L’appello dell’ 11° circuito in Athos c. Youtube USCA 7 gennaio 2026, case: 23-13156, decide che ci sono gli estremi per rinoscere a Youtube-Google il safe harbour previsto dal DMCA (vedilo qui).
Il succo sta alle pp 27-29:
“We conclude with the alleged right and ability of YouTube
to control infringing material it purportedly derives a direct finan-
cial benefit from. Agreeing with the Second Circuit’s consideration
of an equivalent issue in Vimeo II, we hold that YouTube’s moder-
ation and content management features do not constitute a right
and ability to control for purposes of the DMCA. We therefore do
not address whether YouTube receives a direct financial benefit
from infringing material.
The right and ability to control “requires ‘something more’
than the mere ability to remove or block access to materials on [the
service provider’s] website.” Vimeo II, 125 F.4th at 423. The service
provider must exert “‘substantial influence’ on user activities” or
otherwise have “induced the infringing activity.” Id. at 423–24.
In Vimeo II, the Second Circuit explained that “[c]alling at-
tention to selected videos by giving them a sign of approval or dis-
playing them on a Staff Picks channel (or the contrary, by demoting
them) did not restrict the freedom of users to post whatever videos
they wished.” Id. at 425. It also concluded that, given the “huge
number of videos posted by users on Vimeo,” the plaintiffs there
had failed to show that Vimeo staff had intervened in more than a
“tiny percentage.” Id. In its view, “denial of eligibility for the safe
harbor based on such noncoercive exercises of control over only a
small percentage of postings would undermine, rather than carry
out, Congress’[ ] purposes in establishing the safe harbor.” Id. at
426.
We agree with the Second Circuit, and conclude that the
same reasoning applies here, where the record reflects only that
YouTube can remove material and users from its website, can pro-
mote and auto-play select videos algorithmically, and can set
policies for content moderation on the site. The record contains
no evidence that YouTube exercises control over any more sub-
stantial a portion of the YouTube website than did Vimeo in Vimeo
II.
None of the identified “noncoercive exercises of control” on
the part of YouTube amount to substantial influence over user ac-
tivity sufficient to establish it had the right and ability to control
any infringing material at issue in this case. See id. “To interpret
this provision as [Athos] argue[s]—to deny [YouTube] access to the
safe harbor merely because of the tiny influences it exercised—
would subject [YouTube] to a huge expense in monitoring millions
of posts to protect itself against the possibility of liability for in-
fringements.” Id. at 426–27. Athos’ approach would have us upset
the balance between copyright owners and service providers struck
by Congress in the DMCA. If that balance is to be recalibrated, it
is a matter for Congress”.
Non troppo diversa da noi la disciplina del nostro DSA europeo , art. 6 (a parte il requisito dell ‘tile economico, da noi assente)-