Il 20 ottobre è stata depositata la domanda giudiziale degli Stati Uniti d’America contro Google (poi: G.) per violazione antitrust: v. la notizia in Brandom R. in pari data su The Verge , The US government has filed antitrust charges against Google .
Qui trovi il link al testo dell’atto giudiziario , presente su Scribd e cioè questo.
L’inizio suona così : gli Stati uniti di America (e altri stati: Arkansas, Florida etc.) << bring this action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, to restrain Google LLC (Google) from unlawfully maintaining monopolies in the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising in the United States through anticompetitive and exclusionary practices, and to remedy the effects of this conduct>>, p. 1
Si legge che le pratiche di G. sono particolarmente dannose <because they deny rivals scale to compete effectively. General search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising require complex algorithms that are constantly learning which organic results and ads best respond to user queries; the volume, variety, and velocity of data accelerates the automated learning of search and search advertising algorithms. When asked to name Google’s biggest strength in search, Google’s former CEO explained: “Scale is the key. We just have so much scale in terms of the data we can bring to bear.” By using distribution agreements to lock up scale for itself and deny it to others, Google unlawfully maintains its monopolies>, § 8.
Inibisce, poi, possibili innovazioni la presa di G. sulla distribuzione, § 9.
V. il cenno difensivo di G. richiamentesi a Microsoft nel caso US v. Microsoft di venti anni fa, § 10-11.
Per descrizione del business dei motori di ricerca si v. sub III. A , § 19 ss, e sub III.B B, § 35 ss. sulla importanza del profilo dimensionale. V. sub D, § 52 ss per l’esame della fase distributiva (forse poco conosciuta dal pubblico).
Trovi nella Parte IV, § 28 ss, l’individuazione del mercato rilevante: – quello dei general search services, sub A.1; – quello del search advertising, sub B.1 (e al suo interno, quello del genral search text advertising, § 101; assieme considerati al § 108 ss)
Affermato ciò , gli attori dicono: < Google is a monopolist in the general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising markets. Google aggressively uses its monopoly positions, and the money that flows from them, to continuously foreclose rivals and protect its monopolies>, § 111 .
Segue l’esame delle singole condotte cnsurate:
Al § 112: G. ha illecitamente mantenuto il monopolio <by implementing and enforcing a series of exclusionary agreements with distributors over at least the last decade. Particularly when taken together, Google’s exclusionary agreements have denied rivals access to the most important distribution channels. In fact, Google’s exclusionary contracts cover almost 60 percent of U.S. search queries. Almost half the remaining searches are funneled through properties owned and operated directly by Google. As a result, the large majority of searches are covered by Google’s exclusionary contracts and own properties, leaving only a small fraction for competitors>.
Al § 113 : G. ha continuato ad usare <the exclusionary agreements over many years, long after there was any real competition in general search, has denied its rivals access to the scale that would allow rivals to increase quality. By depriving them of scale, Google also hinders its rivals’ ability to secure distribution going forward, insulating Google from competition>.
Al § 114 : <Google’s exclusionary motives influence its negotiations with distributors. Some of these exclusionary agreements have been described by Google as an “[i]nsurance policy that preserves our search and assistant usage.” To preserve its dominance, Google has developed economic models to measure the “defensive value” of foreclosing search rivals from effective distribution, search access points, and ultimately competition. Google recognized it could pay search distributors to “protect [its] market share from erosion.” Google continues to focus on the exclusionary defensive value of its distribution contracts as it tries to expand its search dominance into new distribution channels, such as smart home speakers. Here, Google’s defensive value “is attributable to protecting access to Search and other Google services that may otherwise be blocked in a given household” if a user chooses a rival.>.
Complessivamente, G. priva i concorrenti <of the quality, reach, and financial position necessary to mount any meaningful competition to Google’s longstanding monopolies. By foreclosing competition from rivals, Google harms consumers and advertisers.>, § 115.
Segue esame analitico, sub V.A-B, §§ 116-165.
In sintesi gli effetti inibitori della concorrenza sono: < a. Substantially foreclosing competition in general search services and protecting a large majority of search queries in the United States against any meaningful competition; b. Excluding general search services rivals from effective distribution channels, thereby denying rivals the necessary scale to compete effectively in the general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising markets; c. Impeding other potential distribution paths for general search services rivals; d. Increasing barriers to entry and excluding competition at emerging search access points from nascent competitors on both computers and mobile devices; e. Stunting innovation in new products that could serve as alternative search access points or disruptors to the traditional Google search model; and f. Insulating Google from significant competitive pressure to improve its general search, search advertising, and general search text advertising products and services.>, § 166.
Le violazioni processualmetne dedotte sono indicate sub VII, § 173 ss
Al capo VIII , § 194, v. i provvedimenti richiesti, tra cui le lettere b)-c) :
<< b. Enter structural relief as needed to cure any anticompetitive harm; c. Enjoin Google from continuing to engage in the anticompetitive practices described herein and from engaging in any other practices with the same purpose and effect as the challenged practices; >>.