Esimente del safe harbour ex artt. 14-16 d. lgs. 70-2003 + § 230 CDA + § 512 DMCA – Pagina 7

Ancora su responsabilità per violazione di privacy/right of publicity etc. da parte dei redattori di annuari (yearbooks) e safe harbour ex § 230.

Ancora sul tema in oggetto e ancora (giusto) rigetto dell’eccezine di safe harbour ex § 230 CDA.

Si tratta di filone giudiziario di una certa consistenza , di cui avevo dato conto qui e qui.

1) BONILLA v. ANCESTRY.COM OPERATIONS INC. de 7 dic. 2021 No. 20-C-07390, Colrte ND Illinois, eastern division : <<Ancestry argues that each of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because Ancestry is immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). The CDA provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The CDA applies to online forums that serve as “a mere passive conduit for disseminating (actionable) statements.” Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 742 (7th Cir. 2016). Because affirmative defenses such as CDA immunity frequently turn on facts not before the court at the pleading stage, dismissal is appropriate only when the factual allegations in the complaint unambiguously establish all the elements of the defense. See Siegel v. Zoominfo Techs., LLC, 2021 WL 4306148, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2021) citing Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016)

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint includes allegations that Ancestry created records of Plaintiffs reflecting the information from the yearbook record, and uses that information to entice potential customers to subscribe to its services. Plaintiff also alleges that non-users are shown a limited version of the record (including a low resolution photograph) with a promotional pop-up advertisement promising access to Plaintiff’s identity and likeness if they sign up for a paid subscription. Dkt. 29 at ¶¶38-46. Ancestry recasts Plaintiff’s claims on the “mere reposting” of yearbook records, which is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations that Ancestry uses those records and the likeness/identity to sell subscription services beyond his individual yearbook record. These allegations, taken as true, do not establish that Ancestry is a “passive conduit” that should receive immunity under the CDA. Plaintiff has alleged that Ancestry collected and organized records and subsequently used Plaintiff’s and the putative class members’ names, likenesses, and identities in these records they curated for commercial gain. See Krause v. Rocketreach, LLC, 2021 WL 4282700 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2021) (rejecting CDA immunity argument where complaint allegations did not establish affirmative defense); see also Lukis v. Whitepages, Inc., 454 F.Supp.3d 746, 763 (N.D. Ill. 2020)>>.

2) CALLAHAN v. PEOPLECONNECT, INC. Case No. 20-cv-09203-EMC. del 1.11.2021 , Tribunale del N.D. California. , molto più dettagliata , che valorizza la notevole differenza tra l’annuario in cartaceo a diffusione limitata e la sua messa on line: <<in the instant case, the Court concludes that, at the very least, there is a question of fact as to whether a reasonable person in the position of PeopleConnect (the service provider) would conclude that the yearbook authors/publishers (the information content providers) intended the yearbooks to be published on the internet. As Plaintiffs point out, the yearbooks at issue were published in the 1990s and early 2000s when “[t]he Internet was in its infancy and social media did not exist.” Opp’n at 5. Moreover, there is a difference between publishing a yearbook for a school or local community and publishing a yearbook on the internet where the audience is far broader. Thus, it would be hard to conclude that, as a matter of law, PeopleConnect is a publisher of information provided by another information content provider and is thus entitled to immunity under the CDA.

PeopleConnect’s reliance on Judge Beeler’s Ancestry decisions is unavailing. In Ancestry II, Judge Beeler indicated that, under Batzel, it was reasonable for Ancestry to believe that the yearbooks at issue were being provided to it for publication on the Internet, but Judge Beeler’s ruling appears to turn on her view that an information content provider could be people or entities other than the yearbook author/publisher. See Ancestry II, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112036, at *17-18 (stating that, “whether the yearbooks were donated by other former students or obtained from other sources, Ancestry is demonstrably not the content creator and instead is publishing third-party content provided to it for publication”; “[n]othing in Batzel requires the original creator’s permission for publication”). But that view is not consistent with the express definition of “information content provider” under the CDA; an information content provider is one who created or developed the information at issue. In the instant case, the yearbook authors/publishers are the only ones who meet that criteria.

