TUTELA DEL CONSUMATORE – Lorenzo Albertini

Controllo d’ufficio delle clausole abusive, pure nelle fasi monitoria ed esecutiva

A seguito delle note sentenze della Corte di Giustizia UE, la Cassazione a sezioni unite si è pronunciata -come questione di particolare importanza (la ricorrente aveva rinunciato al ricorso)- sul tema in oggetto .

Ha enucleto un dettagliato decalogo e lo ha fatto nel dispositivo , invece che in motivazione (forse è esatto, essendo proprio questo lo scopo della pronuncia, una volta intervenuta rinuncia del ricorrente).

Si tratta di Cass. sez. un. n° 9.479 del 6 aprile 2023, rel. Enzo Vincenti.

Ecco il decalogo:

<<Fase monitoria
Il giudice del monitorio:
a) deve svolgere, d’ufficio, il controllo sull’eventuale carattere
abusivo delle clausole del contratto stipulato tra professionista e
consumatore in relazione all’oggetto della controversia;
b) a tal fine procede in base agli elementi di fatto e di diritto in
suo possesso, integrabili, ai sensi dell’art. 640 c.p.c., con il potere
istruttorio d’ufficio, da esercitarsi in armonia con la struttura e
funzione del procedimento d’ingiunzione:
b.1.) potrà, quindi, chiedere al ricorrente di produrre il contratto
e di fornire gli eventuali chiarimenti necessari anche in ordine alla
qualifica di consumatore del debitore;
b.2) ove l’accertamento si presenti complesso, non potendo egli
far ricorso ad un’istruttoria eccedente la funzione e la finalità del
procedimento (ad es. disporre c.t.u.), dovrà rigettare l’istanza
d’ingiunzione;
c) all’esito del controllo:
c.1) se rileva l’abusività della clausola, ne trarrà le consequenze
puDblicazione in ordine al rigetto o all’accoglimento parziale del ricorso; cp
c.2) se, invece, il controllo sull’abusività delle clausole incidenti
sul credito azionato in via monitoria desse esito negativo, pronuncerà cUs, O
decreto motivato, ai sensi dell’art. 641 c.p.c., anche in relazione alla
anzidetta effettuata delibazione;
c.3) il decreto ingiuntivo conterrà l’avvertimento indicato o dall’art. 641 c.p.c., nonché l’espresso avvertimento che in mancanza o di opposizione il debitore-consumatore non potrà più far valere o l’eventuale carattere abusivo delle clausole del contratto e il decreto non opposto diventerà irrevocabile.
Fase esecutiva
Il giudice dell’esecuzione:
a) in assenza di motivazione del decreto ingiuntivo in P
riferimento al profilo dell’abusività delle clausole, ha il dovere – da
esercitarsi sino al momento della vendita o dell’assegnazione del bene
o del credito – di controllare la presenza di eventuali clausole abusive
che abbiano effetti sull’esistenza e/o sull’entità del credito oggetto del
decreto ingiuntivo;
b) ove tale controllo non sia possibile in base agli elementi di
diritto e fatto già in atti, dovrà provvedere, nelle forme proprie del cs,
processo esecutivo, ad una sommaria istruttoria funzionale a tal fine;
c) dell’esito di tale controllo sull’eventuale carattere abusivo
delle clausole – sia positivo, che negativo – informerà le parti e
avviserà il debitore esecutato che entro 40 giorni può proporre oo
opposizione a decreto ingiuntivo ai sensi dell’art. 650 c.p.c. per fare
accertare (solo ed esclusivamente) l’eventuale abusività delle
clausole, con effetti sull’emesso decreto ingiuntivo; cc
d) fino alle determinazioni del giudice dell’opposizione a decreto
ingiuntivo ai sensi dell’art. 649 c.p.c., non procederà alla vendita o
o all’assegnazione del bene o del credito;

(ulteriori evenienze)
e) se il debitore ha proposto opposizione all’esecuzione ex art.
615, primo comma, c.p.c., al fine di far valere l’abusività delle
clausole del contratto fonte del credito ingiunto, il giudice adito la
riqualificherà in termini di opposizione tardiva ex art. 650 c.p.c. e
rimetterà la decisione al giudice di questa (translatio
f) se il debitore ha proposto un’opposizione esecutiva per far
valere l’abusività di una clausola, il giudice darà termine di 40 giorni
per proporre l’opposizione tardiva – se del caso rilevando l’abusività di
altra clausola – e non procederà alla vendita o all’assegnazione del
bene o del credito sino alle determinazioni del giudice dell’opposizione
tardiva sull’istanza ex art. 649 c.p.c. del debitore consumatore.
Fase di cognizione
Il giudice dell’opposizione tardiva ex art. 650 c.p.c.:
a) una volta investito dell’opposizione (solo ed esclusivamente
sul profilo di abusività delle clausole contrattuali), avrà il potere di
sospendere, ex art. 649 c.p.c., l’esecutorietà del decreto ingiuntivo, in
tutto o in parte, a seconda degli effetti che l’accertamento
sull’abusività delle clausole potrebbe comportare sul titolo giudiziale;
b) procederà, quindi, secondo le forme di rito>>

L’avvocato generale sul concetto di “ne bis in idem” (art. 50 Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’UE)

Interessante esame condotto dalle Conclusioni 30 marzo 2023 dell’AG . CAMPOS SÁNCHEZ-BORDONA nella causa di rinvio pregiudiziale C-27/22 , Volkswagen c. AGGM.

