Responsabilità di Uber per l’aggressione ad un suo autista?

Dice di no la corte distr. di West Dist. Washington 27 sett. 2022, Civil Action 2:21-cv-202-BJR, Drammeh v. Uber Techs .

L’autista era stato aggredito e ucciso da due utenti che avevano anche creato (allo scopo, parrebbe) un falso account Uber .

Il punto è l’esistenza o meno di un duty of care di Uber vs. gli autisti.

In genrere nel common law non ci sono doveri di protezione di terzi, tranne che ricorrano due circostanze:

– vi sia tra loro special relationship; o

– che vi sia misfeasance “in the limited circumstances [where] the actor’s own affirmative act creates a recognizable high degree of risk of harm.”. Deve però esswerci azione difettrosa, non omissione che non vbasta.

E’ il punto meno sicuro ma la Corte rigetta:

<<Plaintiffs may be correct that certain omissions can amount to misfeasance if they create a risk of harm that would otherwise not exist. The Washington Supreme Court has stated in dicta that “[a] driver affirmatively create[s] a new risk to a pedestrian by failing to stop his or her car [at a crosswalk].” Robb, 176 Wash.2d at 437. However, none of the omissions identified by Plaintiffs created the risk that resulted in Ceesay’s death. Plaintiffs’ own statistics show that carjacking is a broad societal problem. See Pl. Opp’n, Dkt. 123 at 20. There is no evidence or allegation that anything Defendants did actively encouraged carjackings or “create[d] a special or particular temptation or opportunity for crime.” Hutchins, 116 Wash.2d at 232-33; see also Jane Doe 1 v. Uber Techs., Inc., 79 Cal.App. 5th 410, 425 (finding Uber did not engage in misfeasance and contrasting a case in which a “plaintiff was injured by third parties doing exactly what defendant’s conduct encouraged them to do” (emphasis added)). Even if it were conclusively shown at trial that the risk of carjackings would have been reduced if Defendants had implemented the measures demanded by Plaintiffs, it still would not follow that Defendants created the risk. Washington courts have rejected the idea that “the failure to take [preventative measures] against crime is not in and of itself a special temptation to crime.” Sourakli v. Kyriakos, Inc. 144 Wash.App. 501 (2008). >>

Nemeno ricore la foreseeability dell’evento.

La domanda è respinta.

Non  si menziona (strano che non sia stato invocato) il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA,

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)