At the hearing, PeopleConnect suggested that a service provider should be allowed to assume that the person or entity who provided the information to the service provider was the creator or developer of the information.⁶ Such an approach, however, would be contrary to Batzel which focuses on the reasonable perception of the service provider. PeopleConnect fails to explain why a service provider should not be held accountable if, e.g., it is obvious that the person or entity providing information to the service provider is not the creator or developer of the information. In such a situation, if it is obvious that the person or entity providing the information is not the creator or developer of the information, then the service provider “is the one making the affirmative decision to publish, and so . . . contributes materially to [the] allegedly unlawful dissemination” of the information[;] [it] is thus properly deemed a developer and not entitled to CDA immunity.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171.

In the instant case, it is obvious that the yearbook users/purchasers were not the creators or developers of the yearbooks. Instead, the yearbook authors/publishers were the content providers. PeopleConnect cannot claim the benefit of CDA immunity, absent a reasonable basis to believe that the yearbook authors/publishers intended for there to be publication on the Internet. This presents a question of fact that cannot be resolved at the 12(b)(6) phase of proceedings>>.

Ancora sulla (al momento impossibile da ottenere) qualificazione delle piattaforme social come State Actors ai fini del Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola)

Altra sentenza (d’appello stavolta) che rigetta la domadna vs. Facebook (rectius, Meta) basata sul fatto che illegalmente filtrerebbe/censurerebbe i post o rimuoverebbe gli account , violando il Primo Emendamento (libertà di parola).

Questo diritto spetta solo verso lo Stato o verso chi agisce in suo nome o assieme ad esso.

Si tratta della sentenza di appello del 9° circuito (su impugnazione di una sentenza californiana confermata) , emessa il 22.11.2021, No. 20-17489 , D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05546-RS, Atkinson c. Meta-Zuckerberg.

Sono riproposte dall’utente (e la Corte partitamente rigetta) tutte le consuete e note causae petendi in tema. Nulla di nuovo ma un utile loro ripasso.

Inoltre la Corte conferma pure l’applicazione del safe harbour ex 230 CDA.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Responsabilità di Facebook e Tik Tok per omesso controllo dell’ingresso di post persecutori nell’account di un utente (e per abusiva rimozione dell’account)?

No ,naturalmente (secondo il diritto USa), stante il safe harbour ex § 230 CDA (si censura anche l’aver Tik Tok rimosso l’account)

Così la corte del distretto est del Missouri 22.11.2021, Case: 4:21-cv-01046-JAR, Winter e altroi c FAcebook e tik Tok e Dolan .

I post “fastidiosi” di Dolan nell’account di Winter non sono stati filtrati adeguatamente da F. che viene citato in giudizio da W..

Ma la corte , al solito, rigetta per il cit. § 230.

Dei tre requisiti (che sia un provider; che si tratti di notizie di terzi; che l’attore lo tratti come publisher o speaker) è sempre il terzo il più ineressante, dipendendo dala prospettazione attorea. La quale talora genera dubbi , ma non qui. Esattametne la corte ravvisa anche il predetto terzo requisito:

<<Lastly, Plaintiffs are clearly seeking to treat Facebook and TikTok as publishers. (See Doc. No. 16 at 5-6; Doc. No. 24 at 5). Under § 230, a cause of action “treat[s]” an entity as a “publisher” if it would hold an entity responsible for “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 792. Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold Facebook and TikTok liable for not removing the content/accounts posted/held by Dolan and her group, which they find objectionable.

The decision whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content are traditional editorial functions of a publisher. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“Indeed, the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a given piece of content – the very actions for which Klayman seeks to hold Facebook liable.”).

Plaintiffs also seek to hold TikTok liable for removing their social media accounts from its platform, yet courts have found that § 230(c)(1) immunity also applies to the situation where a plaintiff objects to the removal of his or her own content. See Wilson, 2020 WL 3410349, at *12 (citing cases).

In opposition to Facebook and TikTok’s motions, Plaintiffs argue that by failing to follow their own Community Standards and taking down content that violates those standards, both Facebook and TikTok have acted in “bad faith” and thus cannot be protected under § 230(c)(2), the “Good Samaritan” provision of the CDA. (Doc. No. 16 at 6-7; Doc. No. 24 at 6-7). Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing in that it ignores the fact that Facebook and TikTok are claiming immunity under § 230(c)(1), which contains no “good faith” requirement. E. Coast Test Prep LLC v. Allnurses.com, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 952, 964 (D. Minn. 2018), aff’d, 971 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2020).