Riguardano la pratica commerciale sleale del c.d. Dieselgate

Le Conclusioni dell’AG affrontano temi di notevole spessore teorico. L’esito è che tocca al giudice nazinale dire se ricorrano o no i presupposti del ne bis in idem, ma l’AG fornisce qualche chiarimento.

Qui riporto solo il § 77 sul concetto di “stessi fatti”, anzi “fatti identici”:

<<La Corte può tuttavia fornire al giudice del rinvio i seguenti elementi di riflessione su tale punto:

– l’analisi, dettagliata e specifica, dei comportamenti sanzionati deve risultare in una constatazione della loro identità, non della mera analogia;

– in caso di cumulo transfrontaliero di procedimenti e di sanzioni, l’identità territoriale, fattore che può tuttavia servire ad altri fini, non è indispensabile (39). Questo stesso fattore consentirà di eliminare i sospetti di «scelta interessata» dell’autorità sanzionatoria competente (40);

– la procura di Braunschweig, pur sottolineando che l’assenza di supervisione è la causa degli illeciti commessi dalla VWAG in tutto il mondo tra il 2007 e il 2015, prende in considerazione, quali fatti rilevanti, la commercializzazione in altri paesi (tra cui l’Italia) di veicoli dotati del sistema informatico di manipolazione nonché la pubblicità ingannevole finalizzata alla vendita di tali automobili (41);

– il nesso tra questi tre elementi sembra chiaro, anche se sarà il giudice del rinvio a dover decidere se esso sia sufficiente per concludere nel senso dell’identità dei fatti materiali. La procura di Braunschweig indica precisamente che la sua ordinanza osterebbe, a causa del principio del «ne bis in idem», all’adozione di sanzioni in altri Stati nei confronti della VWAG per questi stessi comportamenti>>.

Pratiche pubblicitarie digitali manipolative: dettagliato studio per la Commissione europea

è uscito il Final Report del <<Behavioural study on unfair commercial practices in the digital environment: dark patterns and manipulative personalisation>>, aprile 2022, per la Commissione UE, ad opera di Lupiáñez-Villanueva, Francisco ; Boluda, Alba ; Bogliacino, Francesco ; Liva, Giovanni ; Lechardoy, Lucie ; Rodríguez de las Heras Ballell, Teresa.

Analizza dettagliatametne le modalità “troppo persuasive” della pubblicità (commerciale e non) oggi praticate da chi comunica sul web.

Si legge che i c.d. dark patterns sono diffusissimi (non una gran novità, per vero). Il concetto di “Dark patterns” è <<generally used to refer to practices in digital interfaces that steer, deceive, coerce, or manipulate consumers into making choices that often are not in their best interest , 20>>.

Interessante tabella 2, p. 30, contentente la tassonomia di tali pratiche, e in generale , sul medesimo tema, i §§ 2.1 e 2.2.

Chi ha poco tempo, può limitarsi a leggere l’iniziale Executive summary e/o soprattutto il cap. 6 Conclusions and recommendations.

Interesssante è il loro inquadramento giuridico : in linea di massima consisterà quanto meno nella fattispecie delle pratiche commerciali scorrette in quanto ingannevoli.

Tornata al primo giudice la questione californiana sulla pericolosità di Speedfilter di Snapchat, la risposta è positiva

Continuano le decisioni sulla pericolosità dell’applicazione <Speedfilter> di Snapchat: v. ad es. mio post sulla decisione di appello californiana 04.05. 2021. che aveva negato il safe harbour trattandosi di causa di negligennce.

Tornata la causa al primo giudice, viene decisa con sentenza 31.03.2022, n° CV 19-4504-MWF (KSx) , Carly Lemon c. Snap inc.

Per la corte c’è negligenza nel design dell’applicaizione perchè induce a correre troppo in auto: soprattutto solleticando la psiche degli utenti laddove propone trofei/premi non meglio identificati che vengono manifestati solo dopo l’evemtuale vincita:

<<The FAC alleges that the design of the Snapchat app rewards users by awarding trophies for using the Snapchat app in particular ways that are unknown to the users until they actually obtain such trophies. (FAC ¶ 27). The FAC also alleges that the Speed Filter allows users to record the speed at which they are traveling and display that speed over a photo or video of themselves that they can share on social media. (Id. ¶ 25). Finally, the FAC alleges that Plaintiffs used the Speed Filter within minutes of the accident. (Id. ¶ 70).
The Court is satisfied that these three allegations, accepted as true, are sufficient
to allege causation premised on the theory that the Speed Filter’s design encouraged . Plaintiffs to drive at dangerous speeds.

If Snapchat users are seeking to obtain an unknown trophy associated with using the Speed Filter, it is plausible that they would seek this trophy by increasing their speed — the only metric recorded by the Speed Filter.
Even if there were no reward system whatsoever, the basic design of the Speed
Filter itself appears to encourage reckless driving. There is realistically no purpose for the Speed Filter other than to encourage users to travel at high speeds and record themselves doing so. Defendant’s argument that users will use the Speed Filter “safely while walking, jogging, or riding a train, boat, or Ferris wheel” (Motion at 3) is highly implausible – let’s say it’s the arguments not the allegations that run afoul of the Twombly and Iqbal argument. It is common sense that adding a speed-sharing feature to a social media application used predominantly by minors and young adults would encourage such users to record themselves while driving at high speed>>

Inoltre, <<with respect to the second point, the Court disagrees with the superior court’s
approach because it focused on whether the Speed Filter contained an express
incentive to speed and ignored the incentives inherent in the Speed Filter’s design.
The superior court apparently was persuaded that, without an express incentive to drive
recklessly, individuals would use the Speed Filter safely as a passenger on a ferry,
train, or airplane. In doing so, the Maynard court essentially treated Snap as a
publisher or speaker, rather than a product manufacturer — the exact approach that the
Ninth Circuit has warned against here. (Ninth Circuit Opinion at 10–12 (“the Parents’
amended complaint does not seek to hold Snap liable for its conduct as a publisher or
speaker”). Indeed, the Maynard court treated the plaintiffs’ claim as a negligent
advertising claim rather than a negligent design claim, relying explicitly on Ely v.
General Motors Corp., which held that an auto manufacturer was not liable for
encouraging reckless driving by advertising that a car could go up to 150 miles per
hour. 927 S.W. 2d 774, 782 (Tx.Ct.App. 1996).>>

Nè la pericolosità viene meno per la possibilità di molteplici diversi usi.

