Google è protetto dal safe harbour ex 230 CDA poer truffa da parte di un falso inserzionista (falso eBay)

La US distr. court -South. Dis. of NY Case 1:22-cv-06831-JGK, Ynfante v. Google su un caso semplice del safe harbour ex § 230 CDA:

<<In this case, it is plain that Section 230 protects Google from liability in the negligence and false advertising action brought by Mr. Ynfante. First, Google is the provider of an interactive computer service. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained that “search engines fall within this definition,” LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 174, and Google is one such search engine. See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that the definition of “interactive computer service” applies to Google specifically).
Second, there is no doubt that the complaint treats Google as the publisher or speaker of information. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 27, 34. Section 230 “specifically proscribes liability” for “decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from [a platform] — actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.” Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003). In other words, Section 230 bars any claim that “can be boiled down to the failure of an interactive computer service to edit or block user-generated content that it believes was tendered for posting online, as that is the very activity Congress sought to immunize by passing the section.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v., LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 n.32 (9th Cir. 2008). In this case, the plaintiff’s causes of action against Google rest solely on the theory that Google did not block a third-party advertisement for publication on its search pages. But for Google’s publication of the advertisement, the plaintiff would not have been harmed. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 38-39, 61. The plaintiff therefore seeks to hold Google liable for its actions related to the screening, monitoring, and posting of content, which fall squarely within the exercise of a publisher’s role and are therefore subject to Section 230’s broad immunity.
Third, the scam advertisement came from an information content provider distinct from the defendant. As the complaint acknowledges, the advertisement was produced by a third party who then submitted the advertisement to Google for publication. See id. ¶ 26. It is therefore plain that the complaint is seeking to hold the defendant liable for information provided by a party other than the defendant and published on Google’s platform, which Section 230 forecloses>>

Niente di nuovo.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog del prof. Eric Goldman)