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument rests on a misconception about the purpose of the Good Samaritan provision. It was inserted not to diminish the broad general immunity provided by § 230(c)(1), but to assure it is not diminished by the exercise of traditional publisher functions. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (Section 230 was designed “to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their services” without fear they would incur liability as a result.). In this respect, the CDA was a response to cases such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), in which an ISP was found liable for defamatory statements posted by third parties because it had voluntarily screened and edited some offensive content, and so was considered a “publisher.” Id. at *4. “Section 230(c)(1) was meant to undo the perverse incentives created by this reasoning, which effectively penalized providers for monitoring content.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. As TikTok aptly notes, Plaintiffs’ complaint about selective enforcement of content standards is precisely the type of claim Congress intended to preempt in § 230(c)(1>>

Anche la domanda ex tort of negligence è rigettata: non c’era specifoco duty of care di F. verso l’attore. Tale non erano le sue Community Standards , altrimenti il safa harbour sarebbe vano: <<To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the promulgation of Community Standards gives rise to a state-law duty of care in publishing, that argument has been rejected. “[S]tate law cannot predicate liability for publishing decisions on the mere existence of the very relationship that Congress immunized from suit.” Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359-60. The CDA “allows [computer service providers] to establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so.” Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Green, 318 F.3d at 723).

Again, “[n]one of this means … that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages [will] escape accountability.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. It means only that, if Plaintiffs take issue with the posts and accounts of Dolan and her group, their legal remedy is against Dolan as the content provider, and not against Facebook and TikTok as the publisher>>.

(notizie e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Quattro causae petendi relative al First Amendment/libertà di parola per contrastare la sospensione dell’account Youtube, ma nessuna accolta

Interessante sentenza californiana sulla solita questione della libertà di parola (First Amendement) asseritamente violata da sospensione dell’account su social media (politicamente di destra) da parte di una state action.

Si tratta della corte distrettuale di S. Josè, Californa, 19 ottobre 2021, Case No. 20-cv-07502-BLF, Doe c. Google,.

Sono azionate quattro causae petendi, tutte rigettate visto che nessuna è applicabile alla censura/content moderation di Youtube:

1) Public function: curiosamente l’attore e la corte invocano in senso reciprocamente opposto il noto precedente Prager Univ. c. Google del 2020.

2) Compulsion: <<Rep. Adam Schiff and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and an October 2020 House Resolution, which “have pressed Big Tech” into censoring political speech with threats of limiting Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) and other penalties.>>. Alquanto inverosimile (è però la più lungamente argometnata)

3) joint action: <<Joint action is present where the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). Further, a private defendant must be a “willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Joint action requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between private and public actors. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).>.

Per gli attori la joint action theory starebbe in un <<Twitter exchange between Rep. Schiff and YouTube CEO Susan Wojnicki in which Ms. Wojnicki states, “We appreciate your partnership and will continue to consult with Members of Congress as we address the evolving issues around #COVID19.” FAC, Ex. E at 1; Opp. at 10-15. Plaintiffs argue that this Twitter exchange shows Defendants and the federal government were in an “admitted partnership.”>>. Allegazione un pò leggerina.

4) Governmental nexus: ricorre quando c’è << “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-1005>>. (sembra assai simile alla prcedente).

Non avendo accolto alcuna di quesrta, non affronta il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, p. 12. Curioso l’rodine logico : il criterio della ragine più liquidqa avrebbe potuto a rigttare (nel merito) con tale norma.

(sentenza e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Twitter & co. non sono nè “place of public accomadation” nè “common carrier”

Joachim Martillo cita Twitter e altre cinque piattaforme di social media (non identificate in sentenza, se non erro) per avergli disabilitato o sospeso l’account a causa dei suoi post antisemiti.

La corte distrettuale del Massachusetts rigetta la domanda , che era basata su variae causae petendi.

In particolare, in base all’azionato Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (divieto di discriminazione nei places of public accomodation), la corte ritiene che i social non siano tali.

Analogo esito, poi, in base al divieto di discriminazione ex legge statale del Massachussetts sui common carriers: per la corte i social non sono tali . Diversi autori, però, propongono proprio tale qualifica, non è sempre chiaro se già de iure condito (tesi interessante anche di scarso successo prospettico ; cmq. da noi è forse eccezionale il dovere di contrarre del monopolista, che cmq si estenderebbe al dovere di non interrompere arbitrariametne il rapporto post stipula; qui si inserirebbe il divieto di discriminzione) o de iure condendo.