Inoltre è ravvisata la causalità tra il difetto progettuale e il fatto dannoso verificatosi: <<The causal connection between the Speed Filter and the speeding accident is strong given that the accident occurred while the Plaintiffs were using the Speed Filter for the exact purpose for which it appears to have been designed: to record the user traveling at excessive speeds>>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

la Corte Suprema della Georgia sulla vicenda “Speedfilter” di Snapchat

Prosegue la lite sulla pericolosità dell’applicazione Speed Filter di Snapchat, su cui v. già mio post 19..05.2021.

Interviene la Corte Suprema della Geogia con sentenza 15.03.2022, S21G0555, MAYNARD et al. v. SNAPCHAT, per dire che Snapchat ha un dovere di progettare le applicazioni tenendo conto dei rischi prevedibili producibili a carico degli utenti e che in particolare lo aveva anche in relazione a qhllo poi concretatosi in danno nella vicenda de qua (aver favorito l’eccessiva velocità e la distrazione dell’utente che vuole farsi riprendere mentre guida).

Si tratta in pratica di una precisazione sulla diligenza che avrebbe dovuto essere tenuta dal produttore in fase progettuale. La SC non si sofferma invece sugli altri elementi della fattispecie di responsabilità (aquiliana) : violazione, nesso di causa, danno.

<<Similarly, under our decisional law, when designing a product,
a manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in “selecting
from among alternative product designs” to “reduce[] the
[reasonably] foreseeable risks of harm presented by [a] product.>>, p. 8.

<<A breach of a duty constitutes a proximate cause of an injury
only if the injury is the “probable” result of the breach, “according to
ordinary and usual experience,” as opposed to “merely [a] possible”
result of a breach, “according to occasional experienc>>, p. 13

<As shown by the above discussion, considerations regarding
foreseeability are intertwined with questions of duty, breach, and
proximate causation in negligent-design cases. When determining
whether a manufacturer owes a decisional-law design duty with
respect to a particular risk of harm posed by a product, the question
is whether that particular risk was reasonably foreseeable. >>, p. 15

<<only reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by a product trigger a manufacturer’s duty to use reasonable care in selecting from alternative designs under our decisional law. See Jones, 274 Ga. at 118. Applying that standard,
the Maynards adequately alleged at the motion-to-dismiss stage
that Snap owed Wentworth a design duty with respect to the
particular risk of harm at issue here – namely, injury to a driver
resulting from another person’s use of the Speed Filter while driving
at excess speed.>>, p. 15-6.

Specificamente i Maynards (gli attori) avevano allegato <<that Snap could reasonably foresee that its product design created this risk of harm based on,
among other things, the fact that Snap knew that other drivers were
using the Speed Filter while speeding at 100 miles per hour or more
as part of “a game,” purposefully designed its products to encourage
such behavior, knew of at least one other instance in which a driver
who was using Snapchat while speeding caused a car crash, and
warned users not to use the product while driving. The Maynards
further alleged that, “[o]nce downloaded, Snapchat’s software
continues to download and install upgrades, updates, or other new
features” from Snap, meaning that the Maynards may be able to
introduce evidence showing that Snap continued developing its
product and released new versions of the software between the
initial launch of the Speed Filter and the date of Wentworth’s
accident, after obtaining real-world information about how the
Speed Filter was in fact being used. Given these allegations, we
cannot say as a matter of law at the motion-to-dismiss stage that the
Maynards could not introduce evidence that, when designing the
Speed Filter, Snap could reasonably foresee that the product’s
design created a risk of car accidents like the one at issue here,
triggering a duty for Snap to use reasonable care in designing the
product in light of that risk. See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic,
P.A., 307 Ga. 555, 560 (2) (a) (837 SE2d 310) (2019) (noting that a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim cannot be granted
unless “the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state
of provable facts asserted in support of the allegations in the
complaint and could not possibly introduce evidence within the
framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief
sought” (punctuation omitted)); see also Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., Case
No. CV 19-4504-MWF (KSX), 2019 WL 7882079, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
30, 2019) (holding that plaintiffs asserting a car-crash-related
wrongful-death claim against Snap “sufficiently alleged a duty”
owed by Snap because the plaintiffs’ allegation that “[car] accidents
ha[d] occurred as a result of users attempting to capture [a 100
m.p.h.] Snap” as part of a “game” prevented the court from
“determin[ing] that the harm from the Speed Filter was not
foreseeable as a matter of law”). Cf. Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v.
Walker, 267 Ga. 785, 787 (482 SE2d 339) (1997) (“[E]vidence of the
prior burglaries was sufficient to give rise to a triable issue as to
whether or not Sturbridge had the duty to exercise ordinary care to
safeguard its tenants against the foreseeable risks p osed by the
prior burglaries.”)>>, p. 17-18.

