L’intelligenza artificiale di Facebook viola il diritto di elaborazione delle opere letterarie utilizzate?

Large Language Model Meta AI (LLaMA)  (v.ne la descrizione nel sito di Meta) non viola il diritto di elaborazione sulle opere letterarie usate per creare tali modelli, dice il Trib. del distretto nord della Calofiornia Case No. 23-cv-03417-VC, 20 novembre 2023 , Kadrey v. Meta.

Nè nella costituzione dei modelli medesimi nè nell’output genrato dal loro uso:

<<1. The plaintiffs allege that the “LLaMA language models are themselves infringing
derivative works” because the “models cannot function without the expressive information
extracted” from the plaintiffs’ books. This is nonsensical. A derivative work is “a work based
upon one or more preexisting works” in any “form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. There is no way to understand the LLaMA models themselves as a
recasting or adaptation of any of the plaintiffs’ books.

[più che altro non c’è prova: non si può dire che sia impossibile in astratto]
2. Another theory is that “every output of the LLaMA language models is an infringing
derivative work,” and that because third-party users initiate queries of LLaMA, “every output
from the LLaMA language models constitutes an act of vicarious copyright infringement.” But
the complaint offers no allegation of the contents of any output, let alone of one that could be  understood as recasting, transforming, or adapting the plaintiffs’ books. Without any plausible
allegation of an infringing output, there can be no vicarious infringement. See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).
The plaintiffs are wrong to say that, because their books were duplicated in full as part of
the LLaMA training process, they do not need to allege any similarity between LLaMA outputs
and their books to maintain a claim based on derivative infringement. To prevail on a theory that
LLaMA’s outputs constitute derivative infringement, the plaintiffs would indeed need to allege
and ultimately prove that the outputs “incorporate in some form a portion of” the plaintiffs’
books. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Andersen v.
Stability AI Ltd., No. 23-CV-00201-WHO, 2023 WL 7132064, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023)
(“[T]he alleged infringer’s derivative work must still bear some similarity to the original work or
contain the protected elements of the original work.”); 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 8.09 (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2023) (“Unless enough of the pre-
existing work is contained in the later work to constitute the latter an infringement of the former,
the latter, by definition, is not a derivative work.”); 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 3.01 (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2023) (“A work is not derivative unless
it has substantially copied from a prior work.” (emphasis omitted)). The plaintiffs cite Range
Road Music, Inc. v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012), but that case is not
applicable here. In Range Road, the infringement was the public performance of copyrighted
songs at a bar. Id. at 1151-52. The plaintiffs presented evidence (namely, the testimony of
someone they sent to the bar) that the songs performed were, in fact, the protected songs. Id. at
1151-53. The defendants presented no evidence of their own that the protected songs were not
performed. Nor did they present evidence that the performed songs were different in any
meaningful way from the protected songs. Id. at 1154. The Ninth Circuit held that, under these
circumstances, summary judgment for the plaintiffs was appropriate. And the Court rejected the
defendants’ contention that the plaintiffs, under these circumstances, were also required to
present evidence that the performed songs were “substantially similar” to the protected songs.
That contention made no sense, because the plaintiffs had already offered unrebutted evidence
that the songs performed at the bar were the protected songs. Id. at 1154. Of course, if the
defendants had presented evidence at summary judgment that the songs performed at the bar
were meaningfully different from the protected songs, then there would have been a dispute over
whether the performances were infringing, and the case would have needed to go to trial. At that
trial, the plaintiffs would have needed to prove that the performed songs (or portions of the
performed songs) were “substantially similar” to the protected songs. That’s the same thing the
plaintiffs would need to do here with respect to the content of LLaMA’s outputs. To the extent
that they are not contending LLaMa spits out actual copies of their protected works, they would
need to prove that the outputs (or portions of the outputs) are similar enough to the plaintiffs’
books to be infringing derivative works. And because the plaintiffs would ultimately need to
prove this, they must adequately allege it at the pleading stage>>

[anche qui manca la prova]

Motivazione un pò striminzita, per vero.

(notizia e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)