AI e diritto di autore: il giudice californiano aparzialmente ammette il fair use nell’uso a fini di training (sul caso Anthropic )

Il giudice William Alsup del Distr. Nord della Califonia, 23 giugno 2025, Case 3:24-cv-05417-WHA,ANDREA BARTZ, CHARLES GRAEBER, and KIRK WALLACE JOHNSON contro Anthropic, esamina a fondo (anche sotto il profilo fattuale) la fattisicpecie dell’uso a fini di “allenamento” delle opeere degli autori attori.

L’esito è per lo più  favorevole all’impresa di AI, tranne che per l’uso dei libri piratati, per i quali il processo prosegue.

<<5. OVERALL ANALYSIS After the four factors and any others deemed relevant are “explored, [ ] the results [are] weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
The copies used to train specific LLMs were justified as a fair use. Every factor but the nature of the copyrighted work favors this result. The technology at issue was among the most transformative many of us will see in our lifetimes.
The copies used to convert purchased print library copies into digital library copies were justified, too, though for a different fair use. The first factor strongly favors this result, and the third favors it, too. The fourth is neutral. Only the second slightly disfavors it. On balance, as the purchased print copy was destroyed and its digital replacement not redistributed, this was a
fair use.
The downloaded pirated copies used to build a central library were not justified by a fair use. Every factor points against fair use. Anthropic employees said copies of works (pirated ones, too) would be retained “forever” for “general purpose” even after Anthropic determined they would never be used for training LLMs. A separate justification was required for each use. None is even offered here except for Anthropic’s pocketbook and convenience.
And, as for any copies made from central library copies but not used for training, this order does not grant summary judgment for Anthropic. On this record in this posture, the central library copies were retained even when no longer serving as sources for training copies, “hundreds of engineers” could access them to make copies for other uses, and engineers did make other copies. Anthropic has dodged discovery on these points (e.g., Opp. Exh. 17 at 93–94 (retained); Opp. Exh. 22 at 196 (no limits); Opp. Exh. 30 at 3, 4 (no accounting); see also Opp. 15). We cannot determine the right answer concerning such copies because the record is
too poorly developed as to them. Anthropic is not entitled to an order blessing all copying “that Anthropic has ever made after obtaining the data,” to use its words (Opp. Exh. 30 at 3, 4). (….).

This order grants summary judgment for Anthropic that the training use was a fair use. And, it grants that the print-to-digital format change was a fair use for a different reason. But it denies summary judgment for Anthropic that the pirated library copies must be treated as training copies.
We will have a trial on the pirated copies used to create Anthropic’s central library and the resulting damages, actual or statutory (including for willfulness). That Anthropic later bought a copy of a book it earlier stole off the internet will not absolve it of liability for the theft but it may affect the extent of statutory damages. Nothing is foreclosed as to any other copies flowing from library copies for uses other than for training LLMs>>

(segnalazione di Andres Guadamuz)

 

 

 

Ancora su AI, data scraping e violazione di copyright (questa volta per lo più negata)

La corte del distr. Nord della California  30 ottobre 2023, Case 3:23-cv-00201-WHO, Andersen v. Stability AI, DeviantArt, Midjourney, esamina il tema in oggetto (segnalazione e link di Jess Miers su X).

Le domande sono tutte rigettate tranne quelal verso Stability, per la quale è cocnessa facoltà di modifica:

<<3. Direct Infringement Allegations Against Stability Plaintiffs’ primary theory of direct copyright infringement is based on Stability’s creation and use of “Training Images” scraped from the internet into the LAION datasets and then used to train Stable Diffusion. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged direct infringement based on the allegations that Stability “downloaded or otherwise acquired copies of billions of copyrighted images without permission to create Stable Diffusion,” and used those images (called “Training Images”) to train Stable Diffusion and caused those “images to be stored at and incorporated into Stable Diffusion as compressed copies.” Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 25-26, 57. In its “Preliminary Statement” in support of its motion to dismiss, Stability opposes the truth of plaintiffs’ assertions. See Stability Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 58) at 1. However, even Stability recognizes that determination of the truth of these allegations – whether copying in violation of the Copyright Act occurred in the context of training Stable Diffusion or occurs when Stable Diffusion is run – cannot be resolved at this juncture. Id. Stability does not otherwise oppose the sufficiency of the allegations supporting Anderson’s direct copyright infringement claims with respect to the Training Images>>.

Provvedimento itneressante poer chi si occupa del tema, dato che da noi ancora non se ne son visti.

Azione di classe contro Google, basata su illecito data scraping per allenare la sua intelligenza artificiale

E’ diffusa in rete la notizia della citazione in giudizio per l’illecito in oggetto del 11 luglio 2023 da parte della Clarkson law firm, reperibile ad es proprio nel sito dello studio)  (“web-scraping theft” per la chatbox BArd, concorrente di OpenAI, ad altro).

Provato Bard con richiesta di consulenza giuridica: fa diversi errori (serve altro allenamento)

Google scansionerebbe e raccoglierebbe qualunque dato passa per i suoi server (irragionevole dubitarne). Pare che non sia molto coperta da consenso contrattuale (nonostante nessuno riesca a farle modificare i moduli di accettazione iniziali)

Sono azionati diritto di privacy,  di proprietà sui dati (non coincidente con la privacy; opinabile, ma dipende da come i due istituti son configurati nei singoli ordinamenti), di copyright, di concorrenza sleale (sub III, da § 153 ss.)