E poi: << a manufacturer’s design duty for purposes of a
negligent-design claim extends to all reasonably foreseeable risks
posed by a produc>>, p. 20.

Naturalmente il vero problema è il caso di un uso totalmente improprio: deve risponderne il produttore? cioè deve tenerne conto quando progetta il prodotto?

<<Contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority,
our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a
manufacturer’s design duty in all cases of intentional or tortious
third-party product misuse. Nevertheless, we emphasize that intentional or tortious third-party misuse may be an important
consideration in determining whether a manufacturer owes a
decisional-law design duty in a particular case, whether the
manufacturer breached that duty, and whether the manufacturer’s
breach was a proximate cause of the resulting injury.

As in other areas of the law where a defendant’s duty extends only to reasonably
foreseeable risks, the likelihood and nature of a third party’s use of
a product may be relevant in determining whether the particular
risk of harm from a product was reasonably foreseeable, and thus
whether a manufacturer owed a decisional-law design duty to avoid
that risk in a particular ca se. Cf. Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G.
Spanos Realty Partners, L.P., 268 Ga. 604, 605-606 (492 SE2d 865)
(1997) (concluding that, although “ questions of foreseeability”
underlying a landlord’s “duty to protect tenants from the
[foreseeable] criminal attacks of third parties” are “generally for a
jury,” the evidence of foreseeability on summary judgment could not
support a finding that the landlord owed a duty to the victim of a
criminal attack). Third-party product use may also be relevant in
determining whether a manufacturer breached its design duty if, for
example, danger from such use was so unlikely as to render
reasonable a manufacturer’s decision not to address it. See Banks,
264 Ga. at 736 n.6 (1) (noting that a relevant factor in the risk-utility
analysis is the likelihood of a danger). Finally, the likelihood and
nature of a third party’s tortious product use may be relevant in
determining whether a manufacturer’s breach can be considered a
proximate cause of the injury or whether, under the doctrine of
intervening causes, the third party’s conduct should be deemed the
sole proximate cause of the injury. See Johnson, 311 Ga. at 593>>, pp. 29-31.

Si v. da noi la corrispondente disciplina fornita dall’art. 117 cod. cons., secondo cui

<<Un prodotto e' difettoso quando non offre la sicurezza che ci si
puo'  legittimamente  attendere tenuto conto di tutte le circostanze,
tra cui:
    a) il  modo in cui il prodotto e' stato messo in circolazione, la
sua  presentazione, le sue caratteristiche palesi, le istruzioni e le
avvertenze fornite;
    b) l'uso   al  quale  il  prodotto  puo'  essere  ragionevolmente
destinato  e  i  comportamenti  che, in relazione ad esso, si possono
ragionevolmente prevedere;
    c) il tempo in cui il prodotto e' stato messo in circolazione.
  2.  Un  prodotto  non puo' essere considerato difettoso per il solo
fatto  che un prodotto piu' perfezionato sia stato in qualunque tempo
messo in commercio.
  3.  Un  prodotto  e'  difettoso  se  non offre la sicurezza offerta
normalmente dagli altri esemplari della medesima serie.

Si noti spt. la lettera b), naturalmente.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Obblighi di avvertenza per prodotti venduti sul suo marketplace anche per lo stesso Amazon (che nemmeno può invocare il safe harbour ex 230 CDA)

Secondo una legge californiana del 1986 (c.d. <<Proposition 65>>), “No person in thecourse of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any
individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity without first giving clear and reasonable warning to such individual,
except as provided in Section 25249.10.”.

Il punto è : Amazon rientra nel concetto di <person in the couirse of doing business> gravato dal voere informativo cit.? Si, secondo la corte di appello della California, 1st app. district, Lee c. Amazon, A158275 in un caso concernente crema richiarante la pelle mna contenente mercurio in eccesso.

Amazon siostiene naturalmente di non car parte della catena distrivbutiva, ma la difesa è respinta: <<The trial court was clearly correct to reject Amazon’s claim to beoutside the chain of distribution. Proposition 65 imposes the duty to provide
warnings on any “person in the course of doing business,” which
unquestionably includes Amazon’s activities here. As the trial court
explained, “there is no language in section 25249.l l(f) [‘definitions’ for
Proposition 65] or the new regulations expressly limiting the duty to provide
a Proposition 65 warning only to a ‘manufacturer, producer, packager,
importer, supplier, or distributor of a product,’ or a ‘retail seller’ (under more
limited circumstances described in C.C.R. § 25600.2(e)), or limiting the broad language in the operative statute imposing the warning requirement on any
‘person in the course of doing business’ who ‘knowingly and intentionally
expose[s] any individual’ to a listed chemical. (Health & Saf. Code § 25249.6.)
The phrase ‘person in the course of doing business’ is broadly worded and not
limited to parties in the chain of distribution of a product or whose status is
defined in the regulations. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 25249.11(b).)” Amazon
manages and oversees all aspects of third-party sales on its Web site,
including accepting payment and providing refunds to customers on sellers’
behalf, providing the only channel for communication between customers and
sellers, earning fees from sellers for each completed sale and, for sellers
utilizing the FBA program, storing the products and arranging for their
delivery to customers. There can be no question Amazon was, in the words of
one court, “pivotal in bringing the product here to the consumer.” (Bolger v.
Amazon.com (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 431, 438 (Bolger).>>, pp. 36-37.

Inolktre Amazon noin ha titolo per invoare l’esimente del § 230 CDA per gli editori (in senso opposto il giudioce di priomo grado).

La questione non è semplice.

