Recensione diffamante, a carico di avvocato, postata su Google Maps e responsabilità di quest’ultimo: opera il safe harbor ex § 230 CDA?

La risposta è positiva, naturalmente.

Si tratta di avvocato operante nelle vicinenza di Portland e diffamato da pesante recensione postata su Google maps.

Caso facile, allora,  per il Tribunale dell’Oregon Daniloff c. Google+1, 30 gennaio 2023, Case No. 3:22-cv-01271-IM .

Il prof. Eric Goldman dà pure il link alla recensione diffamante .

L’0aavvopcato attopre aveva CHJIESTO danni per 300.000 dollari a google e al recensore.

<<In evaluating Defendant Google’s immunity under the CDA, this Court applies the threefactor Ninth Circuit test. See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268. First, to determine whether Defendant Google qualifies as an interactive computer service provider, this Court notes that Google is an
operator who passively provides website access to multiple users. Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v., LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“A
website operator . . . [who] passively displays content that is created entirely by third parties . . .
is only a service provider with respect to that content.”). Accordingly, as Defendant Google
argues and Plaintiff concedes, Google qualifies as an interactive computer service provider. ECF
8 at 5; ECF 9 at 3; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Lewis v. Google LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938,
954 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (collecting cases), aff’d, 851 F. App’x 723 (9th Cir. 2021); Gaston v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0063-ST, 2012 WL 629868, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 2, 2012), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-00063-ST, 2012 WL 610005 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2012).
Second, because Plaintiff premises his defamation claim on Defendant Google’s
publication of Defendant Keown’s review, ECF 1-1, Ex. A, at ¶ 22, this Court finds that Plaintiff
seeks to treat Google as a publisher or speaker. See Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268 (holding that
defamation claim based on Yelp review was “directed against Yelp in its capacity as a publisher
or speaker” (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102)).
Third, as the allegedly defamatory review was posted by Defendant Keown, ECF 1-1, Ex.
A, at ¶ 5–7, this Court finds the relevant information was provided by another information
content provider. Rather than allege that Defendant Google created the review, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Google “hosted” it via Plaintiff’s Google Business profile, id. at ¶ 30, thereby
“material[ly] contribut[ing]” to the defamatory review. ECF 9 at 3. An entity who “contributes
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct” at issue is not entitled to protection under
Section 230., 521 F.3d at 1168.
The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar argument in Kimzey, a case arising out of a
negative review on Yelp’s website. Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1265. While the plaintiff in that case
claimed that Yelp had “authored” the review at issue through its star-rating system, id. at 1268,
the Ninth Circuit found that “Yelp’s rating system . . . is based on rating inputs from third parties
and . . . [is] user-generated data,” id. at 1270. As such, the Ninth Circuit held that Yelp’s actions
did not qualify as “creation” or “development” of information and that “the rating system [did]
‘absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message’ beyond the words offered
by the user.” Id. at 1270–71 (quoting, 521 F.3d at 1172).
Defendant Keown’s review similarly qualifies as user-generated data and Defendant
Google’s hosting of that review through its Google Business profile system does not qualify as a
material contribution. This Court finds that Plaintiff bases his defamation claim on a review
provided by an information content provider other than Defendant Google—thus fulfilling the
third factor required under Kimzey. See also id. at 1265 (observing that a claim “asserting that
[an interactive computer service provider is] liable in its well-known capacity as the passive host
of a forum for user reviews [is] a claim without any hope under [Ninth Circuit] precedent[]”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Defendant Google satisfies the Ninth Circuit’s
three-factor test and Defendant Google is immune under Section 230 of the CDA.
To the extent that Plaintiff relies on Defendant Google’s refusal to remove Defendant Keown’s review in pursuing his defamation claim, ECF 1-1 at ¶ 11–17; ECF 9 at 4, this Court also holds that Defendant Google is immunized under the CDA for this decision., 521 F.3d at 1170–71 (“[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under Case 3:22-cv-01271-IM Document 11 Filed 01/30/23 Page 6 of 7PAGE 7 – OPINION AND ORDER section 230.”); see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105. Accordingly, Defendant Google’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 8, is GRANTED.>>