E in tale caso opererebbe comunque il safe harbout ex § 230 CDA: le decisioni di bloccaggio sono discrezionali e non sindacabili (non è chiara però la pertinenza di tale afermazione , se la domanda era basata sulla qualifica di common carrier: bisognerebbe vedere il petitum di causa)

Così l ‘order 15,.10.2021 Case 1:21-cv-11119-RGS .

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Corresponsabilità delle puiattaforme digitali per la strage di Orlando (Florida, USA) del 2016? No

Nella strage di Orlando USA del 2016 Omar Mateen uccise 49 persone e ne ferì 53 con un fucile semiautomatico, inneggiando all’ISIS.

Le vittime proposero domanda giudiziale contro Twitter Google e Facebook sia in base Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333(a) & (d)(2) (è respponsabile chi , by facilitating his access to radical jihadist and ISIS-sponsored content in the months and years leading up to the shooting) sia per legge statale, avendo cagionato negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.

La cit. legge ATA imposes civil liability on “any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed . . . an act of international terrorism,” provided that the “act of international terrorism” is “committed, planned, or authorized” by a designated “foreign terrorist organization.”

Nega ogni responsabilità in capo alle piattaforme (confermando la sentenza di primo grado della Florida) la corte d’appello dell’11° circuito 27.09.2021, No. 20-11283 , Colon ed altri c. Twitter-Facebook-Google.

La prima domanda è respinta sia perchè non si trattò di terrorismo internazionale (pur se reclamato dal’lISIS), come richiede la cit legge, sia perchè non fu una foreign terroristic organization a commetterlo (ma un c.d. lupo solitario).

Ma soprattutto è rigettata la seconda domanda (negligenza nel causare danni e decdessi) : gli attori non hanno superato la prova della proximate causation circa il ruolo delle puiattaforme, sub IV.A, p. 21 ss

La corte parla si del nesso di causalità ma in astratto e in base ai precedenti, senza applicarlo al ruolo delle piattaforme nella commissione di delitti.

La corte stranamente non menziona il safe harbour ex 230 CDA che avrebbe potuto essere invocato (cosa che quasi certanente le piattafirme avranno fatto)

(notizia e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)

La responsabilità degli internet provider per violazioni IP: quella della piattaforma Cloudfare è negata

Secondo i titolari di diritto di autore su vestiti da nozze l’avvalersi della piattaforma Cloudfare per vendere prodotti contraffatti fa sorgere anche responsabilità di questa.

Lo nega la corte del nord Californa Case 3:19-cv-01356-VC del 6 ottobre 2021, MON CHERI BRIDALS c. Cloudfare.

secondo gli attori, <Cloudflare contributes to the underlying copyright infringement by providing infringers with caching, content delivery, and security services.>
Ma il controibutory infringement ricorre solo se <it “(1) has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement>.

la corte osserva: <Simply providing services to a copyright infringer does not qualify as a “material contribution.” Id. at 797–98. Rather, liability in the internet context follows where a party “facilitate[s] access” to infringing websites in such a way that “significantly magnif[ies]” the underlying infringement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). A party can also materially contribute to copyright infringement by acting as “an essential step in the infringement process.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 943–44 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Visa International, 494 F.3d at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). >

Pertanto rigetta la domanda.

1 – Gli attori non hanno dato prova per cui una giuria possa dire <that Cloudflare’s performance-improvement services materially contribute to copyright infringement. The plaintiffs’ only evidence of the effects of these services is promotional material from Cloudflare’s website touting the benefits of its services. These general statements do not speak to the effects of Cloudflare on the direct infringement at issue here. For example, the plaintiffs have not offered any evidence that faster load times (assuming they were faster) would be likely to lead to significantly more infringement than would occur without Cloudflare. Without such evidence, no reasonable jury could find that Cloudflare “significantly magnif[ies]” the underlying infringement. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1172. Nor are Cloudflare’s services an “essential step in the infringement process.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, 658 F.3d at 944. If Cloudflare were to remove the infringing material from its cache, the copyrighted image would still be visible to the user; removing material from a cache without removing it from the hosting server would not prevent the direct infringement from occurring. >

La questione della specificità (v. parole in rosso) è importante -spesso decisiva- anche nel ns. ordinameto sul medesimo problema.

nè Clouddfare rende più difficile l’0individuazione della contraffazione: <Cloudflare’s security services also do not materially contribute to infringement. From the perspective of a user accessing the infringing websites, these services make no difference. Cloudflare’s security services do impact the ability of third parties to identify a website’s hosting provider and the IP address of the server on which it resides. If Cloudflare’s provision of these services made it more difficult for a third party to report incidents of infringement to the web host as part of an effort to get the underlying content taken down, perhaps it could be liable for contributory infringement. But here, the parties agree that Cloudflare informs complainants of the identity of the host in response to receiving a copyright complaint, in addition to forwarding the complaint along to the host provider>.