L’attore Lee afferma che <<Amazon violated Proposition 65 exposing consumers to mercury without warnings through its own conduct. The claims do not
attempt to hold Amazon responsible for third–party sellers’ content (except in
the sense that Amazon would have been able to disclaim responsibility for
providing warnings if the sellers had provided them). As we have discussed,
the claims do not require Amazon to modify or remove third–party content
but rather to provide a warning where Amazon’s own conduct makes it
subject to Health and Safety Code section 25249.6>>, p. 76

E poi: << Contrary to Amazon’s characterization, enforcing its obligations under
Proposition 65 does not require it to “monitor, review, and revise” product
listings. As both Lee and the Attorney General point out, the “knowingly and
intentionally” requirement in Health and Safety Code section 25249.6 means
Amazon is required to provide a warning where it has knowledge a product
contains a listed chemical—for example, from public health alerts or direct
notice. We recognize that any responsibility to provide warnings Amazon
might have under section 25249.6 would not result in liability if the third-
party seller of a skin-lightening product its If a skin-lightening cream is sold in a brick-and-mortar drug store thatwas aware the product contained mercury, there is no question that retailseller would have some obligation to provide Proposition 65 warnings—depending, of course, on whether entities further up the distribution chainhad provided warnings for the products and, if not, could be held to account.Nothing in the text or purposes of the CDA suggests it should be interpretedto insulate Amazon from responsibilities under Proposition 65 that wouldapply to a brick-and-mortar purveyor of the same product.Not only would such an interpretation give Amazon a competitiveadvantage unintended by Congress in enacting the CDA, but it would beinimical to the purposes of Proposition 65. Amazon makes it possible forsellers who might not be able to place their products in traditional retailstores to reach a vast audience of potential customers. (E.g., Bolger, supra,53 Cal.App.5th at p. 453 [“The Amazon website . . . enables manufacturersand sellers who have little presence in the United States to sell products tocustomers here”].) The evidence in this case indicates that mercury-containing skin-lightening products are overwhelmingly likely to have beenmanufactured outside the United States—unsurprisingly, as FDAregulations prohibit use of mercury as a skin-lightening agent in cosmetics.(21 C.F.R. § 700.13.) This makes it all the more likely Amazon may be theonly business that can readily be compelled to provide a Proposition 65warning for these products. (See 2016 FSOR, supra, p. 55 [discussingimpracticality of enforcing warning requirement against foreign entitywithout agent for service of process in United States]; Bolger, supra,53 Cal.App.5th at p. 453 [noting as first factor supporting application of strictliability doctrine to Amazon that it “may be the only member of thedistribution chain reasonably available to an injured plaintiff who purchasesa product on its website”].) Amazon is thus making available to consumers,and profiting from sales of, products that clearly require Proposition 65warnings, yet are likely to have been manufactured and distributed byentities beyond the reach of reasonable enforcement efforts. InsulatingAmazon from liability for its own Proposition 65 obligations in thesecircumstances would be anomalousto review the product’s packaging and/or listing on the Web site to determine whether a warning was provided by the third-party seller. These facts do not mean Lee’s claims necessarily treats Amazon as a speaker or publisher of information provided by the third-party sellers. If Amazon has actual or constructive knowledge that a product contains mercury, it might choose to review the product listing to determinewhether the third-party seller had provided a Proposition 65 warning before providing the warning itself or removing the listing. But nothing inherently requires Amazon to do so. It could choose, instead, to act on its knowledge by providing the warning regardless, pursuant to its own obligations under Proposition 65>>

Tale legge << “ ‘is a remedial law, designed to protect
the public’ ” which must be construed “ ‘broadly to accomplish that protective
purpose.’ ” (Center for Self-Improvement & Community Development v.
Lennar Corp., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1550–1551, quoting People ex rel.
Lungren v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 314.) Moreover, states’
“police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens . . . are
‘primarily, and historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern.’ ” (Medtronic, Inc.79
v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 485.) The United States Supreme Court has
explained that “[w]hen addressing questions of express or implied pre-
emption, we begin our analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ [Citation].” (Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good (2008) 555 U.S. 70, 77.) The “strong presumption against
displacement of state law . . . applies not only to the existence, but also to the
extent, of federal preemption. [Citation.] Because of it, ‘courts should
narrowly interpret the scope of Congress’s “intended invalidation of state
law” whenever possible.’ [Citation].” (Brown v. Mortensen (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1052, 1064.)
As the Ninth Circuit has explained, Congress intended “to preserve the
free-flowing nature of Internet speech and commerce without unduly
prejudicing the enforcement of other important state and federal laws. When
Congress passed section 230 it didn’t intend to prevent the enforcement of all
laws online; rather, it sought to encourage interactive computer services that
provide users neutral tools to post content online to police that content
without fear that through their ‘good samaritan . . . screening of offensive
material,’ [citation], they would become liable for every single message posted
by third parties on their website.” (Roommates.com, supra, 521 F.3d at
p. 1175, quoting § 230(c).)
The text of section 230(e)(3) is clear that state laws inconsistent with
section 230 are preempted while those consistent with section 230 are not
preempted. Proposition 65’s warning requirement is an exercise of state
authority to protect the public that imposes obligations on any individual who
exposes another to a listed chemical. Proposition 65 is not inconsistent with
the CDA because imposing liability on Amazon for failing to comply with its own, independent obligations under Proposition 65, does not require treating Amazon as the publisher or speaker of third-party sellers’ content.

