Raccolta, a fini di successiva vendita, di informazioni personali altrui: right of publicity e safe harbour ex 230 CDA

La corte distrettuale del Nord California, 16.08.2021, 21cv01418EMC , Cat Brooks e altri c. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION (poi, TR), decide la lite iniziata dai primi per raccolta e sucessiva vendita a terzi di loro dati personali.

Il colosso dell’informazione TR , data broker, raccoglieva e vendeva informazioni altrui a imprese interessate (si tratta della piattaforma CLEAR).

Precisamente: Thomson Reuters “aggregates both public and nonpublic information about millions of people” to create “detailed cradletograve dossiers on each person, including names, photographs, criminal history, relatives, associates, financial information, and employment information.” See Docket No. 11 (Compl.) ⁋ 2. Other than publicly available information on social networks, blogs, and even chat rooms, Thomson Reuters also pulls “information from thirdparty data brokers and law enforcement agencies that are not available to the general public, including live cell phone records, location data from billions of license plate detections, realtime booking information from thousands of facilities, and millions of historical arrest records and intake photos.”

1) Tra le vari causae petendi, considero il right of publicity.

La domanda è rigettata non tanto perchè non ricorra l’uso (come allegato da TR) , quanto perchè non ricorre l'<Appropriation of Plaintiffs’ Name or Likeness For A Commercial Advantage>: Although the publishing of Plaintiffs’ most private and intimate information for profit might be a gross invasion of their privacy, it is not a misappropriation of their name or likeness to advertise or promote a separate product or servic, p. 8.

2) safe harbour ex § 230 CDA, invocato da TR

Dei tre requisiti necessari (“(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a
publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content
provider.”
), TR non ha provato la ricorrenza del 2 e del 3.

Quanto al 2, la giurisprudenza insegna che <<a plaintiff seeks to treat an interactive computer service as a “publisher or speaker” under § 230(c)(1) only when it is asking that service to “review[], edit[], and decid[e] whether to publish or withdraw from publication thirdparty content.” Id. (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102). Here, Plaintiffs are not seeking to hold Thomson Reuters liable “as the publisher or speaker” because they are not asking it to monitor thirdparty content; they are asking to moderate its own conten>>

Quanto al requisito 3, l’informazione non è fornita da terzi ma da TR: the “information” at issue herethe dossiers with Plaintiffs’ personal informationis not “provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). In Roomates.com, the panel explained that § 230 was passed by Congress to “immunize[] providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.” 521 F.3d at 1162 (emphasis added). The whole point was to allow those providers to “perform some editing on usergenerated content without thereby becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn’t edit or delete. In other  words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of usergenerated content, not the creation of content.” Id. at 1163 (emphases added). Here, there is no usergenerated contentThomson Reuters generates all the dossiers with Plaintiffs’ personal information that is posted on the CLEAR platform. See Compl. ⁋⁋ 13. In other words, Thomson Reuter is the “information content provider” of the CLEAR dossiers because it is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” those dossiers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). It is nothing like the paradigm of an interactive computer service that permits posting of content by third parties.

Right of publicity e sua circolazione giuridica: novità dallo Stato di New York

Il diritto di NY regola ora espressamente la circolazione , anche mortis causa, del right of publicity.

Ne dà notizia Tyler Ochoa con post 1 giugn 2021 nel blog di Eric Goldman. e con un secondo post 2 giugno 2021 (ove anche menzione di analoghe legislazioni di altri stati) .

Viene inserita la sec. 50-F nelle consolidated laws di NY, Civil Rights ove dettagliata disciplina.

Si v. il § 2.a: <<Any person who uses a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision four of this section, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.>>

Sanzioni:

<<In any action brought under this section:

i. the person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to the greater of two thousand dollars or the compensatory damages suffered by the injured party or parties, as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to such use and are not taken into account in computing the compensatory damages.

ii. in establishing profits under this subdivision, the injured party or parties shall be required to present proof only of the gross revenue attributable to the unauthorized use, and the person who violated this section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses.

iii. punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties>>.

Durata:

 <<8. An action shall not be brought under this section by reason of any use of a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness occurring after the expiration of forty years after the death of the deceased personality.>>

Circolazione

I §§ 3-7 regolano la circolazione giuridica di questo diritto, tra vivi e mortis causa. In quest’ultima eventualità, opera l’eventuale disposizione testamentaria (§ 3) oppure la disciplina legale della successione ab intestato (§ 5).

diritto esclusivo sulla propria voce

Nessuno può utilizzare (commercialmente?) la voce di un altro soggetto al di là di quanto da questi consentito.

Sulla base di questo assunto , la donna, che ha prestato la voce a SIRI (l’assistente intelligente di Apple) per la lingua ebraica, ha citato in giudizio Apple, sostenendo che la sua voce è stata utilizzata in modi non consentiti. In particolare ella aveva acconsentito solo ad utilizzi per “legitimate purposes”, mentre Apple l’avrebbe utilizzata << for saying racist, violent and sexual things >> .

Se la voce è tale da far riconoscere la persona (ha cioè efficacia identificante), l’eventuale violazione della pattuizione permetterà alla persona di far valere anche il diritto (assoluto) della personalità, oltre al contratto (da vedere come coordinare le due pretese). Se invece non è tale da determinarne la riconoscibilità, potrà essere azionato solo il contratto.

La richiesta di compensazione ammmonta a $ 66.000,00.

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