Stranamente non si menziona la preliminare di rito (o pregiudiziale di merito?) della carenza di azione ex saharbour § 230 CDA: pareva invocabile.

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

La proprietà intellettuale, cui non si applica il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, comprende pure il right of publicity

Una giornalista vede la propria immagine riprodotta illecitamente in Facebook e nel social Imgur, cui portava un link presente in Reddit.

Cita tute le piattaforme per violazione del right of publicity (r.o.f.) ma queste invocano il § 230 CDA.

Il quale però non si applica alla intellectual property (IP) (§ 230.e.2).

Per le piattaforme il right of publicity è altro dall ‘ IP e dunque il safe harbour può operre.

La pensa allo stesso modo il giudice di primo grado.

Per la corte di appello del 3° circuito, invece, vi rientra appieno: quindi il safe harbour non opera (sentenza Hepp c. Facebook, Reddit, Imgur e altri, N° 20–2725 & 2885, 23.09.2021)

I dizionari -legali e non- alla voce <intellectual property> indirettamente comprendono il r.o.f. (p. 18-19): spt. perchè vi includono i marchi, cui il r.o.f. va assimilato.

(sub D infine il collegio si premura di chiarire che non ci saranno conseguenze disastrose da questa presa di posizine, apparentemente contro la comunicazione in internet via piattaforme)

(testo e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)

Raccolta, a fini di successiva vendita, di informazioni personali altrui: right of publicity e safe harbour ex 230 CDA

La corte distrettuale del Nord California, 16.08.2021, 21–cv–01418–EMC , Cat Brooks e altri c. THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION (poi, TR), decide la lite iniziata dai primi per raccolta e sucessiva vendita a terzi di loro dati personali.

Il colosso dell’informazione TR , data broker, raccoglieva e vendeva informazioni altrui a imprese interessate (si tratta della piattaforma CLEAR).

Precisamente: Thomson Reuters “aggregates both public and non–public information about millions of people” to create “detailed cradle–to–grave dossiers on each person, including names, photographs, criminal history, relatives, associates, financial information, and employment information.” See Docket No. 1–1 (Compl.) ⁋ 2. Other than publicly available information on social networks, blogs, and even chat rooms, Thomson Reuters also pulls “information from third–party data brokers and law enforcement agencies that are not available to the general public, including live cell phone records, location data from billions of license plate detections, real–time booking information from thousands of facilities, and millions of historical arrest records and intake photos.”

1) Tra le vari causae petendi, considero il right of publicity.

La domanda è rigettata non tanto perchè non ricorra l’uso (come allegato da TR) , quanto perchè non ricorre l'<Appropriation of Plaintiffs’ Name or Likeness For A Commercial Advantage>: Although the publishing of Plaintiffs’ most private and intimate information for profit might be a gross invasion of their privacy, it is not a misappropriation of their name or likeness to advertise or promote a separate product or servic, p. 8.

2) safe harbour ex § 230 CDA, invocato da TR

Dei tre requisiti necessari (“(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a
publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content
provider.” ), TR non ha provato la ricorrenza del 2 e del 3.

Quanto al 2, la giurisprudenza insegna che <<a plaintiff seeks to treat an interactive computer service as a “publisher or speaker” under § 230(c)(1) only when it is asking that service to “review[], edit[], and decid[e] whether to publish or withdraw from publication third–party content.” Id. (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102). Here, Plaintiffs are not seeking to hold Thomson Reuters liable “as the publisher or speaker” because they are not asking it to monitor third–party content; they are asking to moderate its own conten>>

Quanto al requisito 3, l’informazione non è fornita da terzi ma da TR: the “information” at issue here—the dossiers with Plaintiffs’ personal information—is not “provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). In Roomates.com, the panel explained that § 230 was passed by Congress to “immunize[] providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties.” 521 F.3d at 1162 (emphasis added). The whole point was to allow those providers to “perform some editing on user–generated content without thereby becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they didn’t edit or delete. In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of user–generated content, not the creation of content.” Id. at 1163 (emphases added). Here, there is no user–generated content—Thomson Reuters generates all the dossiers with Plaintiffs’ personal information that is posted on the CLEAR platform. See Compl. ⁋⁋ 1–3. In other words, Thomson Reuter is the “information content provider” of the CLEAR dossiers because it is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of” those dossiers. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). It is nothing like the paradigm of an interactive computer service that permits posting of content by third parties.