Accordingly, if Lee can establish all the elements of a violation of Proposition
65, section 230 does not immunize Amazon from liability>>, pp. 79-80

(notizia della sentenza e link dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)

Ancora sul (pericoloso) “speed filter” di Snap e il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA

Altra lite sulle conseguenze mortali dell’uso del software <speed filter> di Snap Inc., che permette di eseguire e condividere filmati dal veicolo con riproduzione della velocità oraria raggiunta.

I genitori di ragazzi morti in incidente automobilistico, causato anche dall’incoraggiamento di Snap a correre forte, citano Snap INc. (poi: S.) per progettazione difettosa del prodotto (responsabilità da prodotto difettoso)

Decide la corte di appello californiana del 9° cicuito, 4 maggio 2021, Lemon ed altri c. Snap Inc. No. 20-55295, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-04504-MWF-KS.

In primo grado era stata accolta l’eccezione di safe harbour ex § 230 CDA; in appello viene respinta, per cui viene riformata la decisione di primo grado.

In breve, per la Corte la domanda dei genitori dei ragazzi era basata su design negligente del prodotto e dunque nulla aveva a che fare con il ruolo di publisher/speaker chiesto dal § 230 CDA.

Va anche tenuto conto che <<many of Snapchat’s users suspect, if not actually “believe,” that Snapchat will reward them for “recording a 100-MPH or faster [s]nap” using the Speed Filter. According to plaintiffs, “[t]his is a game for Snap and many of its users” with the goal being to reach 100 MPH, take a photo or video with the Speed Filter, “and then share the 100-MPH-Snap on Snapchat.”>>, p. 7.

Dunque <<Snapchat allegedly knew or should have known, before May 28, 2017, that its users believed that such a reward system existed and that the Speed Filter was therefore incentivizing young drivers to drive at dangerous speeds. Indeed, the Parents allege that there had been: a series of news articles about this phenomenon; an online petition that “called on Snapchat to address its role in encouraging dangerous speeding”; at least three accidents linked to Snapchat users’ pursuit of high-speed snaps; and at least one other lawsuit against Snap based on these practices. While Snapchat warned its users against using the Speed Filter while driving, these warnings allegedly proved ineffective. And, despite all this, “Snap did not remove or restrict access to Snapchat while traveling at dangerous speeds or otherwise properly address the danger it created.”>>, ivi.

<<Here, the Parents seek to hold Snap liable for its allegedly “unreasonable and negligent” design decisions regarding Snapchat. They allege that Snap created: (1) Snapchat; (2) Snapchat’s Speed Filter; and (3) an incentive system within Snapchat that encouraged its users to pursue certain unknown achievements and rewards. The Speed Filter and the incentive system then supposedly worked in tandem to entice young Snapchat users to drive at speeds exceeding 100 MPH.
The Parents thus allege a cause of action for negligent design—a common products liability tort>>, p. 11.

Non si tratta quindi di causa petendi basata sull’attività di publisher/speaker: <<The duty underlying such a claim differs markedly from the duties of publishers as defined in the CDA. Manufacturers have a specific duty to refrain from designing a product that poses an unreasonable risk of injury or harm to consumers. See Dan B. Dobbs et al., Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 478 (2d ed., June 2020 Update). Meanwhile, entities acting solely as publishers—i.e., those that “review[] material submitted for publication, perhaps edit[] it for style or technical fluency, and then decide[] whether to publish it,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102—generally have no similar duty. See Dobbs’ Law of Torts § 478.
It is thus apparent that the Parents’ amended complaint does not seek to hold Snap liable for its conduct as a publisher or speaker. Their negligent design lawsuit treats Snap as a products manufacturer, accusing it of negligently designing a product (Snapchat) with a defect (the interplay between Snapchat’s reward system and the Speed Filter). Thus, the duty that Snap allegedly violated “springs from” its distinct capacity as a product designer. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. This is further evidenced by the fact that Snap could have satisfied its “alleged obligation”—to take reasonable measures to design a product more useful than it was foreseeably dangerous—without altering the content that Snapchat’s users generate. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851. Snap’s alleged duty in this case thus “has nothing to do with” its editing, monitoring, or removing of the content that its users generate through Snapchat. Id. at 852>>, 12-13.

Tuttavia un hosting di materiali di terzi c’era: quello dei video (snaps) dei tre sfortunati ragazzi (i quali sono terzi rispetto a S.).

Ma ciò non toglie che la causa petendi era di prodotto difettoso: <<Notably, the Parents do not fault Snap in the least for publishing Landen’s snap. Indeed, their amended complaint fully disclaims such a reading of their claim: “The danger is not the Snap [message using the Speed Filter] itself. Obviously, no one is harmed by the post. Rather, the danger is the speeding.” AC ¶ 14. While we need not accept conclusory allegations contained in a complaint, we must nonetheless read the complaint in the light most favorable to the Parents. See Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1096. And this statement reinforces our own reading of the Parents’ negligent design claim as standing independently of the content that Snapchat’s users create with the Speed Filter.
To sum up, even if Snap is acting as a publisher in releasing Snapchat and its various features to the public, the Parents’ claim still rests on nothing more than Snap’s “own acts.” Roommates, 521 F.3d 1165. The Parents’ claim thus is not predicated on “information provided by another information content provider.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101>>, p. 15.

La decisione pare corretta.

Notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman (critico invece sulla sentenza)

Responsabilità di Amazon da prodotto difettoso anche se venduto (suo tramite) da venditore terzo?

la corte di appello della california affronta la ormai nota questione del se Amazon (A.) sia responsabile per i danni provocati da prodotti venduti da terzi tramite il suo marketplace: C. of Appeal of California, Loomis c. Amazon.com LL.CC., 26.04.0221 , n° B297995.

