Interessante sentenza californiana sulla solita questione della libertà di parola (First Amendement) asseritamente violata da sospensione dell’account su social media (politicamente di destra) da parte di una state action.
Si tratta della corte distrettuale di S. Josè, Californa, 19 ottobre 2021, Case No. 20-cv-07502-BLF, Doe c. Google,.
Sono azionate quattro causae petendi, tutte rigettate visto che nessuna è applicabile alla censura/content moderation di Youtube:
1) Public function: curiosamente l’attore e la corte invocano in senso reciprocamente opposto il noto precedente Prager Univ. c. Google del 2020.
2) Compulsion: <<Rep. Adam Schiff and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and an October 2020 House Resolution, which “have pressed Big Tech” into censoring political speech with threats of limiting Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) and other penalties.>>. Alquanto inverosimile (è però la più lungamente argometnata)
3) joint action: <<Joint action is present where the government has “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. and Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)). Further, a private defendant must be a “willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). Joint action requires a “substantial degree of cooperative action” between private and public actors. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).>.
Per gli attori la joint action theory starebbe in un <<Twitter exchange between Rep. Schiff and YouTube CEO Susan Wojnicki in which Ms. Wojnicki states, “We appreciate your partnership and will continue to consult with Members of Congress as we address the evolving issues around #COVID19.” FAC, Ex. E at 1; Opp. at 10-15. Plaintiffs argue that this Twitter exchange shows Defendants and the federal government were in an “admitted partnership.”>>. Allegazione un pò leggerina.
4) Governmental nexus: ricorre quando c’è << “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-1005>>. (sembra assai simile alla prcedente).
Non avendo accolto alcuna di quesrta, non affronta il safe harbour ex 230 CDA, p. 12. Curioso l’rodine logico : il criterio della ragine più liquidqa avrebbe potuto a rigttare (nel merito) con tale norma.
(sentenza e link dal blog di Eric Goldman)