Tag: good faith

Sulla buona fede nell’iniziare una lite per violazione di copyright (misrepresentation ex § 512 (f) DMCA)

Una corte di appello USA si pronuncia sull’abuso di denuncia (notice and take down, NTD) di violazione copyright, secondo la disciplina del safe harbour introdotto nel 1998 dal § 512 Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA).

La lettera f) infatti ne regola la misrepresentation: <<Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section – (1) that material or activity is infringing, or  (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,              shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner’s authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it>>.

Ebbene nella decisione 4 settembre 2020 la Corte di Appello dell’11° circuito, case 19-11070, SHIRLEY JOHNSON v. NEW DESTINY CHRISTIAN CENTER CHURCH e altri,  ha deciso una domanda di danni per misrepresetnation,  ma  l’ha respinta.
Tale Shirley Johnson aveva criticato un associazione tramite video su youtube e per tutta risposta si era vista citare per violazione di copyright. A sua volta dunque citò l’associazione per abuso di NTD e di processo.
La decisione qui ricordata non è la prima intervenuta tra le parti (si v. la parte in fatto nella decisione). V. il post dell’estate 2018 di Masnik Court Awards $12,500 For ‘Emotional Harm’ From Bogus Copyright Lawsuit in techdirt.com , che riferisce della prima fase , favorevole a S. Johnson.
Secondo la giurisprudenza ivi ricordata <<the takedown notice requirements contained in § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) require copyright holders, before issuing the takedown notice, to consider whether the potentially infringing material is a fair use. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 815 F.3d 1145, 1151–1154 (9th Cir. 2016). And failure to consider fair use before issuing a takedown notice constitutes a misrepresentation of copyright infringement under § 512(f)>>, p. 11.
Prima di procedere, dunque, il preteso soggetto leso deve verificare se ricorra l’eccezione di fair use: e cita il (probabilmente più celebre) caso recente di fair use Lenz v. Universal Music Corp, 815 F.3d 1145, 1151–1154 (9th Cir. 2016).
La buona fede è provata dalle indagini svolte e dai pareri legali chiesti prima di procedere.
L’importante disposizione sul fair use  è nel § 107 del cap. 17 US Code:

<<Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors>>

Se il Digital Services Act allo studio in UE procederà introducendo la procedura di NTD, sarà opportuno regoli pure questi profilo.

Viene rigettata anche l’istanza di danni per abuso di processo, i cui elementi costitutivi secondo la legge della Florida sono : <<(1)  that  the  defendant  made  an  illegal,  improper,  or  perverted  use  of  process;  (2)  that  the  defendant  had  ulterior  motives  or  purposes  in  exercising such illegal, improper, or perverted use of process; and (3) that,  as  a  result  of  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff suffered damage>>, p. 14.