Si era trattato di uno hoover che, messo in carica, aveva preso fuoco e rischiato di incendiare l’abitazione,p. 2-3.

A p. 3 segg. sono indicati i tipi di vendita tramite A. , tra cui il <Fullfilment by Amazon – FBA> (con stoccaggio), ma non usato nel caso de quo.

A p. 5 ss i dati di vendita di hoover via A. (in totale più di 380.000 nel 2015). Proprio nel periodo di acquisto de quo , A. aveva rilevato rischi di difetto sugli hoover e aveva tentato di richiamarli.

A p. 10 ss la teria della strict liability che coinvolge qualunque impresa della catena di produzione e marketing.: <<Under the marketing enterprise theory or stream of commerce approach, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant’s role was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process.” (Id. at p.776; Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 711 (Kasel).)>>, p. 12

A p. 12 è anche esamianto il precedente Bolger v. Amazon, pure sfavorevole ad A.

Il succo è al § D.1, p. 16 ss: <<Contrary to Amazon’s assertion that it merely provided an online storefront for TurnUpUp and others to sell their wares, it is undisputed Amazon placed itself squarely between TurnUpUp, the seller, and Loomis, the buyer, in the transaction at issue. When Loomis wanted to buy a hoverboard for her son, she perused product listings on Amazon’s website. Amazon took Loomis’s order and processed her payment. It then transmitted the order to TurnUpUp, who packaged and shipped the product to Loomis.
When Loomis wondered whether the hoverboard would arrive in time for Christmas, she communicated her concerns through Amazon. TurnUpUp was not allowed to communicate with Loomis directly. If Loomis had wanted to return the hoverboard, the return would have been routed through Amazon.
Amazon remitted Loomis’s payment to TurnUpUp after deducting its fees, including a 15 percent referral fee based on the total sale price. These facts undermine Amazon’s characterization of its marketplace as an online mall providing online storefronts for sellers. Owners of malls typically do not serve as conduits for payment and communication in each transaction between a buyer and a seller. Moreover, they do not typically charge a per-item fee rather than a fixed amount to rent their storefronts. Instead, these actions – 1) interacting with the customer, 2) taking the order, 3) processing the order to the third party seller, 4) collecting the money, and 5) being paid a percentage of the sale – are consistent with a retailer or a distributor of consumer goods>>.

Non adattandosi bene l’e-commerce alla dottrina tradizinale, la corte invoca la c.d. stream of commerce approach or market enterprise theory per la strict liability: <<“[U]nder the stream-of-commerce approach to strict liability no precise legal relationship to the member of the enterprise causing the defect to be manufactured or to the member most closely connected with the customer is required before the courts will impose strict liability. It is the defendant’s participatory connection, for his personal profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing product and with the enterprise that created consumer demand for and reliance upon the product (and not the defendant’s legal relationship (such as agency) with the manufacturer or other entities involved in the manufacturing-marketing system) which calls for imposition of strict liability. [Citation.]” (Kasel , supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 725.) Thus, a defendant may be strictly liable under the stream of commerce approach if: “(1) the defendant received a direct financial benefit from its activities and from the sale of the product; (2) the defendant’s role was integral to the business enterprise such that the defendant’s conduct was a necessary factor in bringing the product to the initial consumer market; and (3) the defendant had control over, or a substantial ability to influence, the manufacturing or distribution process.” (Bay Summit, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 778.)>>

Si notino i tre requisiti, di seguito (p. 18 ss) analizzati e ravvisati nel caso de quo.

Nauturalmente anche la difesa per cui a. è un mero service provider, a questo punto, non vale, p. 20 ss

Da ultimo sono interessanti le ragioni di policy enunciate : <<As noted earlier in this opinion, the relevant public policy considerations are: (1) whether Amazon may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end, (2) whether Amazon may be the only member in the distribution chain reasonably available to the injured plaintiff, and (3) whether Amazon is in a position to adjust the costs of compensating the injured plaintiff amongst various members in the distribution chain. (Vandermark, supra, 61 Cal.2d at pp. 262-263.)>>. Vengono analizzate partitatmente e ritenuti applicabili al caso sub iudice, tali da portare al giudizio sfavorevole ad A., p. 24 ss

Esito non diverso per l’azione di negligence generale, p.28/9

E’ infine assai interessante la lunga concurring opinion del giudice Wiley, allegata. Oltre a trovare ammissione (confessione) di A. secondo cui può influire e controllare i prodotti sicchè ne ha strict liability, p. 4, vale la pena di leggere le considerazioni sulla cost-benefit analysis nella tort law: sia in generale 4 ss., che in alcuni precedenti giudiziari, 8 ss .

Egli conclude così: <<In a nutshell, plaintiff Wilkinson proposed requiring secondhand dealers to take expensive safety measures: dismantling, inspecting, repairing, and granting a mandatory warranty. The court, quite reasonably, was not convinced these steps were cost-effective in light of the existing strict liability duties on the original manufacturer and its original distribution network. Wilkinson’s proposed safety measures were too expensive and ineffective to be socially desirable. So Hicks owed no strict liability duty to Wilkinson. (Accord, Brejcha v. Wilson Machinery, Inc. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 630; Tauber–Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 268.). In contrast, the measures Amazon can take to minimize the cost of accidents are cost-effective and socially efficient ….. Amazon’s citations thus offer it no support. All involve defendants who, unlike Amazon, had no cost-effective way to reduce the costs of accidents. This case is easy. Amazon is well situated to take cost-effective measures to minimize the social costs of accidents. Strict liability will prompt this beneficial conduct. Loomis wins this appeal. The case will return to the trial court for resolution of issues the appeal has not addressed.>>, p. 20 e 22

Il Consiglio di Stato sulle pratiche scorrette di Facebook: conferma la loro ingannevvolezza (ma non l’aggressività) nonchè l’onerosità (anzichè gratuità) del rapporto con l’utente

L’impugnazione contro TAR Lazio 10.01.2020 n. 260 (e n. 261) da parte di FAcebook è stata decisa e rigettata da Cons. St. 2630/2021 del 29.03.2021 perFacebook Inc. (e dalla gemella in pari data n° 2631/2021 per Facebook Ireland Limited).