Discriminazione nelle ricerche di alloggi via Facebook: manca la prova

Una domanda di accertamento di violazione del Fair Housing Act e altre leggi analoghe statali (carenza di esiti – o ingiustificata differenza di esiti rispetto ad altro soggetto di diversa etnia- dalle ricerche presuntivamente perchè eseguite da account di etnia c.d. Latina) è rigettata per carenza di prova.

Da noi si v. spt. il d. lgs. 9 luglio 2003 n. 216 e il d . lgs. di pari data n° 215 (autore di riferimento sul tema è il prof. Daniele Maffeis in moltri scritti tra cui questo).

Nel mondo anglosassone , soprattutto statunitense, c’è un’enormità di scritti sul tema: si v. ad es. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter-Janice Kopec & Mohamad Batal, Algorithms and Economic Justice: A Taxonomy of Harms and a Path Forward for the Federal Trade Commission, Yale Journal of Law & Technology

Il giudice così scrive:

<In sum, what the plaintiffs have alleged is that they each used Facebook to search for housing based on identified criteria and that no results were returned that met their criteria. They assume (but plead no facts to support) that no results were returned because unidentified advertisers theoretically used Facebook’s Targeting Ad tools to exclude them based on their protected class statuses from seeing paid Ads for housing that they assume (again ,with no facts alleged in support) were available and would have otherwise met their criteria. Plaintiffs’ claim that Facebook denied them access to unidentified Ads is the sort of generalized grievance that is insufficient to support standing. See, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to recognize a generalized grievance against allegedly illegal government conduct as sufficient to confer standing” and when “a government actor discriminates on the basis of race, the resulting injury ‘accords a basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment.’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).9 Having failed to plead facts supporting a plausible injury in fact sufficient to confer standing on any plaintiff, the TAC is DISMISSED with prejudice>.

Così il Northern District of California 20 agosto 2021, Case 3:19-cv-05081-WHO , Vargas c. Facebook .

Il quale poi dice che anche rigattando quanto sorpa, F. srebbe protetta dal safe harbour ex § 230 CDA e ciò nonostante il noto precedente Roommates del 2008, dal quale il caso sub iudice si differenzia:

<<Roommates is materially distinguishable from this case based on plaintiffs’ allegations in the TAC that the now–defunct Ad Targeting process was made available by Facebook for optional use by advertisers placing a host of different types of paid–advertisements.10 Unlike in Roommates where use of the discriminatory criteria was mandated, here use of the tools was neither mandated nor inherently discriminatory given the design of the tools for use by a wide variety of advertisers.

In Dyroff, the Ninth Circuit concluded that tools created by the website creator – there, “recommendations and notifications” the website sent to users based on the user’s inquiries that ultimately connected a drug dealer and a drug purchaser – did not turn the defendant who ontrolled the website into a content creator unshielded by CDA immunity. The panel confirmed that the tools were “meant to facilitate the communication and content of others. They are not content in and of themselves.” Dyroff, 934 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (where website “questionnaire facilitated the expression of information by individual users” including proposing sexually suggestive phrases that could facilitate the development of libelous profiles, but left “selection of the content [] exclusively to the user,” and defendant was not “responsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple choice responses with a set of physical characteristics, a group of essay answers, and a photograph,” website operator was not information content provider falling outside Section 230’s immunity); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (no liability based on Google’s use of “Keyword Tool,” that employs “an algorithm to suggest specific keywords to advertisers”).

Here, the Ad Tools are neutral. It is the users “that ultimately determine what content to post, such that the tool merely provides ‘a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes, . . . .’” Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1172 (analyzing Carafano). Therefore, even if the plaintiffs could allege facts supporting a plausible injury, their claims are barred by Section 230.>>

(notizia e link alla sentenza dal blog di Eric Goldman)