Distr. Court of california 23 agosto 2023, Case No. 23-cv-00980-JSC., Zhang v. Twitter, rigetta la domanda dell’utente Twitter per presenza del safe harbor.
Regola ormai pacifica tanto che viene da cheidersi come possa uin avvocato consugliuare la lite (nel caso però Zhang aveva agito “representing himself”)
Qui segnalo solo la (fugace) illustazione del motivo per cui T. non è il fornitore delle informaizonie e quindi ricorre il requisito di legge
<<Second, Plaintiff seeks to hold Twitter liable for decisions regarding “information provided by another information content provider”—that is, information he and the third-party user, rather than Twitter, provided. Plaintiff’s argument Twitter is itself “an information content provider” of the third-party account holder’s content within the meaning of Section 230(f)(3) is misplaced. (Dkt. No. 53 at 21-22.) Section 230(f)(3) defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”
Plaintiff appears to argue Twitter’s placement of information in “social media feeds” renders it an information content provider.
Not so. “[P]roliferation and dissemination of content does not equal creation or development of content.” Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding Section 230 immunity applies where the interactive computer service provider “is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of th[e] content, which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by [the interactive computer service provider].”)>>.
Si veda la corrispondente disposizione del digital services act, art. 6 reg. ue 2022/2065, e le tante sentenze emesse in Italia ex art. 16 e 17 d. lgs 70/2003.
(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)