Il tema della commercialblità dei dati personali è affrontato al § 8: il coordinamento tra tutela personalistica e tutela economico-patrimoniale dei dati è agli inizi e necessita di ulteriori approfondimenti. Intanto, oltre ad alcuni interessanti studi già usciti, ci si dedica il Cons. St.: <<Riconoscere dunque la assoluta specialità del settore riferibile alla tutela dei dati personali condurrebbe, inevitabilmente, ad escludere in radice, l’applicabilità di ogni altra disciplina giuridica. Ferma dunque la riconosciuta “centralità” della disciplina discendente dal GDPR e dai Codici della privacy adottati dai Paesi membri in materia di tutela di ogni strumento di sfruttamento dei dati personali, deve comunque ritenersi che allorquando il trattamento investa e coinvolga comportamenti e situazioni disciplinate da altre fonti giuridiche a tutela di altri valori e interessi (altrettanto rilevanti quanto la tutela del dato riferibile alla persona fisica), l’ordinamento – unionale prima e interno poi – non può permettere che alcuna espropriazione applicativa di altre discipline di settore, quale è quella, per il caso che qui interessa, della tutela del consumatore, riduca le tutele garantite alle persone fisiche>>

I motivi di ingannevolezza stanno al § 5

Conferma invece che non ricorre la pratica aggressiva (§§ 13-15), rigettando l’appello dell’AGCM-.

Intelligenza artificiale, riduzione della competitività e danno ai consumatori: un paper approfondito dell’autorità britannica

L’autorità britannica per la concorrenza fa uscire un paper introduttivo al tema in oggetto, aprendo alle consultazioni. Si tratta di Algorithms: How they can reduce competition and harm consumers, 19.01.2021, della Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).

Il paper è approfondito e interessante: affronta un tema non nuovo ma finora poco studiato (lo dice lo stessa CMA).

Si affrontano i danni possibilmente derivanti dalla personalizzazione sia tramite prezzi (personalized pricing) sia tramite altre modalità.

I prezzi personalizzati possono talora essere benefici. Talatra però <<personalised pricing could lead to consumer harm. The conditions under which competition authorities might be concerned about personalised pricing are outlined in an OFT economics paper in 2013, and include where there is insufficient competition (i.e. monopolist price discrimination), where personalised pricing is particularly complex or lacking transparency to consumers and/or where it is very costly for firms to implement . In addition, personalised pricing could harm overall economic efficiency if it causes consumers to lose trust in online markets. It could also be harmful for economic efficiency when personalised pricing increases search and transaction costs, such as consumers needing to shop around or take significant or costly steps to avoid being charged a premium>> (p. ; v. poi il § Complex and opaque pricing techniques).

Quanto ai danni da personalizzazione non su prezzo: Personalised rankings, Recommendation and filtering algorithms, Manipulating user journeys, Algorithmic discrimination (qui ci sono invero già moltssimi scritti teorici, ma poco attenti ai riscontri paratici), Geographic targeting, Unfair ranking and design, Preferencing others for commercial advantage, dark patterns (nascondono ciò che l’utente sta per accettare), etc.

C’è poi una sezione sulle pratiche escludenti (self preferencing -noti sono gli addebiti al marketplace di Amazon-, Manipulating platform algorithms and unintended exclusion, Predatory pricing).

Altra sezione è quella sull’algorithmic collusion : Facilitate explicit coordination, Hub-and-spoke , Autonomous tacit collusion.

Il senso pratico dei britannici emerge nella sezione 3, Techniques to investigate these harms (distinguendo tra ipotesi con accesso diretto ai dati e agli algoritmi e senza accesso direto)

Infine, sez. 4, considerazioni di policy. C’è un seria ragione per intervenire :

The opacity of algorithmic systems and the lack of operational transparency make it hard for consumers and customers to effectively discipline firms. Many of the practices we have outlined regarding online choice architecture are likely to become more subtle and challenging to detect.
Some of the practices we outline involve the algorithmic systems of firms that occupy important strategic positions in the UK economy (and internationally).

In conclusione (§ 5) :

Firms maximise profit. In pursuing this objective, without adequate governance, firms designing machine learning systems to achieve this will continually refine and optimise for this using whatever data is useful. Algorithmic systems can interact with pre-existing sources of market failure, such as market power and consumers’ behavioural biases. This means that using some algorithmic systems may result in products that are harmful. As regulators, we need to ensure that firms have incentives to adopt appropriate standards and checks and balances.

The market positions of the largest gateway platforms are substantial and appear to be durable, so unintended harms from their algorithmic systems can have large impacts on other firms that are reliant on the gateway platforms for their business. If algorithmic systems are not explainable and transparent, it may also make it increasingly difficult for regulators to challenge ineffective measures to counter harms.

Due to the various harms identified in this paper, firms must ensure that they are able to explain how their algorithmic systems work.