a hyperlink to the stream is provided at a technical level, from the user’s point of view content is provided to them at the TuneIn site. In effect this is a kind of framing. The fact that framing was not relevant to answer the questions posed in Svensson (para 29) does not mean it is irrelevant to considering the nature of TuneIn’s activity.
iv) The persistent nature of the content to which the user wishes to link. This is connected to (iii) but is a different point. One of the consequences of providing streams is that they persist over time as the user listens to them. In a conventional search engine, once a user has clicked on a link, they go to the new website and the involvement of the search engine is over. That is not how TuneIn’s service works and if it was then TuneIn would not be able to provide its own visual advertisements while the user was listening.
Date queste differenze il giudice Birss conclude che << For all these reasons I find that TuneIn intervenes directly in the provision of the links to the streams in a manner which neither conventional search engines nor hyperlinks on conventional websites do. TuneIn’s service is not the same as either a conventional search engine or the conventional hyperlinks considered in Svensson and GS Media. Before getting to individual categories, I find therefore that the activity of TuneIn does amount to an act of communication of the relevant works; and also that that act of communication is to a “public”, in the sense of being to an indeterminate and fairly large number of persons (see Arnold J’s summary at paragraph >> (§§ 130/131)
La, pur pregevole ed accurata, disamina non riesce però persuasiva. TuneIn non appare nulla più che un fornitore di link, per quanto tailorizzato e customizzato in base ad algoritmi magari autoapprendenti, non sostanzialmente diverso -sotto il profilo della comunicazione al pubblico- da un normale motore di ricerca
Il giudice deve quindi esaminare se l’atto sub iudice, accertato come di comunicazione al pubblico, era rivolta ad un pubblico nuovo (§ 132 seguenti, soprattutto §§ 135/136), secondo l’elaborazione giurispruedneziale europea della comunicazione al pubblico di opere già pubblicate in precedenza (quando si tratti di uso del medesimo mezzo diffusivo).
La risposta è positiva: << Therefore it is appropriate to analyse the facts on the footing that the whole internet public, insofar as they encounter a link to a Category 3 station which is provided either by a conventional search engine or some other conventional sort of website, has been taken into account. It is an inherent aspect of making this material available on the internet that that sort of linking is likely to happen. On the other hand, absent evidence to the contrary, there is no reason why the kind of public to whom TuneIn’s system is addressed should have been taken into account. TuneIn’s activity is a different kind of act of communication and is targeted at a particular public, i.e. users in the UK>> ( §§ 139-140)
Questo per la categoria di Radio Station numero 3. Le altre categorie non le esamino ma comunque seguono subito dopo: v. §§ 143 160 per la categoria 2, §§ 161 163 per la categoria 4, §§ 164 171 per la categoria 1.
Successivamente esamina la qualificazione giuridica del servizio Premium cioè senza pubblicità (§§ 172 e seguenti)
Interessante anche la disamina sulla responsabilità di coloro che forniscono i servizi radio cioè delle singole radio (§§ 192 e seguenti) : circa la categoria 3 (condivisibilemtne) afferma che c’è comunicazione al pubblico (§ 193).
Infine ai §§ 205 ss nega l’applicazione della direttiva e-commerce n. 31 del 2000 nella parte in cui concede il safe harbour agli internet providers (artt. 12-15).
La conclusioni sono al paragrafo 213:
i) TuneIn’s service (web based or via the apps), insofar as it includes or included the sample stations in Categories 2, 3, and 4, infringes the claimants’ copyright under s20 of the 1988 Act.
ii) TuneIn’s service (web based or via the apps), insofar as it includes the sample stations in Category 1, does not infringe the claimants’ copyright under s20 of the 1988 Act.
iii) TuneIn’s service via the Pro app when the recording function was enabled infringed the claimants’ copyright under s20 of the 1988 Act insofar as it included the sample stations in Categories 1, 2, 3, and 4.
iv) Individual users of the Pro app who made recordings of sound recordings in claimants’ repertoire will themselves have committed an act of infringement under s17 of the 1988 Act. Some but not all will have fallen within the defence in s70.
v) The providers of sample stations in Categories 2, 3, and 4 will (or did) infringe when their station was targeted at the UK by TuneIn.
vi) TuneIn is liable for infringement by authorisation and as a joint tortfeasor.
vii) TuneIn cannot rely on the safe harbour defences under Arts 12, 13 and 14 of the E-Commerce Directive.